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 Abstract	  	  
 
Over the course of the last decade there has been an increasing emphasis on recipient-
country ownership, or the “effective exercise of a government’s authority over development 
policies and activities, including those that rely…on external resources” (OECD 2007), 
within the international development community. This new emphasis is not only rhetorical 
but has resulted in a host of new aid programs promising increased ownership. Broadly 
speaking, these aid programs are supposed to change the institutional relationships between 
donors and recipient-country governments and allow aid beneficiaries to have a say over the 
development policies that impact their daily lives. However, despite their prevalence, we 
know relatively little about how such aid programs affect donor-government relationships 
and the policy decision-making process in aid-dependent states.  
In the following dissertation project, I analyze four “ownership” aid programs in post-
genocide Rwanda: the poverty reduction strategy program; budget support; the aid 
coordination, harmonization, and alignment framework; and the Rwandan Joint Governance 
Assessment. In each case study, I look for evidence that the aid program has resulted in the 
outcomes predicted by their proponents: increased government and citizen influence, and 
decreased donor influence. Data largely come from fieldwork I conducted in Rwanda during 
2009 and 2010.  
My analysis suggests that key Rwandan government officials use the idea of 
ownership to seek influence over decision-making processes. However, the aforementioned 
aid programs have not resulted in the outcomes predicted by proponents of the ownership 
approach in two key ways. One, donors have not retreated nor given control over 
 development policy to recipient countries. Rather they have sought alternative ways of 
influencing the policy process. Two, what we see emerging in Rwanda is not broad national 
ownership. Instead, donors work with an elite group of government policymakers. I call this 
type of aid relationship “centralized collaboration,” meaning that multilateral and bilateral 
donors work with a small group of domestic actors to design and implement socio-economic 
development strategies.  
I conclude by arguing that this outcome is largely the result of three things: donor 
preferences, the amount of leverage the GoR is able to exert over donors, and existing state-
society relationships. These three factors provide a framework for assessing and analyzing 
donor-government relationships and ownership aid programs in other aid-dependent states.   
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Chapter	  1 	  Introduction	  
 
As has been widely acknowledged in developed and developing countries alike, the first 
generation approach to development assistance was essentially paternalistic and 
condescending in nature. This is because it was based on the philosophy that the provider of 
assistance possessed not only financial resources, but also the monopoly of wisdom, as well 
as the expertise required to transform the beneficiary...The new global consensus explicitly 
rejects this approach, primarily because development outcomes, as well as the philosophy 
that underpinned them have been found wanting. Instead of the 'giver knows all' paradigm, 
the new global consensus places at the centre of development assistance, policy ownership by 
the receiving country. 
 
-His Excellency Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda 
November 22nd, 2006  
 
In developing countries throughout the world, the presence of foreign assistance is 
ubiquitous. Emblems and flags of donors dot the landscape, often accompanied by signs 
proclaiming that the American people or the Swedish people or the Japanese (the list goes on 
and on) people paid for this well, school or hospital. In capital cities, there are enclaves of 
foreigners working for development agencies and myriad restaurants, hotels, and bars to 
service them. Governments complain about development agencies poaching their best staff, 
while residents worry about rising prices due to the influx of foreigners with money in their 
pockets.  
Foreign aid often brings a needed source of capital to developing countries, but, at the 
same time, it can disrupt the social, political, and economic fabric of everyday life. Over the 
past decade, there has been a worldwide push to give more control or “ownership” over such 
changes to those that are supposed to benefit from foreign aid. Instead of being passive 
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recipients of foreign assistance, recipient-country governments and their citizens are 
supposedly being given the opportunity to take charge of their own development. Instead of 
being forced to rely on foreigners to tell them what is best, developing countries are 
purportedly being given the opportunity to decide when and where those wells, hospitals, and 
schools will be built. 
The verdict is still out on whether or not new practices in foreign assistance over the 
past decade have actually fostered positive change, but a few things are clear. The hotels and 
bars catering to foreigners haven't closed down, and donor emblems still dot the landscape. 
So, what has changed?  
Findings from this dissertation suggest that what you see more and more often is 
government boardrooms filled with donor-staff working side-by-side with government staff. 
Instead of foreigners proclaiming their ideas for economic development from a lectern, they 
have moved inside the ministries and now sit alongside government officials drafting policy. 
The line between “donors” and “the state” is increasingly harder to draw. Is this the 
ownership Rwandan President Kagame seeks in his vision of the new development assistance 
paradigm? Perhaps not.  
1.1.	  	   Summary	  of	  the	  Project	  
Historically, donors have sought to impose development from the outside. Under the 
“donorship” approach, donors used conditionalities and monetary incentives to pressure 
recipient countries to make “necessary” donor-identified reforms; or they funded stand-alone, 
donor-driven aid projects. Both means of disbursing aid are now thought to lead to 
unsustainable development strategies that are out of touch with the actual needs of people 
and communities within a particular country. Instead, “ownership” or the “effective exercise 
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of a government’s authority over development policies and activities, including those that 
rely – entirely or partially – on external resources” (OECD 2007) has become the new silver 
bullet of international development assistance.  
Under this new ownership approach, control is thought to shift to the recipient 
country. Instead of donors calling the shots, recipient countries are supposed to dictate the 
terms of their own development through an inclusive process involving multiple domestic 
actors. This is supposed to alter existing donor-government relationships and allow aid 
beneficiaries to have a say over the development policies and practices that impact their daily 
lives. But, does ownership actually allow recipient countries to call the shots?  
In this dissertation, I analyze “ownership” aid programs in post-genocide Rwanda.3 In 
each case study, I am looking for evidence that the ownership aid program has achieved the 
outcomes predicted by their proponents: increased government and citizen influence, and 
decreased donor influence. That is, I am looking for evidence that ownership aid programs 
have resulted in a policy decision-making process that is guided by a wide-array of domestic 
actors, not by donors. 
In this introductory chapter, I provide a synopsis of the dissertation presented in the 
following chapters. In the forthcoming section, I provide a brief overview of my research 
design and summarize my findings. Then, in the subsequent section, I outline the 
forthcoming chapters and explain the significance of the project. 
                                                
3 An aid program is “a time bound intervention involving multiple activities that may cut across sectors, themes 
and/or geographic areas” (Denmark, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011). See Chapter Three for more details.  
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Research	  design	  
In this dissertation, I analyze four “ownership” aid programs in post-genocide and 
civil war Rwanda. Members of the Government of Rwanda (GoR) leadership frequently (and 
often aggressively) push for more ownership in Rwanda. The GoR’s emphasis on ownership, 
combined with the eagerness of donors to support the current regime, has spurred several 
new aid programs intended to foster ownership. If ownership is feasible, it ought to be 
feasible in Rwanda. 
In my case studies, I analyze the following aid programs: Rwanda’s poverty reduction 
strategy and budget support; the aid coordination, harmonization, and alignment framework 
(ACHA); and the Rwandan Joint Governance Assessment (JGA). For the purposes of this 
study, Rwanda’s experience with the poverty reduction strategy program and budget support 
constitutes a single case study, as the two aid programs are so interlinked.  
Poverty reduction strategies are “nationally owned” development strategies drafted by 
national governments. Budget support entails a direct transfer of funds into the national 
treasury. Collectively, the two aid programs purportedly increase ownership by allowing 
recipient-country governments to outline their own plans for development and then fund such 
plans using aid deposited into their treasuries. Rwanda finalized an interim poverty reduction 
strategy in November 2000, and the push for budget support began shortly thereafter.  
The ACHA framework is a multifaceted attempt by donors and the government to 
coordinate and harmonize aid in Rwanda through a series of working groups, donor-
government forums, and policies regarding aid practices in Rwanda. The ACHA framework 
purportedly increases coordination, harmonization, and alignment, allowing donors and the 
GoR to work together more effectively on government-driven initiatives. Meetings between 
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donors and the GoR resumed immediately following the 1994 genocide and moved to 
Rwandan soil in 2000; however, the ACHA framework did not really take off until 2002. 
The JGA is a collaborative effort between donors and the GoR to establish a common 
framework for assessing and improving governance in Rwanda. By allowing the GoR to have 
a say over governance indicators, the JGA purportedly establishes a partnership between the 
GoR and donors regarding governance. The JGA is much newer than the other aid programs 
analyzed in this dissertation. While the idea was first put forth in 2005, the first report was 
not published until 2007. Additionally, while poverty reduction strategies, budget support, 
and aid coordination mechanisms have been established in other aid-dependent states, the 
JGA is unique to Rwanda.  
The new emphasis on ownership presumes that more government participation will 
lead to more recipient-country government influence, decrease the influence of donors over 
development policy, and increase the influence of citizens over policy decision-making. 
Therefore, in each case study, I look for evidence that the introduction of the aid program(s) 
has: (1) increased the influence of the recipient-country government, (2) decreased donor 
influence over policy-decision making, and (3) increased the influence of Rwandan citizens.  
Throughout the dissertation, I make an important distinction between participation 
and influence. That is, it is not enough that governments are more involved in the policy 
process, there has to be evidence that they have more influence over the policy process. 
Similarly, it is not enough for citizens to merely participate more; there must be evidence that 
citizens have more influence over the policy decision-making process. I also pay close 
attention to changes in both the degree of donor influence (i.e. how much?) and the type of 
donor influence (i.e. what kind?).  
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To build my case studies I use a process-tracing methodology. Instead of relying on 
covariation between units, process tracing connects the dots over time to establish a causal 
narrative, paying particular attention to causal mechanisms. Validity is increased when we 
find similar trends across the aid programs and rule out alternative explanations using sound 
evidence.  
Most of the data for my dissertation come from in-country fieldwork that I completed 
in 2009 and 2010. While in the field, I conducted forty-seven interviews with donor, 
embassy, and NGO staff, Rwandan government officials, and independent consultants (see 
Appendix 1, pg. 177). Additionally, I observed relevant meetings and conferences whenever 
permitted. To supplement fieldwork, I also conducted substantial textual analysis on 
pertinent documents produced by the GoR and donors (see Appendix 2, pg. 179). 
Findings	  
My case studies of ownership aid programs in Rwanda suggest that government 
policymakers actively seek to influence decision-making processes. However, the 
aforementioned aid programs have not resulted in the outcomes predicted by proponents of 
the ownership approach in two key ways. One, donors have neither retreated nor given 
control over development to recipient countries. They are simply influencing the policy 
process in different ways. Two, what we see emerging in Rwanda is not broad national 
ownership. Instead, donors work with an elite group of government policymakers. I call this 
type of aid relationship “centralized collaboration,” meaning that multilateral and bilateral 
donors work with a small group of domestic actors to design and implement socio-economic 
development strategies.  
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, donors have been unwilling to relinquish their authority. 
Instead, the Government of Rwanda has become like a co-pilot to donors—sometimes 
allowed to take the wheel, but still very much dependent on aid contributions and bound by 
the parameters set up by donors. Instead of fostering a more inclusive political space, these 
new aid programs perpetuate a highly centralized state. Rather than increasing domestic 
participation, the aid modalities I examined allow political authority to remain centralized 
with the executive.  
Instead of pressuring from the outside, my case studies suggest that donors now 
increasingly exert influence from the inside. Donors, particularly those who advocate for 
more recipient-country ownership, increasingly appear to engage with the state. Instead of 
working against it, they work with it and through it. As a result, the relationship between 
donors and the GoR is less hierarchical and less outwardly antagonistic. However, donors to 
Rwanda are certainly not subservient to the government. Instead of relinquishing authority, 
donors merely shifted their role to one that that is less visible and more technical. This 
qualitative change was most apparent among those donors, like the United Kingdom, that 
emphasize ownership as a matter of their own internal policy.  
At the same time, my cases studies also suggest that, rather than opening the 
Rwandan political space, the new emphasis on ownership has further centralized authority 
into the hands of a select group of domestic actors. Although the emphasis on ownership has 
not led donors to abandon their influence over the policy process completely, it has given the 
GoR an opening. Ownership aid programs have integrated top GoR officials into policy 
decision-making processes, but they have excluded other domestic actors. Domestic 
stakeholders, such as civil society groups, have recently been invited to sit at the table. 
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However, my case studies suggest that their involvement is typically only symbolic or a way 
of informing such actors to the policy agenda already decided by the executive branch. 
1.2.	  	   Chapter	  Outline	  
This dissertation is composed of eight chapters, including this introduction. Chapters 
four through seven comprise the major analytical portion of the dissertation, with chapters 
five through seven presenting the case studies. Chapter eight concludes by summarizing my 
empirical findings, outlining the implications of these findings, and discussing their broader 
applicability. 
In chapter two, I present the theoretical underpinnings of this project. This chapter 
documents prominent critiques of foreign aid and explains why “ownership” is thought to be 
a solution to these critiques. The chapter’s purpose is to provide the reader with a better sense 
of where the new emphasis on recipient-country ownership comes from, what problems it 
seeks to address, and the challenges facing this new approach to international development. 
In chapter three, I explain my method and research design in greater detail. I 
summarize my independent and dependent variables and explain the method I used to 
analyze my cases, process tracing. I also justify my case selection and summarize my three 
case studies. Lastly, I explain my data sources and the fieldwork I conducted in Rwanda for 
this dissertation project.  
In chapter four, I outline the contemporary history of development in Rwanda and 
examine the major donors currently providing development aid to Rwanda. In order to 
understand contemporary development schemes and practices, it is important for the reader 
to have a basic understanding of the Rwandan context. Additionally, how ownership plays 
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out in a particular country is likely to be affected by both the country context and who the 
country’s donors are.  
In chapter five, I focus on the aid programs most associated with the ownership 
approach: poverty reduction strategies and budget support. I conclude that, in Rwanda, 
neither has led to a retreat of the donor. Donors simply seek to influence policy decision-
making in alternative ways. In fact, in Rwanda, budget support donors appear to actually 
have more influence – not less – than non-budget support donors. Additionally, far from 
opening the political process to citizen input and criticism, introducing these two aid 
modalities has allowed the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MINECOFIN)4 
to dominate domestic development policy processes.  
In chapter six, I present the findings from my case study on the aid coordination, 
harmonization, and alignment (ACHA) framework. While the ACHA framework has 
increased coordination, harmonization, and alignment (at least to some degree), it has not 
decreased donor influence. Donors that readily support the ACHA framework have merely 
become more integrated into state structures; while other donors have largely continued 
business as usual. In either case, bilateral negotiations still take precedence, and donors are 
still clearly influential. At the same time, the ACHA framework has largely excluded civil 
society, centralizing influence with donors and a select group of domestic actors.  
In chapter seven, I present the findings from my case study on the Rwandan Joint 
Governance Assessment (JGA). I find that the JGA has allowed the GoR a larger platform 
for their governance agenda, and that donors often remain at the periphery of governance 
debates. This comes at a cost to other domestic actors. Civil society groups, local 
                                                
4 From here on out, I refer to the Rwandan Ministry of Finance and Economic Development by its French 
acronym, MINECOFIN or simply as the ministry of finance.  
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governments, and even parliament are periphery of debates of consequence regarding 
governance in Rwanda. The JGA has not changed this. Instead, the aid program has (thus far) 
assisted in keeping governance debates on governance centralized at the national level.  
In the concluding chapter, I summarize the core findings of the empirical research 
presented in chapters four through seven. I suggest that the ownership approach has altered 
the institutional relationship between donors and the GoR, but not in the ways predicted. 
Instead of decreasing donor influence, the ownership approach has merely made influence 
less transparent. Additionally, instead of increasing citizen influence, the new emphasis on 
ownership permits the executive branch of the GoR to monopolize domestic authority.  
I conclude by arguing that this outcome is largely the result of three things: donor 
preferences, the amount of leverage the GoR is able to exert over donors, and existing state-
society relationships. These three factors provide a framework for assessing and analyzing 
donor-government relationships and ownership aid programs in other aid-dependent states 
and suggest several policy implications for development practitioners.  
1.3.	  	   Significance	  of	  the	  Project	  
This dissertation is part of a growing body of literature that is concerned less with the 
quantitative amount of foreign aid, and more with the quality of foreign aid. As frustration 
with foreign aid continues to grow, many scholars and practitioners are recognizing that how 
aid is disbursed is central to its impact, and concluding that the answer is not just more aid 
but better aid. The new emphasis on recipient-country ownership proposes to transform the 
relationship between government policymakers and donors and, as a result, make aid more 
effective. However, its actual impact in recipient countries is still largely unknown.  
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My dissertation is both an empirical examination of the impact of ownership aid 
programs in one recipient country, and an opportunity to build theory on donor-government 
relationships more broadly. Despite the fact that we know that donor-government 
relationships impact the quality of foreign aid (Pomerantz 2004), we know very little about 
the factors that shape the relationship between donors and recipient countries, and how 
variations in this relationship change the way foreign aid is distributed. My dissertation 
narrows in on the relationship between donors and government policymakers. Only by 
understanding this relationship and its policy implications, can we begin to improve the 
effectiveness of foreign assistance.  
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Chapter	  2 	  The	  Problem	  with	  Ownership	  	  
 
Historically, foreign aid has served a variety of diplomatic, development, and 
commercial functions (Lancaster 2007), but the major benchmark for aid effectiveness has 
typically been economic growth. However, isolating the relationship between aid and growth 
has been anything but straightforward. At a simplistic level, there appears to be no direct 
relationship between foreign aid and growth. Some countries that have received huge 
influxes of foreign aid, such as Botswana, Indonesia, and Korea, have experienced rapid 
economic growth, but others, such as Haiti, Papua New Guinea, Somalia, and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, have experienced spiraling poverty (Radelet 2006). Growth has been 
particularly slow in Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite the fact that more than $500 billion dollars 
(the equivalent of four Marshall Aid Plans) was dispersed in Africa from 1960-1997, per 
capita GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa actually declined throughout much of this period 
(Ayodele et al. 2005). 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with a better sense of where the 
new emphasis on recipient-country ownership comes from, what problems it seeks to 
address, and the challenges facing this new approach to international development. I begin by 
outlining the tenuous relationship between foreign aid and growth, noting divergent schools 
of thought on the subject. I then argue that in order to fully understand the relationship 
between aid and growth we have to open the black box of aid, exposing the multiple links in 
the causal chain connecting aid to county outcomes.  
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In this dissertation project, I focus on the link between donors and policymakers in 
recipient countries. Although relatively little is known about this link, principal-agent theory 
suggests that it will be fraught with moral hazard and adverse selection problems. The link 
between donors and recipient-countries is further challenged by a broken feedback loop, 
which makes it difficult for beneficiaries to express discontent when an aid policy is not 
working.  
The new emphasis on recipient country ownership attempts to correct for this broken 
feedback loop by encouraging country-level policy decision-making. Instead of aid policy 
being determined in boardrooms in Washington, DC and Brussels, aid policy is supposed to 
be decided in recipient-countries. Proponents of ownership argue that by increasing the 
participation and influence of recipient-country governments, donor influence will decrease 
and citizen influence will increase. However, these predictions are based on several highly 
problematic assumptions.  
The chapter is composed of five major sections. I begin by reviewing the literature on 
aid and growth and the various policy responses to widespread pessimism regarding the 
ability of foreign aid to promote economic and social development. I then make a case for 
opening up the black box of foreign assistance and focusing on the relationship between 
donors and policymakers. I summarize principal-agent theory and the challenges facing 
foreign aid and explain what the new, global emphasis on ownership is predicted to change 
about the way aid is delivered. I conclude by arguing that the new emphasis on ownership is 
based on three faulty assumptions: (1) greater participation does not mean greater influence; 
(2) donors are unlikely to relinquish their influence; and (3) government influence doesn’t 
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equal national influence. These problematic assumptions make it unlikely that the ownership 
approach will actually result in the predicted outcomes.  
2.1.	   Aid,	  Growth,	  and	  Development	  	  
In this section, I outline divergent opinions on the relationship between aid and 
growth. When I use the term “foreign aid,” I am primarily referring to what some call 
“development aid” or “development assistance.” Alternative forms of aid, such as debt relief 
and humanitarian aid, comprise a significant part of aid totals, but they are not central to the 
research questions of this dissertation. Foreign aid totals are typically captured by official 
development assistance (ODA) figures recorded by the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), which define ODA as: 
Flows of official financing administered with the promotion of the economic 
development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective, and 
which are concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 percent 
(using a fixed 10 percent rate of discount). By convention, ODA flows 
comprise contributions of donor government agencies, at all levels, to 
developing countries (“bilateral ODA”) and to multilateral institutions. 
Lending by export credit agencies—with the pure purpose of export 
promotion—is excluded (OECD 2003).  
 
ODA totals exclude certain types of development assistance, such as remittances, foreign 
direct investments, or aid from private donations.5 Furthermore, ODA from countries such as 
China, who choose not to submit their aid totals to the OECD, is not captured in ODA totals. 
Scholarly	  views	  on	  aid	  and	  growth	  	  
Over the course of the last thirty years, three broad views on the relationship between 
aid and growth have emerged in the scholarly literature on foreign aid.6 Divergent opinions 
                                                
5 These are not insignificant sources of funding. The Center for Global Prosperity at the Hudson Institute reports 
that, in 2007, philanthropic flows equaled $49 billion, remittances $145 billion, and private investment $345 
billion. In comparison, official flows equaled $107 billion (Center for Global Prosperity 2009, 18). 
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are often based on disputes over methods and data, which continue to rage despite new 
econometric techniques and better (although still very limited) data.  
First, on average, aid has a positive relationship with growth (see, for example, 
Hansen and Tarp 2000; 2001; Lensink and White 2001; Sachs et al. 2004). That is, while aid 
has not worked in every country, on average and controlling for other factors (such as 
geography, political conflict, policies, and institutions), aid has contributed to growth. 
Scholars in this camp argue that, after controlling for certain variables and diminishing 
returns, a positive relationship between aid and growth emerges. However, they concede that 
there is significant variation around the trend line.  
Second, aid has no effect on growth and may actually undermine development and 
growth (see, for example, Mosley 1980; Mosley, Hudson, and Horrell 1987; Rajan and 
Subramanian 2008). Scholars in this camp point to the potential for aid to undermine private 
sector investment incentives and productivity, to reduce domestic savings, and to cause 
currency to appreciate and undermine the profitability of tradable goods (“Dutch Disease”). 
While these studies have been highly influential, few studies have reached this conclusion in 
the past decade. Additionally, many of these studies only examine aggregate aid, which rules 
out the (likely) possibility that different types of aid have different types of effects on growth 
(Radelet 2006). 
Third, aid has a conditional relationship with growth. That is, aid promotes growth 
under certain circumstances or conditions. Conditions argued to be important include 
recipient-country characteristics (e.g., domestic policy, type of government, and warfare); 
donor practices (e.g., aid fads, special interests, and political motivations); and type of aid 
                                                                                                                                                  
6 This literature review draws heavily from Radelet (2006). 
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(e.g., conditional, untied, and multilateral). The most vibrant debate in this camp centers 
around Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) claim that aid produces better outcomes in countries 
with good policy and, therefore, by extension should be targeted to countries with good 
policy.7 While conventional wisdom says that better policies lead to more effective aid, 
several recent papers have called this assumption in to question (see, for example, Collier and 
Dollar 2002; Hudson and Mosley 2001; Hansen and Tarp 2001, 2000; Easterly, Levine, and 
Roodman 2004).  
Policy	  actions	  on	  aid	  
These three scholarly perspectives map on to three, divergent policy tactics: stop aid; 
increase aid; and make aid more effective. Citing evidence that aid has not produced 
aggregate economic growth, the “aid pessimists” (Wright and Winters 2011) argue that 
donors and recipient states should abandon foreign aid altogether. This perspective has 
gained traction due to Moyo’s (2009) popular book, Dead Aid. However, given that both 
donors and recipients remain deeply invested in the current aid structure, abandoning aid 
altogether is unlikely to happen anytime soon.  
According to the “aid optimists” (Wright and Winters 2011), the solution is to 
increase aggregate aid flows. As part of its push to reach the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) by 2015, the UN is once again urging developed countries to contribute at least .7% 
of their GNP to ODA,8 and, at the G8 summit in Gleneagles in 2005, rich countries pledged 
to dramatically increase their contributions to development assistance from $80 billion in 
                                                
7 This is exactly what the new US Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) does (for more details, see 
http://www.mcc.gov/).  
8 This target, first pledged in a 1970 General Assembly Resolution, was reaffirmed twice in 2002 at the 
International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico and at the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa.  
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2005 to $130 billion in 2010 (OECD 2009c). As a means of channeling this new funding, a 
host of new initiatives, such as Tony Blair’s Commission for Africa, George W. Bush’s 
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC), have sprung up; each promising billions more in aid.  
For those who believe that aid has a conditional effect on growth, the solution is to 
increase the effectiveness of aid. That is, instead of (a) abandoning aid or (b) increasing it, the 
focus should be on improving the quality of the aid already being distributed. This is the 
most dominant school, as it requires neither a blind faith in aid, nor a willingness to abandon 
aid all together. Scholars and practitioners in this school advocate for evidence-based 
research on specific aid practices in order to decipher what works and what does not. As part 
of the effectiveness agenda, a host of edited volumes and policy papers (often based on 
country case studies) have emerged that draw on the lessons of ineffective aid to produce 
policy recommendations on how to “reform,” “improve” or make aid “smarter” (see, for 
example, Devarajan, Dollar, and Holmgren 2001; Joseph and Gillies 2009; Carlsson, 
Somolekae, and van de Walle 1997; van de Walle and Johnston 1996). 
2.2.	   Opening	  the	  “Black	  Box”	  
While improving the effectiveness of aid is an important goal, figuring out how to do 
so has been quite challenging. Much of the research on foreign aid runs into the same 
problem over and over again. After disbursement, aid travels through a complex causal chain, 
making it extremely difficult to isolate aid’s impact on particular country outcomes. 
Controlling for the numerous variables that likely impact foreign aid (not to mention 
problems of endogeneity) is all but impossible. Consequently, isolating the relationship 
between aid and growth (or lack of growth) is incredibly difficult. 
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Given this reality, senior World Bank economists François Bourguignon and Mark 
Sundberg argue in a 2007 article in The American Economic Review that to improve aid 
effectiveness we must open up the “black box” of aid. That is, instead of blindly trying to 
link donor inputs to development outcomes, we need to examine the causality chain behind 
aid. Bourguignon and Sundberg identify three types of links inside the black box: donors to 
policymakers, policymakers to policies, and policies to outcome. Figure 2.1 below depicts an 
adoption of the causality chain Bourguignon and Sundberg layout in their article. 
Figure	  2.1:	  Opening	  the	  Black	  Box	  
  
Source:	  Adopted	  from	  Bourguignon	  and	  Sundberg	  (2007:	  312)	  
 
By “policies to outcomes” (arrow 3), Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007) refer to 
knowledge at the micro or project level. For example, how does the tax structure or trade 
policy of a state affect growth and/or poverty? Do micro-finance programs contribute to 
poverty reduction? Research in this area is an essential part of understanding the relationship 
between aid and growth and is a growing part of the development literature, especially in 
light of the new advances in impact evaluations based on experimental or quasi-experimental 
designs (see, for example, Banerjee and Duflo 2011; Karlan and Appel 2011).  
“Policymakers to policy” (arrow 2) refers to the link between systems of governance 
and policy choices. For example, do democratic systems lead to better economic policy? As 
Bourguignon and Sundberg point out, in practice, most research bypasses policy choices, 
Donors 1 Policy-makers 2 Policies 3 
Country 
Outcome 
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instead pointing to the importance of governance on outcomes (for example, Svensson 1999; 
Boone 1996). Consequently, our understanding of this link is limited.  
The last link, “donors to policymakers” (arrow 1), refers to the relationship between 
donors and domestic policymakers (typically government officials). As Bourguignon and 
Sundberg point out, this link is largely built on a body of circumstantial evidence stemming 
from years of failed aid efforts. In other words, we know more about what does not work 
than what actually works.  
This dissertation narrows in on the link between donors and policymakers. Not only is 
this the link that we know the least about, but it is also the beginning of the causality chain. 
Consequently, its impact will be felt all the way down the line. As Pomerantz (2004) notes, 
the quality of the relationship between donors and domestic policymakers is likely more 
influential on policy directions and development outcomes than aid money itself. If aid is not 
distributed in a way that is conducive to good policymaking and good policies then it is 
unlikely to result in the desired country outcomes.  
2.3.	   Relationship	  between	  Donors	  and	  Policymakers	  	  
The little that we do know about the link between donors and policymakers is 
usefully summarized using principal-agent theory, also known as agency theory. Principal-
agent theory, a subset of institutional economics, is a set of assumptions and rules that are 
thought to underlie all modern organizations, including organizations designed to distribute 
foreign aid. This theory provides insight in to why the link between donors and policymakers 
is often fraught with challenges. 
By donors, I mean both bilateral donors (e.g., the United States and Sweden) and 
multilateral donors (e.g., international finance intuitions (IFIs) like the World Bank and 
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international organizations like the United Nations). Consistent with my working definition 
of foreign aid, I exclude donors that only distribute private donations (for example, the 
Clinton or Gates Foundations).  
By policymakers, I mean the key domestic decision makers. Who the key 
policymakers are can vary from context to context. However, they generally hold positions of 
authority (either by election or by force) in the domestic government.  
Principal-­‐agent	  theory	  
Principal-agent theory begins with the observation that modern organizations are 
often hierarchically structured. In other words, they are made up of both principals and 
agents, with principals giving instructions to agents. Because principals cannot make all 
decisions and carry out all tasks by themselves, they delegate some of the work to agents. In 
doing so, they cede full control of information and activities. This results in two types of 
problems.  
First, agents may choose to ignore the principal’s instructions, instead carrying out 
tasks in a way that benefits their own interests. This is called the problem of moral hazard. 
In the case of foreign aid, a moral hazard problem arises when foreign aid is redirected 
towards non-desirable purposes. For example, a recipient-country government is often given 
foreign aid for the purposes of poverty alleviation. However, instead of allocating aid to the 
poor, it is sometimes used to support undesirable military operations or deposited into 
personal bank accounts.  
Second, given that agents may have access to information that principals do not, they 
might manipulate information in ways that run contrary to the principal’s interests. This is 
called the problem of adverse selection. In the case of foreign aid, an adverse selection 
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problem arises when need is inflated for personal gain. For example, if the local leaders who 
are responsible for allocating food aid artificially inflate the number of persons requiring 
assistance, there will be a surplus. Leaders are then able to use the surplus for their own gain, 
accumulating more for their own families or selling it on the black market for a profit.  
Both moral hazard and adverse selection are inherent problems when tasks are 
delegated. Therefore, they are, to some degree, unavoidable in all modern, hierarchical 
organizations—including aid agencies. Consequently, it is important for development 
agencies to design institutions that mitigate the risk of moral hazard and adverse selection 
whenever possible.  
The	  broken	  information	  feedback	  loop	  	  
The problems of moral hazard and adverse selection are common in all modern 
organizations and have been explored in detail in agency theory. However, as Martens 
explains below, an exceptional problem of foreign aid is a broken information feedback loop:  
…a unique and most striking characteristic of foreign aid is that the people for 
whose benefit aid agencies work are not the same as those from whom their 
revenues are obtained; they actually live in different countries and different 
political constituencies. This geographical and political separation between 
beneficiaries and taxpayers block the normal performance feedback process: 
beneficiaries may be able to observe performance but cannot modulate 
payments (rewards to the agents) as a function of performance (Martens 2002, 
14).  
 
Domestic redistribution programs, such as Medicare, face a number of principal-agent 
problems. However, contrary to foreign aid programs, taxpayers and beneficiaries are the 
same people. Consequently, they have information about success and failure and can reward 
accordingly. On the other hand, dissatisfied foreign aid beneficiaries have no way to express 
discontent to the taxpayers who are footing the aid bill, if foreign assistance is not meeting 
their needs. The result is a broken feedback loop.  
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This broken feedback loop is exacerbated by the complex chain of principals and 
agents involved in aid distribution. The complex chain of principals and agents weakens 
information flows, introduces a myriad of motivations, and makes monitoring and 
accountability difficult (Radelet 2006). Donors themselves are complex organizations, made 
up of the taxpayers that fund them, the politicians that allocate taxpayers’ money, donor 
agencies, and contractors. On the recipient side, a similarly complex relationship exists 
between recipient-country governments, NGOs (who receive and distribute aid), and the 
intended beneficiaries of aid. These multiple principal-agent relationships exacerbate the 
problems inherent in hierarchical modern organizations.    
Conditionality	  
One proposed solution to the challenges identified by principal-agent theory is 
conditionality. Conditionality is most often identified with structural adjustment loans. 
However, all donors use conditionality to some degree. The rationale for conditionality is at 
least partially based on principal-agent theory. The idea is that if donors tie aid to certain 
policy conditions or actions that are seen as necessary for growth, adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems will be mitigated. However, conditionality faces several challenges, 
and the practice has faced intense criticism since the early 1990s.  
 First, it is often unclear what policies are the most appropriate (and in what context). 
Therefore, when selecting conditions, donors may elect to include conditions that are 
unhelpful or even damaging. This challenge is exacerbated by a broken feedback loop 
because beneficiaries have few mechanisms at their disposal to express dissatisfaction. 
Second, aid is often highly political, and the conditions attached to aid may serve donors 
more than recipients. For example, some donors “tie” aid or require the recipient-country to 
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spend aid money in the country that grants the aid. For example, the United States requires 
the majority of food aid to be produced and packaged in the US, even though higher food 
prices and added shipping costs means that less food per dollar is delivered to the recipient 
country. Third, the logic behind conditionality itself might be quite problematic. As Streeten 
succinctly puts it, “Why would a donor pay a recipient to do something that is anyway in his 
own interest? And if it is not in his interest, why would the recipient do it anyways?” 
(Streeten 1988, as quoted in Martens 2002, 9).  
Explanations for why conditionality has not produced better outcomes vary as widely 
as the explanations for foreign aid’s failure overall,9 and research on the topic has also found 
it difficult to isolate the impact of conditionality, given the multiple intervening variables. As 
Radelet (2006) notes, conditionality has mirrored thinking about development, consequently 
the types of conditions required by donors have historically varied.10 Therefore, it is possible 
that the problem is not conditionality but the type of development policy pursued.   
2.4.	   From	  Donorship	  to	  Ownership	  
Despite little hard evidence explaining why conditionality does not seem to work, 
there is a growing consensus that (overt) conditionality has failed (Collier 1997) and that a 
new approach is needed. The narrative that has emerged to explain conditionality’s “failure” 
is that conditionality does not produce the desired outcomes because it relies on top-down 
                                                
9 For example, Dollar and Svensson (2000) argue that SALs succeed or fail based on domestic political-
economy forces. Alternative, Collier et al. (1997) argues that contemporary uses of conditionality have failed, 
because they focus on “inducements.” This results in a piece meal approach to reform and crowds out other uses 
of conditionality. 
10 A state-led approach dominated in the 1950s and 1960s, while a basic human needs approach took over in the 
1970s. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the focus became open markets, shifting in the mid-1990s to intuitions. 
Currently, the debate centers around whether or not aid should be conditional on good policy and democratic 
reform (Radelet 2006). 
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pressure from donors to act in externally prescribed ways. Instead of being decided on by 
beneficiaries, policy is being dictated by donors. This narrative is clearly apparent in a 2009 
Oxfam report, which argues that: 
50 years of foreign aid have proven that even when they understand how 
development happened, donors cannot reduce poverty by themselves. When 
donors impose solutions, the solutions are often wrong from the context. Even 
when development solutions are right, they are rarely implemented properly. 
That is history’s lesson. (Oxfam 2009, 4). 
  
Out of this narrative has emerged an approach to development that emphasizes local 
ownership. As Wood notes, after the Cold War “a consensus emerged that aid would be most 
effective if donors forged better partnerships with recipient governments, and if those 
governments in turn had greater ‘ownership’ of policies” (2005, 394). The following section 
examines the concept of ownership and its promises in greater depth.    
Aid	  effectiveness	  and	  the	  Paris	  Agenda	  
 Ownership is the cornerstone of a global policy agenda that was solidified in a series 
of international declarations on aid effectiveness in the early 2000s. The most notable of 
these declarations is the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The Paris Declaration 
puts forth an agenda for increasing aid effectiveness known as the Paris Agenda or the Paris 
Consensus and was signed by more than 140 developed and developing countries and 
international organizations.  
The Paris Agenda puts forth a set of principals (known as the “Paris Principals”) that 
are seen as instrumental to improved aid effectiveness (see figure 2.2). At the heart of the 
Paris Agenda is ownership (Hayman 2006). While principals such as alignment and 
harmonization are advocated for on their own merits, they are most often tied to the need for 
ownership. As figure 2.2 suggests, both harmonization and alignment are seen as improving 
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ownership by ensuring that donors coalesce around an agenda set by “partners,” i.e. 
recipient-country governments.  
Figure	  2.2:	  Partnership	  for	  Great	  Aid	  Effectiveness11	  
Source:	  OECD	  (2005a,	  18)	  
 
Since its pronouncement in 2005, the Paris Declaration has resulted in a multitude of 
working groups and subsequent meetings (both between high-level dignitaries and regional 
and local working groups). In 2008, the third high-level forum on aid effectiveness took 
place in Accra, Ghana. The forum resulted in the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), which 
follows up on the agenda outlined in Paris.12 The Paris Declaration also led to the so-called 
“Paris Survey,” an annual evaluation rubric that rates recipient countries and donors on the 
principals outlined in the declaration.  
                                                
11 A fifth principal, mutual accountability, would later be added to the four principals depicted in the figure. 
12 The fourth high-level forum on aid effectiveness will take place in Busan, South Korea from November 29th 
to December 1st, 2011. 
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The new emphasis on recipient-country ownership is more than just clever wording 
for development practitioners. Theoretically, ownership is now seen as essential to improving 
aid effectiveness.13 Suggesting that the Paris Agenda is rooted in a broad base of evidence, 
one development practitioner summarizes the predictions of the ownership approach in this 
way, "Aid delivered in the spirit of Paris at the very least shifts the balance of probabilities” 
(Armon 2007, 653).  
What	  is	  ownership?	  
Although the concept of ownership currently dominates the development policy 
agenda, there is actually a very poor understanding of what the word means. The OECD 
statistical glossary defines ownership as the “the effective exercise of a government’s 
authority over development policies and activities, including those that rely – entirely or 
partially – on external resources” (OECD 2007). Yet, what does ownership actually look like 
in practice? How do donors actually encourage ownership? What domestic actors are 
responsible for ownership? These and other questions have gone largely unanswered in the 
academic and policy literature on ownership and development.  
 While a degree of variation does exist in understandings of ownership,14 the most 
widespread understanding is a change in the institutional relationship between donors and 
recipient country governments. That is, a change in the “rules of the game” that guide the 
interactions between donors and recipient-country governments (North 1990).  
                                                
13 Many of the notions embedded in the ownership model are not new. In fact, the authors of a report 
commissioned by the World Bank in 1969 make very similar points (Pearson 1969). However, over the past 
decade, these concepts have profoundly shifted the worldwide discourse on development in ways that they had 
not previously. 
14 For example, an IMF working paper depicts ownership as “buy-in” by the recipient state (Boughton and 
Mourmouras 2002).  
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In the past, donors sought development primarily from the outside. Under the 
“donorship” approach, which is exemplified by conditionality, donors used monetary 
incentives to try and pressure recipient countries to make what they saw as needed reforms 
and improvements. Alternatively, under the new ownership approach, control is supposed to 
shift to the recipient-country. Instead of donors calling the shots, recipient-country 
governments are supposed to dictate the terms of their own development.  
Predictions	  of	  ownership	  
Just as there is variation in how ownership is defined, there is variation in what 
ownership is predicted to change. However, the common thread running through pro-
ownership work is the idea that ownership allows recipient-country governments to 
participate more in policymaking. In other words, ownership gives recipient-countries a seat 
at the table. 
Increasing the participation of recipient-country governments is predicted to have 
three effects: increase the influence of recipient-country governments; decrease the influence 
of donors; and increase the influence of domestic citizens. The UK’s Department for 
International Development succinctly articulated these three predictions in a 2005 white 
paper:  
For us, ‘country ownership’ requires that the country has leadership over its 
development policies. It requires partner governments in consultation with 
citizens to define a poverty reduction programme, which donors can 
support….We do not only equate country ownership with government 
ownership. We believe that civil society, including poor people, should also 
have a voice and stake in their development, and that governments should be 
accountable to them (DFID 2005, 11). 
 
In other words, as the participation of recipient-countries increases, recipient-countries will 
exercise more influence over development policy and donors will take a step back, letting 
  
28 
governments lead. As a result, citizens will be better able to shape the policies that affect 
their lives. The following section explains these three predictions in greater detail.  
First, the influence of the recipient-country government will increase. Implicit in most 
pro-ownership work is the idea that as recipient-countries participate in policy decision-
making they will acquire more influence over policymaking; i.e., recipient-countries will “set 
the agenda” and have more say over the development policies funding by foreign assistance. 
The idea that recipient-country governments will gain more influence is reflected in the 2005 
Paris Declaration, in which recipient-countries commit to, “[e]xercise leadership in 
developing and implementing their national development strategies through broad 
consultative processes,” and to “[t]ake the lead in co-ordinating aid at all levels in 
conjunction with other development resources in dialogue with donors and encouraging the 
participation of civil society and the private sector” (OECD 2005, 3).   
Second, donor influence will decrease. This prediction is not often explicitly stated. 
However, implicit in conversations about ownership is the assumption that, as recipient-
countries take a more active role in development, donor influence will decrease as authority 
and influence transfers to recipient-country governments. Often this sentiment is expressed in 
the idea that recipient-countries should “lead.” For example, the recent publication by Oxfam 
America argues that, “Ultimately, ownership means supporting effective states and active 
citizens’ efforts to determine how they use aid resources as part of their broader development 
agenda” (2009, 37). The document equates ownership with control or letting the recipient-
country lead, and argues for changing US aid practices to be more inline with ownership 
principles and commitments, such as untied aid, fewer earmarks, and increased budget 
support. Similarly, donors signing on to the Paris Declaration commit to “[r]espect partner 
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country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it” (2005c, 3). In other 
words, donors commit to supporting and following recipient-country governments.  
Third, citizen influence and participation will increase. The assumption here is that as 
recipient-country governments become more responsible for development policy, the 
opportunities for citizens to influence development policy will increase. Donors are not 
accountable to citizens. However, domestic governments require citizens to stay in power, 
and citizens are able to sanction them for poor performance through electoral and civil 
society mechanisms. Introducing aid programs that emphasis ownership are predicted to 
change the ability of citizens to exercise influence over domestic policymakers. According to 
Hudson, “The impact of aid on the scope for domestic accountability depends on the extent 
to which recipient governments are able to control and manage the aid that they receive, 
incorporate it in their policy cycle, and spend it according to their own developmental 
priorities” (Hudson and GOVNET Secretariat 2009, 9) 
Implicit in each of these predictions is the idea that ownership will help fix the broken 
feedback loop identified in the previous section. By giving more authority to recipient-
country governments, the thinking is that development policies become more aligned with 
the actual needs of beneficiaries, because decision-making supposedly takes place closer to 
the people who are supposed to benefit from development. According the aforementioned 
Oxfam report “…the best hope for poor people lies in their own capacity to require 
accountability and performance from their governments. That is why ownership matters” 
(2009, 37).  
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2.5.	   The	  Problem	  of	  Faulty	  Assumptions	  
The picture presented by pro-ownership scholars and policymakers provides a 
convenient story to combat the perceived lack of aid effectiveness. However, it likely 
oversimplifies reality. Both the older literature on foreign aid and newer work specifically on 
ownership and ownership aid programs point out a number of factors that directly challenge 
the assumptions and predictions implicit in the story of ownership outlined above.15 
(1)	  Greater	  participation	  doesn’t	  mean	  greater	  influence	  
The rhetoric on ownership in the literature on foreign aid often fails to distinguish 
between participation and influence. However, conflating the two is highly problematic, 
because it ignores important nuances in the positioning power of recipient-country 
governments. Giving recipient-countries a seat at the table does not automatically give them 
more influence over policy outcomes;. Assuming that participation is the same thing as 
influence is not only logically incorrect but ignores long-standing power asymmetries 
between donors and recipient-country governments.  
Ownership, as it is defined above, may not actually be feasible in most aid-dependent 
states. For example, Booth (2008) argues the new ownership agenda requires political vision 
and leadership from domestic actors. However, we rarely see this in countries heavily 
dependent on foreign aid. Similarly, Whitfield and her colleagues argue that the 
characteristics of African states influence how much ownership a state can acquire (Whitfield 
2009; Whitfield and Maipose 2008). If states do not have certain characteristics, such as the 
ability to “project non-negotiability and the confidence that its actions will not lead to donors 
                                                
15 Much on the newer literature on ownership is critical of particular practices, such as poverty reduction 
strategy papers and general budget support. See chapter five (pg. 104) for a more extended discussion of this 
literature.  
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pulling out (or that it can manage aid on its own if they do),” then it is unlikely that 
ownership will translate in to more than a nice headline or catchphrase (Whitfield 2009, 329). 
Additionally, letting the recipient-country set the agenda is not the only alternative to 
the old donorship approach. Several different types of relationships between donors and 
recipient governments are possible. For example, ownership and partnership are often used 
interchangeably (see, for example, Millennium Challenge Corporation 2010; European 
Parliament Council Commission 2006). However, at least theoretically, the two terms 
describe very different types of relationships. Partnership conveys the need for an equal 
relationship between two or more “partners,” whereas ownership conveys a situation in 
which one actor, in this case the recipient country, takes the lead.   
(2)	  Donors	  are	  unlikely	  to	  relinquish	  their	  influence	  
There is also very little reason, either theoretically or empirically, to assume that 
donors will be willing to relinquish their influence over development policy. Not only is it 
likely to be bureaucratically challenging, but it also requires donors to voluntarily give up 
control over vast sums of money that they are charged with using wisely for diplomatic, 
development, and/or commercial purposes. This is obviously unrealistic (and probably 
unwise). Donors are actors with interests and reputations to uphold. They are not neutral 
parties but remain deeply invested in the process. Furthermore, donors have preferences that 
are not likely to change overnight. However, these political-economic factors are largely 
unaccounted for in the ownership predictions articulated above (de Renzio 2006). 
Recently, several scholars have made a similar point when suggesting that there is a 
gap between the rhetoric of ownership and actual practices on the ground. For example, some 
have questioned whether the aid system is truly able to provide ownership given it continues 
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to rely on conditionalities (Easterly 2008; Whitfield 2009). Based on country case studies of 
“ownership” in several African countries, Whitfield and her colleagues suggest that “aid 
officials start out with a commitment to ownership defined as control over policies, but as 
soon as there is some disagreement over policy choices they tend to fall back on a definition 
of ownership as commitment to their preferred policies” (Whitfield 2009, 2). In other words, 
donors are willing to let recipient-country governments set the agenda, as long as it is their 
agenda. This raises the question: does ownership actually change anything?  
(3)	  Government	  influence	  doesn’t	  equal	  national	  influence	  
Even if governments are granted more influence over the policy process, there is very 
little reason to believe that citizen influence will increase as a result of this change. In fact, 
the opposite may occur. Ownership is presumed to increase domestic accountability by 
shortening the feedback loop. The idea is that, if domestic governments set the agenda, 
citizens can sanction them for bad performance. However, in many aid-dependent states, 
systems of patronage and clientelism alter the rule of the game, and mechanisms for citizens 
to sanction policymakers cannot be assumed to exist (Wantchekon 2003; van de Walle 2003; 
Kitschelt 2007). In fact, aid dependence may actually decrease the likelihood that citizen-
sanctioning mechanisms are present, because revenue comes from donors, not from 
taxpayers/citizens. Consequently, governments are accountable to the donors who pay their 
bills not their own citizens (Moss, Pettersson, and van de Walle 2008; Moore 1998).  
Foreign assistance arguably affects governance in aid-dependent states, because it 
changes the institutional arrangements that structure cooperation and incentives to improve 
governance (Bräutigam 2000). In his influential book, van de Walle (2001) argues that the 
aid system actually prolonged many African neopatrimonial regimes by providing a huge 
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influx of resources and technical capacity. And, in a large-scale statistical analysis of the 
relationship between aid and governance, Bräutigam and Knack (2004) find that increases in 
aid negatively affect governance. 
Ultimately, even if governments have more influence, the person controlling the 
purse strings does not change. Under the ownership model, revenue still comes from donors 
not taxpayers. Therefore, there is no reason to predict that recipient-countries will take the 
demands of their citizens more seriously. In fact, if the government is hostile to citizen 
demands, increasing their influence may allow them to take the demands of their citizens 
even less seriously.  
2.6	   Concluding	  Remarks	  	  
In this chapter, I outlined the contemporary debates in the literature on foreign aid. 
These debates have resulted in a new emphasis on recipient-country ownership, which is 
predicted to fix many of the longstanding challenges facing foreign assistance. In addition, I 
outlined the definitional contours and predictions of the ownership approach, contrasting it to 
the older donorship approach. While the donorship approach relies on top-down 
conditionalities, ownership seeks to change the institutional arrangements between donors 
and recipient-country governments by allowing the latter to set the agenda. I then challenged 
several of the assumptions implicit in the pro-ownership rhetoric.  
The claim that that ownership is unrealistic has become a common refrain in some 
policy circles. However, such refrains are largely based on anecdotal evidence and a 
widespread skepticism about donors and foreign aid, not on systematic, empirical evidence. 
Thus far, there has been little scholarly analysis of actual attempts to change the institutional 
arrangements between donors and recipient countries. I provide such an analysis with this 
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dissertation project. In the following chapter, I outline my research design in more detail, 
noting how I propose to test the predictions of the ownership model using three case studies 
of aid programs in post-genocide and civil war Rwanda. 
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Chapter	  3 	  Research	  Design,	  Methodology,	  &	  Data	  Collection	  
 
In the previous chapter, I laid out the predictions of the ownership approach to 
international development, contrasting it to the older donorship approach. In summary, 
development practices that emphasize ownership claim to allow recipient-country 
governments to participate more and have more influence over the policy process, while at 
the same time decreasing donor influence and increasing the influence of citizens. In this 
dissertation, I test these predictions using case studies of aid programs in one recipient-
country, Rwanda. Each of the aid programs I analyze attempts to provide more ownership to 
the recipient-country by changing the institutional relationship between donors and the 
recipient-country government, in this case the Government of Rwanda (GoR). In the 
following chapter, I lay out the research design and methodology I used to test the 
predictions of the ownership model, and how I went about collecting data. 
The chapter is composed of three major sections. I first outline my independent and 
dependent variables and explain process tracing, the method I used to analyze my cases. 
Second, I make the case for looking at aid programs in Rwanda and summarize my three case 
studies: general budget support and poverty reduction strategies, the aid coordination, 
harmonization, and alignment framework, and the Rwandan Joint Governance Report. Third, 
I summarize my data sources and the fieldwork I conducted in Rwanda during 2009 and 
2010.  
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3.1.	   Variables	  of	  Interest	  &	  Methodology	  
Independent	  variable	  	  
In this dissertation, I am interested in the effect of ownership on the influence of 
donors, government policymakers, and citizens of aid-dependent states. The independent 
variable, a change in the institutional arrangement between donors and the government, is 
operationalized through aid programs designed to allow the recipient country to participate 
more in the policy decision-making process, i.e. “ownership aid programs.”  
An aid program is “a time bound intervention involving multiple activities that may 
cut across sectors, themes and/or geographic areas” (Denmark, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2011). An aid program is different than an aid project, or specific “development intervention 
designed to achieve specific objectives within specified resources and implementation 
schedules” (Denmark, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011). However, aid projects are often 
implemented within the framework of an aid program. For example, donors may coalesce 
around an aid program on decentralization, which includes a variety of specific and 
distinctive aid projects that are each designed to transfer authority to local decision-makers 
and build local institutions.     
Looking at aid programs, rather than ownership’s aggregate effect in a country, 
allows for more specificity. Country case studies provide an important macro-level picture 
(see, for example, Whitfield 2009). However, they have difficulty verifying that the 
outcomes they describe are actually the result of an increased focus on ownership in the 
recipient-country and not something else. By focusing on specific aid programs, I can better 
specify causal mechanisms and explore variations between program outcomes, improving the 
validity and specificity of my findings.    
  
37 
Dependent	  variables	  	  
The new emphasis on ownership assumes that more government participation will 
lead to more recipient-country government influence, and consequently, a decrease in the 
influence of donors and an increase in the influence of citizens over policy decision-making 
in aid-dependent states. However, as explained in chapter two, there are several faulty 
assumptions implicit in the story of ownership. Therefore, in this dissertation, I examine how 
ownership aid programs affect each one of the predicted outcomes of the ownership approach 
to international development. 
 First, in each case, I ask whether or not the influence of the recipient-country 
government has increased as a result of the aid program. Here I make an important 
distinction between participation and influence. It is not enough that governments are more 
involved in the policy process, there has to be evidence that they have more influence over 
the policy process. I look for evidence of government influence by asking questions such as: 
Are there instances where donors and the government disagreed? If so, who prevailed? 
Where donors have clear preferences, did they cede authority to recipient-country 
governments?  
Second, I examine whether or not donors have become less influential over policy 
decision-making. Given that donor influence likely comes in several forms, I am interested in 
changes in both the degree of donor influence (i.e. how much?) and the type of donor 
influence (i.e. what kind?). In other words, I am interested in changes to not just the amount 
of donor influence, but changes to how donors wield their influence as well. I look for 
evidence of decreased donor influence by asking questions, such as: When, where, and how 
have donors tried to influence the policy process? When government preferences conflict 
with donor preferences, do donors allow the government to set the agenda? 
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Third, I look for evidence that citizens in the recipient-country have become more 
influential. Once again, it is not enough for citizens to merely participate more; there must be 
evidence that citizens have more influence over the policy decision-making process. I look 
for evidence of citizen influence by asking questions such as: Is there evidence of increased 
political competition? Has civil society become more active and vibrant? Is there evidence of 
increased accountability? 
Process	  tracing	  	  
To move from descriptive narrative to a causal story, my analysis relies on process 
tracing.16 True to its name, process tracing emphasizes processes, attempting to connect X to 
Y by exploring the causal link(s) between the variables of interest. Instead of testing the 
relationship between two variables using, for example, statistical analysis, process tracing 
builds a causal relationship through establishing the links and mechanisms that connect the 
two variables. Process tracing, therefore, leverages the data points between time A and time 
B to explain the relationship or lack of relationship between the variables of interest.  
Process tracing is particularly advantageous because of its ability to account for 
complex causal relationships, such as path dependency, critical junctures, and equifinality 
(Bennett and Elman 2006). By tracing causal processes and mechanisms, process tracing is 
able to describe causal process without substantial abstraction, building theory from the 
ground up. This dissertation explores questions that have been hinted at, but have not been 
systematically theorized or analyzed. Therefore, using an approach that is more detail- 
oriented helps prevent heavy abstraction and the accidental omission of important variables.  
                                                
16 For an overview of process tracing see George and Bennett 2005; Bennett 2010; Bennett and Elman 2006; 
Checkel 2008.  
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Process tracing can be used for a variety of purposes, including description, theory 
generation, and theory testing. In this dissertation, I use process tracing in two ways. First, I 
use it to test the predictions of the ownership approach. In each case, I look for evidence that 
connects a change in the institutional relationship between donors and the GoR with an 
increase in the influence of government policymakers and citizens and a decrease in the 
influence of donors over the policy decision-making processes.  
Bennett (2010) and Collier (2011), refer to this type of causation test as a “hoop test.” 
The hypotheses under consideration must “jump through the hoop” in order to remain under 
consideration. Passing the hoop test does not affirm a hypothesis; it merely suggests that the 
hypothesis is likely to be valid. However, failing eliminates the hypothesis. In other words, 
passing the hoop test is necessary for establishing causation but not sufficient.  
Then, because each of the hypotheses predicted by proponents of ownership fail the 
hoop test, I use process tracing to provide an alternative explanation of how the aid programs 
actually impact the three variables of interest. In other words, I build an alternative, causal 
account of how the introduction of ownership aid programs in Rwanda changed (or failed to 
change) the influence of donors, the GoR, and Rwandan citizens over the policy decision-
making process.  
3.2.	   Case	  Studies	  
Why	  Rwanda?	  
The universe of cases for this dissertation includes all aid-dependent countries. 
Bräutigam defines aid dependency as “a situation in which a country cannot perform many of 
the core functions of government, such as operations and maintenance, or the delivery of 
basic public services, without foreign aid funding and expertise” (Bräutigam 2000, 2). 
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Countries that receive ODA equal to or greater than approximately 10% of their gross 
national income (GNI) are generally considered aid dependent.  
If yearly figures for ODA as a percentage of GNI are averaged from 2000-2008, 
forty-one countries fall into this category (The average ODA as percentage of GNI across all 
forty-one countries is 21.44 %.). Additionally, another group of twenty-seven countries are 
more moderately aid dependent with averages in the 4%-9.9% range17 (A complete list of 
both groups can be found in Appendix 3, pg. 185). In my dissertation, I only look at aid 
programs in one aid-dependent country, Rwanda. (Rwanda’s average ODA as a percent of 
GNI from 2000-2008 is right at the median for aid dependent countries, 21.08 %.) The 
question is then, why Rwanda? 
By an accident of history, Rwanda is a “plausibility probe.” Rwanda emerged from 
conflict when the aid agenda was being refashioned and ownership was taking center stage. 
Donors championing the ownership approach (the United Kingdom, in particular) came into 
Rwanda following the genocide and began using Rwanda as a test case for the new approach 
(Hayman 2006).  
The emphasis on ownership by donors has been echoed in the current regime’s 
rhetoric. President Paul Kagame and his government are vocal supporters of the ownership 
approach, rarely missing an opportunity to argue for the importance of local ownership and 
castigate donor influence (see, for example, Handelsblatt 2009; Kagame 2007; 2009a 2009b; 
2009c). As one of my interviewees put it, Rwanda is not a country that has signed on the 
dotted line (Interview I-VIII, 11.02.2009). In other words, Rwanda projects the non-
                                                
17 Figures compiled from the World Bank Development Indicators.  
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negotiability that Whitfield (2009) says is essential for country ownership. In a recent speech 
to donors and senior GoR officials, Kagame argued: 
It is therefore sometimes uncalled for, that we become subjects of endless 
lectures of how we should manage ourselves. We know what is best for us. 
No one should pretend that they know better than us what we need for 
ourselves (Kagame 2010, 2). 
 
Rwanda’s (rhetorical) commitment to ownership is perhaps best illustrated by a lexicon 
change that came about during a conference in the late 1990s. Instead of being called donors, 
agencies providing foreign assistance to Rwanda are always referred to as “development 
partners” (Interview I-VI, 10.30.09). 
Additionally, several contextual factors make it more likely that donors will actually 
be willing to give ownership to the Rwandan government. As chapter four explains in detail, 
Rwanda has seen tremendous economic growth over the past decade. As a result, donors are 
eager to attach their name to its success and support the current regime. The current 
government is also largely perceived as having “political will,” strong leadership, and strong 
anti-corruption policies. In other words, Rwanda has the vision Booth (2008) says is 
necessary. The perception of political will and leadership, combined with tremendous 
economic growth, makes donors eager to back the GoR.  
Lastly, a “genocide credit” likely gives the GoR more leeway to advance its agenda 
(Reyntjens 2004). As chapter seven explores in more detail, donors have often been willing 
to back the current regime, as it is largely seen as responsible for ending the 1994 genocide. 
Additionally, donors are sometimes fearful of challenging government policies too much, out 
of fear that conflict may once again erupt. As one of my interviewees noted, the role or 
absence of the international community in 1994 is always in the background; the GoR is 
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always thinking about it. The international community is not in a weak position, as it gives 
lots of money, but in an ambiguous one (Interview I-XVIII, 01.13.09).  
Collectively, the proactive nature of the GoR and the increased likelihood that donors 
will actually grant ownership means that if a change from donorship to ownership is feasible, 
it should be feasible in Rwanda. If we do not see ownership emerging in Rwanda, it is 
unlikely we will see it emerging elsewhere. Therefore, although it is not representative of all 
aid-dependent countries, the country offers an excellent place to begin analyzing the impact 
of ownership in aid-dependent countries.  
Summary	  of	  case	  studies	  
Within the Rwandan context, I examine four “ownership” aid programs – poverty 
reduction strategies, budget support, the joint governance assessment, and the Aid 
Coordination, Harmonization, and Alignment Agenda – through three case studies. Poverty 
reduction strategies and budget support are distinct aid programs; participation in one does 
not mean participation in another. However, they are tightly linked and both have similar 
objectives. Therefore, for the purposes of this dissertation, they constitute one case study in 
this dissertation project.  
Each aid program is designed to change the institutional relationship between donors 
and the recipient-country government, giving more influence to the GoR. What differs is 
what the GoR, as a result of the aid program, is supposed to have more influence over. 
Poverty reduction strategies and budget support are supposed to give the GoR more influence 
over the design and implementation of development policy. Alternatively, the Aid 
Coordination, Harmonization, and Alignment agenda supposedly gives the government more 
influence over the aid policy donors pursue in Rwanda. Lastly, the Joint Governance 
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Advisory Report is supposed to give the GoR more influence over governance policy (see 
table 3.1).  
Table	  3.1:	  Predictions	  of	  Case	  Studies	  
Budget Support & Poverty Reduction Strategies: 
Changes in influence over development policy 
 
Joint Governance Report: 
Changes in influence over governance policy 
 
Aid Coordination, Harmonization, and Alignment: 
Changes in influence over aid policy   
 
 
Below, I briefly summarize each case study and explain why each is an “ownership” aid 
program. More specifics about each case can be found in the case study chapters (chapters 
five, six, and seven). 
Rwanda’s	  poverty	  reduction	  strategy	  and	  budget	  support	  	  
Poverty reduction strategies began as a part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) program, a World Bank and IMF program that grants debt relief to low-income 
countries. In 1999, the HIPC program began to require that participating countries lay out 
their own medium-term development goals and strategies in a poverty reduction strategy 
paper or PRSP (IMF 2010).18 As of early 2011, seventy low-income states either had a PRSP 
or an interim PRSP, and many states are currently working on their second or third PRSP.19 
Rwanda jumped on the poverty reduction strategy bandwagon quite early, finalizing its first 
                                                
18 Other criteria for participation include (1) be eligible to borrow from IDA, (2) face an unsustainable debt 
burden that cannot be addressed through traditional debt relief mechanisms, and 3) have established a track 
record of reform and sound policies through the IMF and World Bank (IMF 2010). The PRSP program was 
officially approved by the Joint Boards of the IMF and World Bank in December 1999 (Cheru 2006). 
19 New PRSPs are generally prepared every three to five years. For a full list of all countries with a PRSP or 
interim PRSP see http://go.worldbank.org/LYE7YNYBH0.  
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PRSP in June 2002 and finalizing a second, the “Economic Development & Poverty 
Reduction Strategy 2008-2012” (EDPRS), in 2007. 
Poverty reduction strategies are said to represent an ownership approach, because 
they ask countries to outline their own plans for development. As Cheru notes, “The PRSP 
approach is supposed to represent a major departure from previous development strategies 
whereby the World Bank and the IMF dictated the directions of economic policies in poor 
countries” (Cheru 2006, 355). That is, instead of making aid conditional on World Bank and 
IMF thinking, poverty reduction strategies are supposed to give authority to recipient-country 
governments. 
Following the introduction of the poverty reduction strategy program, donors began 
issuing a new type of “program aid,” or aid that is not tied to a particular project.20 Budget 
support is a resource transfer directly into the budget or treasury of the receiving country and 
allows the recipient country to use its own allocation, procurement, and accounting 
structures. The idea is that countries define their own priorities through the PRSP process, 
and then budget support funds these priorities. Collectively, budget support and the poverty 
reduction strategy program are supposed to give recipient-countries control over 
development policy and the allocation of aid money. Because it supposedly gives recipient-
countries the ability to spend aid money as they wish, budget support is often heralded as the 
prime example of the ownership approach.  
Rwanda’s	  Aid	  Coordination,	  Harmonization,	  and	  Alignment	  Agenda	  
The Aid Coordination, Harmonization, and Alignment agenda (ACHA) is an attempt 
by the GoR and donors to localize the Paris Declaration in Rwanda by providing higher 
                                                
20 Alternative types of program aid include, balance of payment support and debt relief (Hammond 2006).  
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levels of ownership through increased coordination, harmonization, and alignment. 
Ownership is at the core of the Paris Agenda outlined in chapter two. However, additional 
elements, such as coordination, alignment, and harmonization, provide the foundation for 
ownership. If donors do not harmonize and align their activities with national systems and 
priorities, it would be difficult for a recipient-country to take charge of development and aid 
policy. At the same time, if donors remain fragmented, advancing one agenda led by the 
recipient-country would be difficult.  
In contrast to the poverty reduction strategy program and budget support, which are 
global programs, ACHA is a Rwandan aid program. However, several other countries have 
similar coordination, harmonization, and alignment mechanisms (for example, the Joint 
Assistance Strategy in Zambia or the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania). ACHA brings 
donors and the GoR together in a series of forums and working groups that are designed to 
make sure donors and the GoR are on the same page and allow donors to support GoR 
programs more effectively. For example, under the ACHA framework, high-level donor 
representatives and GoR officials meet in a series of quarterly meetings, as well as a bi-
annual Development Partners Meeting and an annual Development Partners Forum. 
Additionally, under the ACHA framework, the Rwandan cabinet approved an Aid Policy in 
2006. 
The	  Rwandan	  Joint	  Governance	  Assessment	  	  
In contrast to the other case studies, the Joint Governance Assessment or JGA is 
completely unique to Rwanda. The JGA is a “jointly owned” set of indicators that assess 
governance in Rwanda and is arguably the first of its kind globally. The idea for the JGA 
came about in 2006, and the first report was approved by Rwanda’s cabinet on September 12, 
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2008 and adopted at the Development Partner’s Meeting in November 2008. The JGA covers 
three broad areas of assessment: ruling justly, government effectiveness, and investment 
climate and corporate governance (RGAC 2009; Williams et al. 2009). The JGA process is 
supposed to result in an annual report. However, only one official report has been released 
thus far. 
The central objective of the JGA is to produce a single governance assessment that 
donors and the GoR can both utilize. The JGA is a particularly interesting aid program, 
because it deals with governance, a highly politically sensitive topic for the GoR. 
Additionally, while the GoR and donors appear to see eye to eye about economic policy, they 
have often butted heads when it comes to governance. These differences distinguish the JGA 
from the other two aid programs analyzed in this dissertation.  
Representativeness	  
My research design is based on case studies from a single country. While the design 
allows me to make fairly conclusive claims about the impact of the ownership approach in 
Rwanda, its ability to make claims about the impact of the ownership approach globally is 
limited. Therefore, the conclusions outlined in chapter eight will need to be corroborated in 
other contexts to ensure their generalizability.  
Two factors in particular make Rwanda a unique case, and may influence the 
generalizability of my findings. First, the leadership provided by President Paul Kagame is 
perhaps unique. As chapter four will explain with more depth, Kagame is not without his 
critics (particularly in the human rights world). However, Kagame has found a voice with 
many Western leaders and enjoys substantial support from powerful states like the United 
States and the United Kingdom, whom he has courted extensively. Kagame’s support from 
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the United States and United Kingdom is important to keep in mind, as it is likely to 
influence the relationships between donors and the GoR. Second, the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide provides a very particular country context. Although there has been no systematic 
analysis of how the genocide affects aid disbursement in Rwanda, donors and scholars often 
note a sense of guilt amongst donors that likely affects the relationship between donors and 
the GoR.21  
Both factors are likely to make Rwanda a unique context, particularly the 1994 
genocide. Kagame has at times been linked with the “new generation of African leaders,” a 
group of African presidents that were highly regarded during the 1990s (many have since 
fallen out of favor).22 As such, his leadership is not a completely unique phenomenon. 
However, the Rwandan genocide was a particularly important world event. Its dramatic 
impact on present day Rwanda cannot, and should not, be ignored. I did not “control” for 
these factors. However, throughout my research, I was very attentive to how the unique 
features of the Rwandan case might influence my findings and conclusions. I will discuss 
how generalizable my findings are in chapter eight. 
3.3.	  	   	  Data	  Sources	  
I obtained data for this dissertation from three main sources: (1) in-country fieldwork, 
(2) primary documents, and (3) supplemental evaluations and reports. It was often the case 
that it would be in the best interest of the actors I analyzed to focus on successes rather than 
limitations. Therefore, I avoided relying on a single data source.  
                                                
21 For example, Reyntjens (2004) speaks of a genocide credit that he argues lets the Kagame regime get away 
with very serious human rights violations.  
22 Leaders often included in this group (along with Kagame) include Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Meles 
Zenawi of Ethiopia, Isaias Afewerki of Eritrea, Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique, 
and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. 
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Fieldwork	  
I conducted approximately three months of in-country fieldwork in Rwanda during 
October/November 2009 and June/July 2010. This fieldwork consisted of interviews with 
Rwandan government officials, international development staff from bilateral and 
multilateral donor agencies, NGOs, and independent consultants, as well as observations of 
pertinent meetings and conferences. In addition, throughout my time in Rwanda, I was 
introduced to and participated in informal conversations with countless individuals relevant 
to my subject of study. Although these conversations are not directly reflected in my data 
sources, they often alerted me to key aspects of the Rwandan case.  
I conducted 47 formal interviews with 48 people.23 A list of interviews can be found 
in Appendix 1. Interviews lasted anywhere from thirty minutes to more than three hours, with 
the average being around an hour. I chose not to have a standard interview protocol for my 
interviews. The information I desired from each interviewee was different, and I wanted to 
have the flexibility to explore interesting topics that might arise spontaneously. Having a 
rigid interview protocol would have prevented this type of flexibility. Therefore, before each 
interview I established what I hoped to obtain from the conversation and outlined important 
questions to ask that particular interviewee. However, I gave myself the flexibility to explore 
topics that came up unexpectedly. I made sure to avoid leading questions, instead asking the 
interviewee to describe their experiences or provide their opinion about pertinent topics.  
The questions I asked varied based on several factors. First, I asked different 
questions depending on whether the interviewee worked for a donor or the GoR. Several of 
                                                
23 In some cases, interviews were with conducted with more than one person. In addition, I conducted more than 
one interview with some individuals. All of these interviews took place in person in Kigali, save for one, which 
was conducted via Skype.  
  
49 
my interviewees who were Rwandan nationals had actually worked for both the GoR and one 
or more donor. This led to many interesting conversations comparing the two experiences. 
Second, I asked different questions depending on the interviewee’s job title/description. For 
example, when interviewing donors it mattered whether the interviewee was the head of the 
delegation or in charge of a specific aspect of the agency’s country program. When 
interviewing government representatives it mattered if the interviewee was the head of a 
division or a lower ranking civil servant. Third, I asked different questions depending on the 
interviewee’s past experience and work on specific programs or aid projects. 
Selecting whom to interview was not particularly difficult. Most donors, even the 
largest agencies, have a relatively small staff on the ground in Rwanda and access was not 
typically an issue. Each donor agency is arranged differently. However, in most agencies I 
spoke to the donor representative working on governance/democratization and the donor 
representative in charge of aid coordination (typically an economist). In the end, I was able to 
speak with representatives of all the major donors. Government officials were slightly less 
easy to identify, because there were more of them and sometimes access was more difficult. 
That being said, I was able to speak with almost all persons that I identified as a key 
informant, and I was pleasantly surprised at my ability to access high-level elites. The 
greatest challenge I faced was that key informants on a particular subject were sometimes no 
longer in Kigali. 
Given that Rwanda is a relatively closed society, frankness was always a concern. I 
was particularly concerned about the ability of government employees to speak openly. Most 
of my conversations did not center on highly politically sensitive topics (i.e. human rights, 
repression, ethnic relationships). However, the topic of governance, broadly defined, can be a 
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delicate subject in Rwanda. Therefore, throughout my analysis I always kept in mind that my 
informants might not have been at liberty to be completely forthcoming.  
Due to concerns about openness, I opted not to tape record my interviews. Instead, I 
took detailed notes during the interview and then spent anywhere from one to two hours 
writing up the interview immediately after it was completed. Because I did not tape record, 
my dissertation includes very few direct quotes by interviewees. While direct quotes would 
have been an asset, I felt it was more important to establish a neutral space for my 
interviewees than be able to quote them directly. 
In addition to interviews, I was also able to attend and observe a few key meetings 
between donors and the GoR, including a biannual Joint Budget Support Review, a 
Workshop on the Joint Governance Assessment, and a Policy Dialogue on the Mo Ibrahim 
Foundation Index. During these meetings, I was able to directly observe how donor 
representatives and government policymakers interacted. This experience was invaluable to 
my research, and enabled a deeper understanding of the current relationships between the 
GoR and its development partners. Attending these meetings also allowed me to speak to 
many more individuals than those I formally interviewed, and allowed me to observe 
informal exchanges between development partners and government officials. 
Primary	  documents	  
To supplement fieldwork, I also collected and analyzed primary documents about 
development in Rwanda and the aid programs I analyzed. A list of documents consulted can 
be found in Appendix 2. Primary sources mainly came in the form of: (1) key aid documents 
and declarations by the GoR and its donors; (2) meeting agendas, power point presentations, 
and minutes; and (3) documents specific to the identified program of interest. An online 
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library on the Development Partners website (http://www.devpartners.gov.rw) provided a 
wealth of information to analyze. In addition, I acquired more documents during my time in 
Rwanda, as interviewees gave me documents, sometimes without me requesting them. I also 
worked with staff at the External Finance Unit at the Ministry of Finance to obtain missing 
documents.  
Monitoring	  and	  evaluation	  reports	  and	  academic	  sources	  
I also consulted several monitoring and evaluation (M&E) reports on matters related 
to aid in Rwanda. At times, I relied on evaluations and reports to verify my findings and, in 
some cases, they provided powerful confirmation of my conclusions. However, I never used 
them as the sole confirmation of a finding, because I have no way of verifying the accuracy 
of their conclusions. Additionally, such reports are often critiqued for relying on a fly-in and 
fly-out method in which highly paid consultants touchdown in Kigali for a day or two. I paid 
close attention to the project descriptions to avoid particularly careless work. However, the 
time spent on the report was still typically an unknown. Lastly, while these reports were 
usually conducted by independent consultants, the scope and conditions of the project (and 
sometimes the findings) often must be signed-off by the sponsoring donor(s) and the GoR. 
Therefore, it is difficult to know how “independent” the reports actually are.  
I also consulted the work of several academics who conducted extensive research in 
Rwanda, including Peter Uvin, Filip Reyntjens, Gérard Prunier, and René Lemarchand. 
While my case studies are largely based on my own data, I referred to works by these and 
other authors to gain a fuller understanding of the Rwandan context and the history of donor 
engagement in the country. In particular, I found Rachel Hayman’s thorough and meticulous 
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work on aid to Rwanda in the post-genocide period informative and helpful (Hayman 2006, 
2009a, 2009b). 
3.4.	  	   Concluding	  Remarks	  	  
In this chapter, I outlined my research design, which is based on my analysis of four 
different aid programs implemented in the early 2000s in Rwanda. Each of these aid 
programs promises an increase in recipient-country ownership. I use a process-tracing 
method and rely on data collected during fieldwork in Rwanda, as well as primary sources 
and external evaluations to make my conclusions. In each case study, I ask whether or not we 
see: (1) an increase in recipient-country influence, (2) a decrease in donor influence, or (3) an 
increase in citizen influence.  
My goal is to develop middle-range theory on how global norms around aid 
disbursement influence decision-making and policy choice in local contexts. As George and 
Bennett note:  
High general theories that attempt to formulate broad covering laws tend to 
have quite limited explanatory and predictive power…They are pitched at a 
level of abstraction that fails to give insightful explanation of foreign policy 
decision or of interactions between states that lead to specific outcomes. 
Middle-range theories, on the other hand, are deliberately limited in their 
scope; they attempt to explain different subclasses of general phenomena. 
Middle-range theory attempt to formulate well-specified conditional 
generalizations of more limited scope (George and Bennett 2005, 266: my 
emphasis). 
 
Given that the purpose of my research is to generate theory that makes conditional 
generalizations about a particular group of countries, the generation of middle-range theory is 
appropriate for my purposes. Furthermore, middle-range theory is easier to translate into 
policy relevant conclusions than high-level general theories, which provide little for 
policymakers to go on (George and Bennett 2005). The ability to make policy-relevant 
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conclusions is essential when analyzing a subject area such as foreign aid that is clearly 
pertinent to a wide array of policymakers. 
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Chapter	  4 	  Donors	  and	  Development	  	  
 
…in the heart of the African continent, lie the highlands of Rwanda. The country is tiny, the size 
of Massachusetts, and has one of the highest population densities in the world. This is not the 
Africa of jungles, corruption, and failed states portrayed in movies. Temperatures fall to freezing 
on some hill tops, cattle graze on velvety pastures, and the government maintains a tight grip on 
all aspects of society. On the thousand of hills – in between tea plantations and eucalyptus 
groves – millions of peasants eke out a living by farming beans, bananas, and sorghum. 
 
-Jason Sterns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters (2011, 13) 
 
In the following chapter, I outline the Rwandan context, describing the history of 
development in Rwanda and the activities of bilateral and multilateral donors currently active in 
in the country. The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, in order to understand contemporary 
development schemes and practices, it is important for the reader to have a basic understanding 
of the Rwandan context. Second, both the country context and the country’s donors are likely to 
affect how the ownership approach plays out in a particular country. Whoever benefits from 
ownership is apt to be dependent on the existing power dynamics in the recipient county. If a 
particular group of domestic actors have little authority in a given country context, there is little 
reason to believe that ownership aid programs will drastically change how much influence they 
wield. Likewise, if a donor does not prioritize ownership, we are not likely to see a great deal of 
change in how they do business, even if there is a growing emphasis on ownership in Rwanda as 
a whole.  
The chapter is organized into three sections. In the first two sections, I provide a brief 
overview of development in Rwanda. I divide this discussion into two time periods: 
independence the genocide (1962-1994) and post-genocide to the present day (1994-2010). The 
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1994 genocide is clearly a major turning point in Rwandan history; it changed development 
practices and ushered in a new set of donors. I, therefore, use it to structure my discussion.  
I then discuss the roles and strategies of the major multilateral and bilateral donors 
currently active in Rwanda. While several donors are increasing their presence in Rwanda, I 
focus on the donors currently providing the highest levels of ODA to Rwanda: the World Bank, 
African Development Bank, European Commission, United Kingdom, and United States. I also 
briefly discuss the United Nations. My discussion of Rwanda’s donors highlights differences in 
the practices and priorities of the multiple donors currently providing aid to Rwanda. These 
differences not only make coordination and harmonization difficult, they impact the types of aid 
programs a donor pursues and the commitment to ownership a donor expresses.  
4.1.	  	   The	  Pre-­‐Genocide	  Period,	  1962-­‐1994	  
The boundaries of modern day Rwanda were established in 1962 when the state declared 
its independence from Belgium and separated from what is now the independent state of 
Burundi.24 In the section below, I provide a very brief summary of more than 40 years of 
development in Rwanda, from independence to the 1994 genocide. I also briefly summarize 
ethnic divisions between the Tutsi and Hutu populations. Tensions between the two groups are 
not only fundamental to understanding the civil war and genocide of the 1990s, but 
contemporary politics and development practices in Rwanda as well.  
                                                
24 What we now know as two separate countries, Rwanda and Burundi, were at one time the colonial territory known 
as Ruanda-Urundi. Ruanda-Urundi was first assigned to Germany by the 1884 Berlin Conference but was allocated 
to Belgium by a League of Nations mandate after World War I. 
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Development	  and	  the	  influx	  of	  ODA	  	  
Following independence, there was a gradual but steady increase in the amount of foreign 
aid flowing into Rwanda (see figure 4.1). In 1960, ODA to Rwanda was calculated at $7.5 
million. By the early 1990s, Rwanda’s ODA was over $300 million. Growth in ODA was 
particularly strong in the 1970s. In this decade alone, aid increased more than seven-fold, from 
around $22 million at the start of the decade, to over $154 million at the end of the decade. In the 
1980s, ODA once again doubled, exceeding $287 million by 1990. This means that in 1990 
alone, donors spent $41 for each of Rwanda’s seven million citizens.25 
Figure	  4.1:	  ODA	  to	  Rwanda,	  1960-­‐1994	  (current	  USD	  million)	  
 
	  Source:	  World	  Development	  Indicators	  
 
Did this all this aid do any good? Poverty has always been a problem in Rwanda. In 
1984-1985, 63.33% of the population lived in households with consumption or income per 
person below the poverty line ($1.25 a day).26 Like most underdeveloped countries, Rwanda has 
historically faced high-levels of debt, population growth, and pressure on the environment. 
Historically, most Rwandans have engaged in subsistence agriculture, with the primary exports 
                                                
25 It is estimated that around 200 bilaterials, multilaterals, and NGOs managed more than 500 aid projects in 
Rwanda by 1986 (Hansson 1989, cited in Uvin 1998). This is an exceptionally large presence considering Rwanda 
has a population akin to Virginia and is geographically the size of Maryland.  
26 Source: PovcalNet. Available at http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp  
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being coffee and tea. This has placed a great deal of strain on the land and economy, as Rwanda 
has the highest population density in continental Sub-Saharan Africa (Bureau of African Affairs 
2011).  
Despite these challenges, economic development in Rwanda was generally upwards 
(although slow) in the decades following independence (see Table 4.1).  
Table	  4.1:	  Rwandan	  Economic	  Development	  Indictors	  
Indicator Period Growth Rate (%) 
GNP per capita 1965-88 +1.5 
Industrial Growth 1980-88 +3.6 
Services Growth 1980-88 +3.4 
Agricultural Growth 1980-88 +.3 
Energy Production 1980-88 +5.5 
Gross Domestic Investment  1980-88 +7.4 
Annual exports 1960-80 +7.8 
Source:	  Data	  compiled	  by	  Uvin	  (1998,	  47)	  
 
Rwanda’s economic growth during this time period is particularly impressive when you compare 
it to economic growth (or lack of growth) in Rwanda’s East African neighbors. While Rwanda’s 
neighbors saw their ranking among other least developed countries (LDCs) decrease, Rwanda’s 
ranking increased (see table 4.2).  
Table	  4.2:	  Rwanda’s	  LDC	  Ranking	  Compared	  to	  East	  African	  Neighbors	  
Country	  ranking	  among	  LDCs	  from	  bottom	  up	  	  
 Rwanda Burundi Zaïre Uganda Tanzania 
1976 7 11 16 33 25 
1981 16 14 12 13 19 
1985 18 11 9 N/A 21 
1990 19 11 12 13 2 
Variation +12 - -4 -20 -23 
Source:	  World	  Bank	  Development	  Reports,	  compiled	  by	  Reyntjens	  (1994,	  35)	  
 
During the 70s and 80s, Rwanda stood out among other states in Africa and became a 
model for African development. The small but upwards economic trends in Rwanda, combined 
with a belief that Rwanda possessed political stability, effective administration, and prudent and 
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sound management, made the country very attractive to foreign donors (Uvin 1998). However, 
the high rate of foreign assistance would have lasting effects. 
From 1982-1987, foreign assistance financed over 70% of public investment (World 
Bank 1989: 11), allowing the state to import much more than it exported (see Uvin 1998, 42-43). 
Beginning in the 1980s, the system began to show signs of fatigue. In the mid-1980s, an 
agricultural crisis hit Rwanda. Food production dropped sharply and the prices of tea and coffee, 
Rwanda’s major cash crops, dropped dramatically on the world market. As a result, the country 
spiraled into financial crisis. Foreign debt, which had previously been relatively low by regional 
standards, increased rapidly from 16% of GNP in 1980 to 32% of GNP in 1990 (Uvin 1998).  
The financial crisis was exacerbated by drought (1984), excessive rain (1987), plant 
disease (1998), and, of course, the civil war that began in the 1990s. However, the major causes 
of the crisis were structural. Rwanda’s dependence on coffee made the country vulnerable to 
international price swings, and its industrial sector was mismanaged and expensive. Additionally, 
since the 1980s the state had faced a balance-of-payment deficit and had been increasingly 
dependent on foreign aid. Although the country did achieve a positive balance of payments and 
public sector budget in 1984-1985, the collapse in the mining sector and the worldwide decline 
in coffee prices brought about a crisis that the government was unable to manage (Uvin 1998).  
These fiscal challenges resulted in a $90 million structural adjustment program (SAP) 
with the World Bank in 1991, and additional SAPs in 1992 and 1993. The latter were only 
partially implemented. The SAPs called on the state to devalue the Rwandese franc in order to 
boost coffee exports (leading to inflation), reduce imports, and cut expenditures. There is little 
consensus on the impact of the SAPs, because they were never fully realized due to the civil war 
and 1994 genocide, which spiraled the country into economic and social turmoil. In the 
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following section, I provide a brief overview of the ethnic tensions that, in combination with 
economic challenges, fostered the civil war and 1994 genocide.  
The	  “ethnicity”	  question	  
Historically, three groups of people have co-existed in Rwanda, the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. 
While ethnic identification is now forbidden, Hutus are believed to make up approximately 84% 
of the population, Tutsis 15% and the Twa 1% (CIA n.d.). All three groups speak the same Bantu 
language (Kinyarwanda) and have lived side-by-side and intermarried for centuries. Therefore, it 
is inappropriate to call these groups “tribes.” However, there are stereotypically physical features 
associated with each group.27  
Ethnic divisions have been a part of Rwandan society for centuries. However, their 
meaning and political significance has always been intertwined with class and power and have 
varied over time and between regions (Newbury 1988; 1998). During the Belgian colonial state, 
ethnic divisions became more entrenched and ethnicity became less fluid.28 The Belgian colonial 
state required all Rwandan citizens to carry identity cards, on which their ethnicity was listed. 
During the colonial state, Tutsis were to elevated to positions of power, while Hutus were 
systematically removed from positions of power and excluded from higher education. This 
stifled Hutu advancement for generations (Des Forges 1999). Tutsis gained increased authority 
based on a combination of factors, including administrative efficiency, kinship institutions, and 
                                                
27 The Bwatwa or Twa people are pygmoids who historically were hunters and gatherers in forested areas or 
completed menial tasks for high-raking persons. Hutus are thought to have a more standard Bantu physical 
appearance, resembling the populations of neighboring Uganda. On the other hand, Tutsi are thought to be very tall 
and thin with sharp, angular facial features. While Hutus were historically pastoralists, Tutsis were associated with 
wealth and power largely due to their ownership of cattle (Prunier 1995).  
28 Prior to a census in the 1930s, ethnicity was relatively fluid. E.g., if a Rwandan acquired a great deal of cattle, 
they might “become” a Tutsi. However, in the 1930s, all Rwandan adults were required to declare an ethnicity. This 
ethnicity was then entered into the public record and indicated on mandatory identification cards. This made one’s 
ethnicity more difficult - although not impossible - to change (Des Forges 1999). 
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racist theories of evolution. The latter argued that Tutsis were a Hamatic race (i.e., the Tutsis 
were descendants of Noah’s son Ham) and, therefore, superior to the Hutu population, which 
was argue to be related to the “Negorid” population of Sub-Saharan Africa (Prunier 1995).   
Through the colonial experience, the cleavages between Hutus and Tutsis grew more 
pronounced and salient. In the 1950s, there were several clashes between the Tutsi minority and 
the Hutu majority, and cleavages between the two groups continued to grow. After 
independence, Hutus came to power, led first by Grégoire Kayibanda (1962-1973) and then 
Juvenal Habyarimana (1973-1994). Over the following decades, ethnic tensions between the two 
groups flared at multiple points, resulting in forced migration and death for many Tutsis. By 
1964, approximately 336,000 Tutsis were living in exile in neighboring states. Between 
December 1963 and January 1964 alone, an estimated 10,000 Tutsis were killed (Prunier 1995).  
The question of ethnicity is exceedingly complex and difficult, and there are multiple 
“contested histories” in Rwanda (Newbury 1998). What is most important to keep in mind is that 
divisions between Hutus and Tutsis are not primordial. Although ethnicity is clearly a salient 
cleavage in Rwanda, its importance is deeply tied to issues of power and class. As Uvin writes, 
ethnicity in Rwanda is “not a matter of ‘objective’ cultural or physical distinctions but rather is a 
social construct, an ‘imagined community’” (Anderson 1983; Uvin 1998: 15).29  
Civil	  war	  and	  genocide	  	  
In the 1990s, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a force largely composed of Tutsi 
refugees living in neighboring Uganda, invaded Rwanda from the north. Their advancement 
began a civil war and reignited ethnic fears. Far from being an unorganized and inexperienced 
                                                
29 For a more details on ethnicity in Rwanda, the reader is encouraged to see works by Gérard Prunier (1995), Scott 
Straus (2006), Alison Des Forges (1999), René Lemarchand (2009), and Lee Ann Fujii (2009). 
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militia, the RPF contained experienced military personnel due to the training many members 
received in the Ugandan Army.30 The RPF was originally commanded by General Fred 
Twigema, but, when Twigema was killed (allegedly by friendly fire), Major Paul Kagame 
returned from military training in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (USA) to take command. Under 
Kagame’s leadership, the RPF advanced relatively quickly against the government forces, the 
Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) (Prunier 1995). Approximately 9,000 soldiers and civilians 
were killed as a result of the civil war (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005).  
In 1993, a peace agreement between the Hutu-led government and the Tutsi-led RPF was 
negotiated in Arusha, Tanzania. The so-called Arusha Peace Accords resulted in a cease-fire and 
the implementation of a transitional government. Additionally, a UN peacekeeping mission 
(UNAMIR) was dispatched to the region. However, the tides changed once again when, on April 
6, 1994, a plane crashed over Kigali Airport, killing the current (Hutu) Rwandan president, 
Juvenal Habyarimana, and his Burundian counterpart. Who is responsible for the attack is still 
unknown, although many blame the RPF.31  
Based on these speculations, within hours, what is now known as the Rwandan genocide 
began. In approximately 100 days an estimated 800,000 Rwandans (mostly Tutsi and moderate 
Hutus) were killed.32 The Rwandan army and militarized gangs and small local militias known as 
the Interahamwe were largely responsible for the killings (Mamdani 2002; Straus 2006). The 
                                                
30 Many members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front gained wartime experience through participating in the Uganda 
Bush War, which brought the currently Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni, to power in 1986. 
31 In 2006, French judge Jean Louis Bruguiere issued arrest warrants for nine senior RPF officials, including 
President Kagame, on charges that they were responsible for downing Habyarimana's plane. The indictment led to 
the arrest of a senior aide to Kagame, Rose Kabuye, in Germany in 2008. The charges were vehemently denied by 
Kagame and were eventually dropped in December 2010 after a leaked US cable suggested they were politically 
motivated (Kanuma 2010). 
32 This figure represents a median consensus that has developed in the literature on the Rwandan genocide. Some 
reports cite the total number of deaths as low as 500,000 and others as high as 1.2 million.  
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genocide (and civil war) officially ended on July 4th, 1994 when the RPF, led by General Paul 
Kagame, took Rwanda’s capital city, Kigali. 
Western	  Involvement	  
How much did Western states and aid agencies know about the possibility of genocide in 
Rwanda? This too is a very difficult question (both because the facts are somewhat muddy and 
the political implications are large). However, there is significant evidence that Western actors 
knew that genocide was likely but chose to ignore the warning signs. By most accounts, it was 
clear that the human rights situation in Rwanda was rapidly deteriorating in the early 1990s. In 
1993, two international commissions (one from the UN and the other from a collection of human 
rights organizations) warned of a possible genocide (Power 2001).  
Some donors responded to alleged human rights violations by limiting foreign aid.33 
However, overall, most donors did not make significant changes to their activities in Rwanda. 
Although Germany and Belgium threatened to cut aid on human rights grounds, they never did 
(Reyntjens 1994: 194). Uvin writes, “The aid community largely continued business as usual, as 
if oblivious to the challenges facing Rwandese society” (1998: 86). 
Warnings of an impending crisis intensified in early 1994. The so-called “Dallaire fax” 
was sent on January 4, 1994, some three months before the genocide began. In this 
correspondence, Romeo Dallaire, commander of UNAMIR, reported to UN headquarters that a 
reliable informant claimed, “he has been ordered to register all Tutsi in Kigali. He suspects it is 
for their extermination. The example he gave was that in twenty minutes his personnel could kill 
                                                
33 For example, the Swiss Development Cooperation shifted its aid commitments from three to five years to annual 
distribution. In 1992, the United States cut aid, and, in 1993, it channeled aid primarily through NGOs and the 
World Food Programme (Uvin 1998). 
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up to 1000 Tutsis.”34 Dallaire was prepared to act on this information by raiding arms caches 
identified by the informant but was forbidden to do so by the then head of UN Peacekeeping, 
Kofi Annan. (Annan would later become UN Secretary-General.) Instead, Dallaire was 
instructed to inform President Habyarimana, whose government was later directly implicated in 
the genocide, of the informant’s claims (Power 2001).35  
Even once the genocide was underway, the international community did little to stop the 
atrocities. Most donor agencies evacuated their foreign staff, leaving not only the population at-
large but also their own local staff to perish. During the three days in which approximately 4,000 
foreigners were evacuated, approximately 20,000 Rwandans were killed. As Des Forges (1999) 
points out, western leaders (often due to very little knowledge of the context) had difficultly 
separating out the civil war violence from the genocidal acts being committed. Their focus was 
on rescuing the now defunct Arusha Peace Accord instead of stopping the atrocities. Stepping up 
the military intervention would have likely had a large impact. However, instead, UNAMIR lost 
its best troops during the height of the killings when Belgium withdrew its forces from Rwanda 
on April 19th, 1994 (Power 2001).  
Enabling	  and	  fostering	  genocide?	  
While the lack of international intervention in 1993 and 1994 is by now relatively well-
known, the role Western actors played in enabling and/or fostering the genocide is discussed far 
less. In particular, France has faced intense criticism for its support of Juvénal Habyarimana’s 
regime. Located at the border between Francophone and Anglophone Africa, Rwanda is 
strategically important for France, and the Habyarimana regime was closely tied to France and 
                                                
34 A full copy of the fax can been seen at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/warning/cable.html.  
35 For a full account of the UN response, or lack of response to the genocide, see Dallaire’s memoir (2005) and 
Barnett (2002). 
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its former president, François Mitterrand. There is little doubt that French support extended 
Habyarimana’s presidency (Kroslak 2007; McNulty 2000).  
Throughout the conflict between the Habyarimana government and the RPF, France 
supplied arms and military training to the Presidential Guard; the same guard that eventually 
trained the genocidal Interahamwe militias (McNulty 2000, 1997). Just two years before the 
genocide, the French government financed a $6 million arms deal between the Egyptian 
Government and the Rwandan government.36 In addition to financial support, there are 
allegations that French paratroopers directly participated in the war against the RPF by manning 
artillery positions and arresting Tutsis for the Rwandan army. While the French government 
denies these allegations, there is a decent amount of evidence to support them (Melvern 2000). 
To this day, France denies any responsibly for the genocide (Kroslak 2007) and tensions remain 
strained between the Anglophone leaning RPF and Paris.37   
In Aiding Violence, Peter Uvin extends the blame beyond France, arguing that the 
“development enterprise” fostered the conditions that led to the 1994 genocide. Uvin argues that 
development cannot be seen as distinct from Rwandan domestic socioeconomic and political 
processes, as development always interacts with processes of elite reproduction, social 
differentiation, political exclusion, and culture change. Uvin argues that development in Rwanda 
exacerbated conditions of social exclusion and underlying tensions among Hutus and Tutsis. 
Consequently, the development enterprise is not only guilty of failing to prevent and stop the 
                                                
36 Boutros Boutros-Gahli, who was then the Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs but became UN Secretary 
General shortly thereafter, oversaw the arms deal. 
37 In 2008, a Rwandan commission produced a report (commonly called the “Mucyo Report”) on French 
involvement in the genocide. The 500-page report cites evidence that France helped train the ethnic Hutu militia 
perpetrators and accuses French troops of being direct involved in the killings. It also names thirty-three senior 
French military and political figures (including the former President, Francois Mitterrand, and Prime Minister, 
Edouard Balladur) that the commission argues should be prosecuted. France has denounced the report (BBC News 
2008). 
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genocide, but also of exacerbating the conditions that led to genocide in the first place (Uvin 
1998). 
4.2.	   The	  Post-­‐Genocide	  Period,	  1994	  to	  the	  Present	  
In present day Rwanda, post-genocide development and reconstruction is generally 
divided into three periods: the emergency aid period (1995-1997), the transition period (1998-
2001), and the sustainable development period (2002-present).38 Although these distinctions are 
somewhat artificial, they do reflect the changing nature of development and aid in Rwanda. The 
period after the genocide was characterized by huge amounts of humanitarian aid. In the late 
1990s, attention shifted towards building state-capacity and institutions. In 2003, the constitution 
went into effect and the first post-genocide elections took place. 
In the following section, I provide an overview of development and governance in post-
genocide Rwanda. The current Rwandan leadership has often attempted to link Rwanda’s 
economic development to that of the so-called “Asian Tigers;” whose approach to economic 
development is characterized by interventionist policies combined with strong limits on political 
freedom. The result has been a fairly impressive track record of economic growth since the 
genocide. However, in recent years, criticism of the GoR and its policies has increased. Some 
suggest that Rwanda is taking the South Korean or Taiwanese model (in which democratization 
comes only after sustained economic growth), while others argue that Singapore is a more apt 
model (Longman 2011).39  
                                                
38 According to one of my interviewees, the government called a meeting in 1998 (which she was present at) and 
said now the emergency phase is over. Now we are in the “development stage” (Interview I-XVI, 11.10.09). 
39 Rwanda is also sometimes linked to Singapore, because of its tough stance on corruption (Zorbas 2011) 
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Development	  and	  foreign	  assistance	  
Rwanda has developed at impressive rates since the genocide (see table 4.3). GNP 
growth has averaged at over 6%. In 2008, GNP was $4.46 USD billion (up more than $3 billion 
since in its lowest point in 1994) and the growth rate was an outstanding 11.23%.40 In 2005, 
Rwanda reached the completion point under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries program 
(HIPC), entitling them to debt relief of $1.4 billion in nominal terms (IMF 2005).41 In 2009, the 
World Bank labeled Rwanda the “top global reformer” in its “Doing Business” report (2009). 
Table	  4.3:	  Economic	  Indicators	  for	  Rwanda,	  1994-­‐2008	  
 
 
GDP  
(Current US$ 
billion) 
GDP growth  
(Annual %) 
GNI per 
capita, Atlas 
(Current US$) 
Aid as % of 
National 
Budget 
1994 0.75 -50.25 160 94.41% 
1995 1.29 35.22 230 53.71% 
1996 1.38 12.75 240 33.66% 
1997 1.85 13.85 270 12.40% 
1998 1.99 8.86 270 17.60% 
1999 1.93 7.58 270 19.32% 
2000 1.74 8.10 250 18.53% 
2001 1.67 8.50 230 18.19% 
2002 1.64 11.00 210 21.83% 
2003 1.78 0.30 200 18.85% 
2004 1.97 5.30 220 24.84% 
2005 2.38 7.10 250 24.32% 
2006 2.83 7.29 290 20.67% 
2007 3.41 7.94 330 20.89% 
2008 4.46 11.23 410 N/A 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
Despite these positive trends, it is important to keep in mind that a considerable percentage of the 
population still lives under the poverty line (56.9% in 2005/06). Additionally, many are 
concerned about rising inequality in Rwanda. Between 1985 and 2000, Rwanda’s Gini 
                                                
40 GNP per capita stayed relatively constant until the mid-2000s, largely due to the huge influx of returning refugees. 
41 Nominal terms refers to the actual dollar value of debt service forgiven over a period of time (IMF 2005). 
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coefficient rose from 28.9 to 46.8 (CIA n.d.), and the African Development Bank (AfDB 2008) 
estimates that, in 2006, it rose again to 51.42  
Furthermore, despite Kagame’s proclivity to denounce foreign aid, Rwanda continues to 
be a highly aid-dependent nation. Rwanda’s aid dependency has decreased sharply from a high 
of 94.92% immediately following the genocide. However, it remains well over the ODA as 10% 
of GNI mark, which is generally utilized to identify an aid-dependent county. According to the 
World Bank’s Development Indicators, ODA as a percentage of GNI has remained over 20% 
since the early 2000s. Figure 4.2 below provides an overview of ODA to Rwanda from 1995-
2008.43  
Figure	  4.2:	  ODA	  to	  Rwanda,	  1995-­‐2008	  (current	  USD	  million)44	  
 
Source:	  World	  Development	  Indicators	  and	  OECD-­‐DAC45	  
 
As figure 4.2 illustrates, Rwanda received a large amount of emergency aid immediately 
after the genocide, but aid declined sharply in the years following.46 Additionally, there was a 
                                                
42 See Ansoms (2005) for a discussion on growth, poverty and inequality in Rwanda following the genocide. 
43 For a discussion of the different sources and discrepancies between Rwanda aid statistics see Tew (2009). 
44 Foreign aid sent to refugee camps in neighboring countries (such as Zaire, Tanzania, and Burundi) between 1995 
and 2000 is not captured in figure 4.2.  
45 OECD-DAC data is available at http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/. Date from the WDI project is available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.  
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smaller decline in ODA in the early 2000s. This was caused by increased Rwandan military 
activity in Eastern DRC (where Hutu militants fled flowing the genocide). However, since 2003, 
aid has been increasing steadily; ODA reached over $893 million in 2008 (OECD-DAC). This 
means that, for the first time, annual foreign assistance surpassed the $882 million sent to 
Rwanda immediately following the genocide. According to a recent report on ODA produced by 
the GoR, 95% of aid to Rwanda comes in the form of grants, with more than half going to the 
social sectors (GoR 2010d).  
The official line is that ODA represents 49% of the GoR’s budget (GoR 2010d). This 
number is conveniently under 50%, and the percentage is likely much higher. During field 
interviews, one NGO representative put the actual figure closer to 90% (Interview I-VIII, 
11.02.09). According to a senior UNDP representative (who was previously on staff at the 
Ministry of Finance), the government’s recent emphasis on private development and 
public/private partnerships is political. The government discourse on aid is that it is a short-term 
solution not a long-term one. However, Rwanda remains a “donor darling” (Interview I-XIV, 
11.06.09).  
As table 4.4 below shows, Rwanda remains much more wedded to foreign assistance than 
other Sub-Saharan African countries and other low-income countries. With only 34,193 
taxpayers in 2009 (in a country with a population of more than 11 million people), dependency 
on foreign aid is not likely to change anytime soon (Rwanda Civil Society Platform 2010: 5).47  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
46 There are discrepancies between different agencies reporting on the amount of aid sent to Rwanda (and 
elsewhere). See Tew (2009) for a discussion of the different sources and discrepancies between Rwandan aid 
statistics.  
47 Decreasing dependency also means increasing compliance with the existing tax code. While large taxpayers have 
a compliance rate of 94.9%, there is low compliance among small to medium taxpayers – 37.6% (Rwanda Civil 
Society Platform 2010, 23). 
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Table	  4.4:	  Aid	  Dependency	  in	  Rwanda,	  2008	  
 Rwanda Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Low-income 
countries 
Amount of aid per capita ($) $96 $49 $45 
As % of GNI 21% 4.3% 9.2% 
As % of gross capital formation 86.7% 22% 39.6% 
As % of imports 63.6% 8.8% 21.4% 
Source:	  World	  Development	  Indicators	  
Post-­‐genocide	  governance:	  The	  Rwandan	  Patriotic	  Front	  and	  Paul	  Kagame	  
Since 1994, Rwanda has been led by the RRF, which now functions as a political party 
and the state military. The core-base of the RPF is small, largely made up of English-speaking 
Tutsis refugees who fled to Uganda prior to 1994. In other words, the core constituency of the 
current regime is a small percentage of the already minority Tutsi ethnic group (Strauss and 
Waldorf 2011).  
At the helm of the RPF is its wartime leader Paul Kagame. Although Pasteur Bizimungu 
(a moderate Hutu) was initially appointed interim president, Kagame ruled from behind the 
scenes, serving as Minister of Defense and Party Chairman. Kagame officially took over as 
president in 2000 after Bizimungu resigned.48 In 2003, Kagame won the country’s first post-
genocide election with an overwhelming 95.5% of the vote. In August 2010, Kagame was re-
elected to another seven-year term with 93% of the vote (African Elections Database 2010). 
There are both fans and critics of the current state of Rwandan politics and President 
Kagame’s leadership. Well-known journalists and public intellectuals, such as Stephan Kinzer 
(2008), Philip Gourevitch (2009), and Fareed Zakaria (2009), hail Rwanda as a site of 
remarkable transformation. In a recent article, Zakaria wrote, “Rwanda has become a model for 
                                                
48 Bizimungu later became a critic of the regime and attempted to form an opposition party. In 2002, he was 
convicted for embezzling state funds, inciting violence, and criminal association. He claims these charges were 
politically motivated (BBC News 2006).  
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the African renaissance. It is now stable, well ordered, and being rebuilt every month.” He 
added, “Ask anyone who has studied Rwanda—African or Westerner—what its secret is and 
they will say leadership, by which they mean Paul Kagame” (2009). Kagame’s supporters 
include President Bill Clinton, who awarded Kagame his Global Citizen award in 2009 (Clinton 
Global Initiative 2009), and Former UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, who serves as an advisor to 
Kagame (Wintour 2008). In 2009, Kagame was named on of the “fifty faces that shaped the 
decade” by the Financial Times (2009) and one of Time Magazine’s “Time 100” in the category 
“leaders and revolutionaries” (Warren 2009).  
However, in other circles Kagame and his policies face intense criticism. Much of this 
criticism has historically come from human rights advocates, who are critical of RPF 
involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire),49 constraints on 
individual freedoms and the press, and reports of arbitrary detention and coercive practices 
within Rwanda itself.  
Recently, more scholarly critiques of RPF policies have also emerged. In a recent volume 
on state-building and human rights in Rwanda, several well-known Rwandan scholars “register 
considerable concern.” In summarizing the volume, the editors, Scott Strauss and Lars Waldorf, 
note that: 
Based on their research and experiences, most contributors to this volume 
have developed deep concern about the depth and durability of Rwanda’s 
recovery, even while recognizing the country’s achievements…the volume 
calls attention the social and political costs of repression, exclusion, growing 
inequality, a general climate of fear and intimidation, and impunity for crimes 
                                                
49 The RPF and Kagame have been accused of both supporting and participating in the ongoing atrocities in the Kivu 
region of the DRC. Such accusation recently received more weight when a UN mapping exercise of the atrocities 
committed in Eastern Zaire from 1993-2003 was leaked. The report suggests that the Hutu population living in Zaire 
(not just persons responsible for the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis) were directly targeted, constituting a potential 
genocide and documents RPF involvement in such campaigns (Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights 2010). The GoR denounced the mapping exercise both in the popular press (threatening to withdrawal 
Rwandan peacekeeping troops in Sudan) and in a formal statement (GoR 2010e). 
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against humanity and war crimes committed in Rwandan and in the DRC 
(2011, 7). 
 
The editors go on to suggest that Rwanda has all of the traits identified by James Scott as 
necessary for “the most tragic episodes of state-initiated social engineering” (Scott 1998, 4; 
Stauss and Waldorf 2011, 12-13).  
As table 4.5 shows, Rwanda has made many improvements to governance since 1996, 
including huge gains in “control of corruption” and “government effectiveness.” However, 
Rwanda’s score for “voice and accountability” remains low due to limited freedom of expression 
of the citizenry and press,50 and accusations of politically motivated detention, amongst other 
things.  
Table	  4.5:	  Worldwide	  Governance	  Indicators	  for	  Rwanda,	  1996-­‐2008	  
 1996 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 
Voice & Accountability 12.4 8.2 8.2 9.6 11.5 13 
Political Stability  4.8 4.8 4.8 23.1 26.4 37.3 
Government Effectiveness 5.7 18.5 14.2 28.4 43.1 48.3 
Regulatory Quality 5.4 13.7 22 28.8 31.2 33.3 
Rule of Law 5.4 13.7 22 28.8 31.2 33.3 
Control of Corruption N/A 28.6 35 37.9 55.3 59.4 
Source:	  The	  Worldwide	  Governance	  Indications	  Project51	  
 
In particular, many are concerned about Rwanda’s laws on divisionism, sectarianism, and 
genocide revisionism and ideology (see, for example, Burnet 2007; Human Rights Watch 2010). 
Such laws, which have increasingly been strengthened over the course of the 2000s, establish 
stiff penalties for those guilty of ambiguous crimes, such as “genocide revisionism” or being a 
“spokesperson for genocide ideology.” They have been used to suspend the BBC Kinyarwanda 
                                                
50 In August 2009, the GoR passed a new law on the media that gives the Media High Council a great deal more 
authority, including the power to suspend newspapers and impose criminal penalties on journalists who incite 
discrimination or show contempt to the president. The law also requires all journalists to have formal training in 
communication or journalism, which most journalists at independent papers do not have (Department of State 2009; 
Human Rights Watch 2010).  
51 Available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
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radio service, accuse well-know human rights advocates, such as Alison Des Forges,52 and 
remove opposition candidates from competition (Waldorf 2011). According to Waldorf, “… 
Rwanda’s law on genocide ideology is so broadly drafted that it is easily manipulated for 
personal and political reasons. It also conflates any challenges to the government with genocide 
ideology” (2011, 59).  
In Rwanda, power is largely thought to be concentrated in a small, inner circle. The 2003 
constitution established an independent parliament and judiciary branch. However, parliament is 
dominated by RPF representatives and is widely viewed as “a rubber stamp to policy initiatives 
emerging from the ministries and the president’s office" (Burnet 2007: 4). In parliamentary 
elections, the RPF and its allies won 73.8% of the vote in 2003 and 78.8% in 2008 (Longman 
2011).53 Similarly, judicial independency is questionable on many fronts, and the RPF has not 
been able to answer the many allegations leveled against it.54  
Furthermore, since the mid-1990s, the GoR has expressed a strong skepticism about civil 
society. In December 1995, the GoR suspended the operations of eighteen NGOs, and an 
additional thirty-eight were told to leave within a week.55 The GoR produced reports in 1996 and 
1997 that claimed NGOs were uncontrolled, uncoordinated, competitive, and diverted human 
resources from the government. The reports also claimed that NGOs often overlapped, did not 
cooperate in evaluations, were not transparent and spread too thinly, lacked quality staff, and 
                                                
52 Des Forges, who died in a plane crash in 1999, was well-know for her activism and detailed accounts of the 1994 
genocide (see, for example, Des Forges 1999). Therefore, accusing her with genocide denial is bizarre. 
53 Longman (2011) argues that, while in 2003 presidential electors were altered to favor the RPF candidate, the 2008 
parliamentary elections were altered to look more democratic. According to sampling carried out by EU election 
monitors, the RPF actually got close to 94% of the vote. Longman argues that this was largely because communities 
fear the repercussions of not supporting the RPF.  
54 According to Human Rights Watch, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that the RPF 
killed between 25,000 and 45,000 civilians in 1994 (Human Rights Watch 2010: 2). However, Rwanda has only 
tried 36 soldiers. Additionally, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has faced intense criticism for 
declining investigations on war crimes allegedly committed by the RPF (Burnet 2007). 
55 A third of the NGOs asked to leave were French (Hayman 2006). 
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encouraged limited knowledge transfer (Hayman 2006: 100). NGOs that are critical of the 
government’s record on human rights, including press freedom and arbitrary detention, have 
been particularly targeted (Gready 2011). 
4.3.	  	   Rwanda’s	  Contemporary	  Development	  Partners	  
Below, I discuss the aid portfolio of the largest multilateral and bilateral donors to 
Rwanda. (See table 4.6 for a list of Rwanda’s top twenty donors.) There are important 
differences between the donors’ approaches to development. These differences stem from a 
variety of factors, ranging from traits of the donors themselves (i.e. ideology, purpose, 
organization, and management) to the particular nature of the donor’s relationship with the 
country or region. For example, the Netherlands and the UK both had ministers that took a 
particular interest in Rwanda immediately following the genocide.  
Additionally, how individual donor representatives view Rwanda and the Rwandan 
leadership influences the country’s aid portfolio. As Hayman argues “…it is possible to ‘read’ 
Rwanda in very different ways, and this is very important for reflecting on relations between the 
GoR and donors, as how donors understand Rwanda and the GoR depends greatly upon their 
perceptions of the state and country” (2006: 145). Depending on what aspects are focused on, i.e. 
Rwanda’s economic successes or its human rights record, the image can look very different. 
(Unsworth and Uvin (2002) refer to this duality as the “contradictory faces” of Rwanda).   
Differences between donors manifest themselves most readily in the types of aid 
programs that donors pursue. As the subsequent chapters explore further, certain donors prefer to 
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work with the Rwandan government and provide budget support, while others prefer to fund 
individual projects. This section introduces the reader to these differences.56  
Table	  4.6:	  Top	  Twenty	  Donors	  to	  Rwanda	  
Top 20 Donors, ODA Total (net 
disbursements), 2008 Only 
 Top 20 Donors, ODA  (net 
disbursements), 1994-2008 
Donor US$ million Donor US$ million 
1. IDA 133.44 1. IDA 1175.81 
2. United States 114.81 2. United States 1067.5 
3. United Kingdom 106.96 3. EC 1057.6 
4. EC 95.57 4. United Kingdom 1012.71 
5. Global Fund 77.64 5. Netherlands 574.38 
6. AfDF  61.45 6. Belgium 501.1 
7. Belgium 60.67 7. Germany 442.48 
8. Netherlands 36.16 8. WFP 382.31 
9. IFAD 27.57 9. AfDF 358.08 
10. Germany 22.89 10. UNHCR 263.2 
11. Spain 22.82 11. Canada 251.8 
12. Japan 15.75 12. Sweden 234.01 
13. Canada 13.81 13. Global Fund 230.89 
14. Sweden 13.73 14. Norway 206.01 
15. Arab Agencies 10.65 15. France 203.42 
16. Nordic Dev. Fund 10.37 16. UNICEF 165.84 
17. UNICEF 7.86 17. Switzerland 156.42 
18. Luxembourg 7.39 18. IMF  126.67 
19. WFP 6.82 19. UNDP 105.83 
20. GAVI 5.87 20. IFAD 96.76 
Source:	  OECD-­‐DAC	  
Multilateral	  Aid	  Agencies	  
Figure 4.3 below provides an overview of ODA disbursements since 1994 for the three 
largest multilateral donors to Rwanda: the International Development Association (IDA), the 
African Development Bank (AfDB), and the European Commission (EC). IDA, better known as 
the World Bank, is the largest donor to Rwanda. It has distributed over $1.2 billion USD to 
Rwanda since 1994. However, funding from the World Bank has been highly variable with sharp 
                                                
56 See Hayman (2006) for a lengthy discussion on the differences between all of Rwanda’s donors, as well as the 
many reasons for these differences. See chapter three, in particular.  
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declines in 2000, 2003, and 2006. The EC and AfDB (through its funding mechanism the 
African Development Fund) provide a more consistent source of aid. Both have dramatically 
increased their foreign assistance packages to Rwanda in the years since the genocide.  
Figure	  4.3:	  ODA	  from	  Multilateral	  Donors,	  1994-­‐2008	  (current	  USD	  millions)	  
 
Source:	  OECD-­‐DAC	  
 
In addition to providing large amounts of aid, the World Bank is a very active 
development partner in Rwanda. According to its Country Assistance Strategy, it currently has 
eleven active projects in Rwanda, plus budget support. Commitments from the World Bank 
Group57 are projected to reach $516 million over fiscal years (FY) 2009-12. The only sector that 
the Bank does not have a presence in (intentionally) is political governance. However, no new 
funding for education, water and sanitation, HIV/AIDs, urban management or public sector 
reform is planned for FY2009-2012, as the bank focuses on budget support (The World Bank 
2008). Currently the World Bank co-chairs four sectors, more than any other donor.58 
                                                
57 The World Bank Group in Rwanda also includes the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA); however, the amount of aid contributed by these organizations is much 
lower than the amounts contributed by IDA. 
58 Those sectors are agriculture, livestock, and forestry; energy, ICT, science, and technology; public administration; 
and capacity building. 
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Additionally, it took the lead in preparing both the agriculture and energy sector-wide 
approaches or SWAPs (see pg. 128) (The World Bank 2008; AfDB 2008).  
The next largest multilateral donor is the European Commission. According to its country 
strategy paper, the EC plans to allocate €290 million (approximately $409 million59) in long-
term programmable development	   operations to Rwanda during FY 2008-2013 (European 
Commission 2007, 38).60 The EC is an active donor in eleven sectors and leads the roads and 
transportation sector (AfDB 2008; European Commission 2007). The EC currently sees itself in 
a “fourth phase” of development in Rwanda. This phase is characterized by increased alignment 
with the GoR and its poverty reduction strategy, and greater alignment with other donors. 
As part of its focus on alignment, the EC has increasingly been providing direct budget 
support. The EC began budget support in Rwanda in 1999 and, since 2000, has provided, on 
average, €20 million (approximately $28 million) per year in budget support to Rwanda. During 
the FY 2008-2013, 60% or €175 million (approximately $204 million) of the EC’s funding 
envelope to Rwanda will come in the form of general budget support. In addition, the EC has 
two major focal sectors, rural development, and infrastructure for regional interconnectivity. 
Cumulatively, these sectors will receive 31% of the total amount of aid. The remaining 9% of aid 
will be spread across governance, support for trade, and technical cooperation (European 
Commission 2007). 
In recent years, the African Development Bank (AfDB) has assumed a more central role 
in Rwanda. (The current president of the AfDB, Donald Kaberuka, is Rwandan.) In the mid-
2000s, the AfDB began significantly increasing its funding to Rwanda, and its activity across 
                                                
59 All euro to dollar conversions are based on the conversion rate on July 18th, 2011 (1 euro = 1.41 dollars). 
60 This figure only includes A-allocation funds. There is also a smaller amount of B-allocation funds (€4 million) for 
unforeseen needs. 
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sectors grew. According to its country strategy for 2008-2009, the organization is guided by two 
main pillars: economic infrastructure, and competitive and enterprise development. Specific 
projects include involvement in the Methane Gas Project at Lake Kivu61 and the Rwanda Private 
Sector Capacity Building Project (AfDB 2008). Recently the AfDB also began providing general 
budget support to Rwanda. For the FY 2010/2011, the AfDB promised $27.6 million in direct 
budget support to the GoR (Kagire 2009). 
While the United Nations no longer provides large amounts of aid to Rwanda,62 it still 
maintains a strong presence, due to its active involvement across sectors and its role in aid 
coordination.63 As it does in many countries, the UN in Rwanda now serves less as a direct 
funder and more as an administrator, advisor, and implementer. According to two interviewees, 
the UN is moving towards a policy advisory role in Rwanda (Interview II-XI, 06.16.10; 
Interview I-VI, 10.30.09). 
The UN assumed responsibility of aid coordination in Rwanda in 1999, and today has the 
largest on-the-ground presence of any organization in the country. They now co-chair a forum 
for development partners and the GoR (see chapter six, pg. 121), and several common funds are 
facilitated by UN agencies.64 Rwanda is also a pilot “One UN” country. The One UN program, 
which began in 2007, is intended to coordinate the multiple UN bodies working simultaneously 
in one country and is based on four principals: one leader, one budget, one programme, and one 
office (United Nations 2007).   
                                                
61 This project seeks to extract and convert methane gas currently found in Lake Kivu into energy. 
62 Immediately following the genocide, UN institutions provided large amounts of ODA. In 1995 alone, UN 
institutions gave $346.62 million. The majority of this aid was emergency aid and came from the UNHCR 
($118.81m) and the World Food Programme ($178.63m). However, since the emergency phase, UN direct funding 
has dropped dramatically. In 2008, the total ODA from all UN institutions was $25.76 million (OECD-DAC). 
63 The five principals of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework in Rwanda are good governance; 
health, population, HIV, and nutrition; education; environment; sustainable growth and social protection (United 
Nations 2007). 
64 Common funds include an election basket fund and a fund to support aid coordination. 
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Bilateral	  Aid	  Agencies	  
Figure 4.4 graphs annual ODA from Rwanda’s top four bilateral donors since 1994. As 
the figure demonstrates, the US and the UK are by far the largest bilateral donors to Rwanda. 
France is notably absent from this list. The GoR’s public fallout and recent shift away from the 
francophone world had created ripples throughout the Rwandan donor community and marks a 
dramatic change in Rwandan diplomatic relations.65 Immediately following the genocide, a 
group of “new” donors arrived in Rwanda, including the Netherlands, Norway, the UK and 
Sweden. In contrast to the more “traditional” donors, such as France and Belgium, these new 
donors do not have a long history in Rwanda and are not associated with the previous 
Habyarimana regime.  
Figure	  4.4:	  ODA	  from	  Bilateral	  Donors,	  1994-­‐2008	  (current	  USD	  millions)	  
 
Source:	  OECD-­‐DAC	  
 
                                                
65 Tensions between France and Rwanda have been strained since the genocide but came to a head in the mid-2000s. 
In 2006, a French judge issued arrest warrants for nine senior GoR officials, including Kagame. This resulted to in 
the severing of diplomatic ties. However, in 2010, France and Rwanda restored diplomatic relations (BBC News 
2009; Sundaram 2010). 
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The largest of these “new” donors is the United Kingdom, which had no presence in 
Rwanda prior to the genocide, and no bilateral aid program. Immediately following the genocide, 
the UK began providing military and humanitarian assistance, and established an embassy in 
Kigali in 1996. Shortly after, an election brought the Labour Party to power in the UK. The new 
UK government was not only pro-development aid, but also included a strong ally of Kagame, 
Clare Short (who was appointed Minister for International Development).66  
Under the new administration, the UK’s bilateral program in Rwanda expanded rapidly. 
Even though Rwanda isn’t strategically important to the UK, since 2000 it has been one of the 
top ten recipients of UK aid (Hayman 2006).67 While the UK has increasingly been looking at 
Rwanda with a more critical eye, it generally paints a very positive picture of Rwanda and the 
GoR in its policy documents and in dealings with other donors. Former Prime Minister Tony 
Blair serves as an advisor to Kagame, and, in 2009, Rwanda become the second non-former 
colony to join the Commonwealth of States (Kron 2009). 
At the same time that the UK began engaging in Rwanda, it also began experimenting 
with a new approach to development that emphasized partnering with recipient countries. 
Rwanda became a model for this new approach, and the UK began working in close 
collaboration with Rwandan authorities and advocating for budget support to Rwanda. British 
aid to Rwanda now overwhelmingly comes in the form of general budget support, and the UK is 
by far the largest bilateral budget support donor.68  
According to the new Development Assistance Database (DAD), the UK’s Department 
for International Development (DFID) dispersed $56.9 million to Rwanda in the form of general 
                                                
66 A representative from DFID put it this way, ‘the reason DFID is here is Clare Short’ (Interview I-XII, 11.04.09).  
67 See Hayman (2006, chap. 7) for more details on the history and background of the UK’s engagement with 
Rwanda. 
68 Two-thirds of the UK’s aid to Rwanda is dispersed directly into the national budget (Interview I-XII, 11.04.09). 
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budget support and an additional $5 million in sector budget support in 2007.69 In 2008, direct 
budget support from DFID alone constituted 6% of the GoR’s national budget. Furthermore, the 
UK has placed a great deal of faith in Rwandan systems and the current regime. To measure 
progress, the UK relies heavily on the MDGs and targets established by the national poverty 
reduction strategy, for which they strongly advocated. Top GoR officials often refer to the UK as 
a “friend.” 
On the other hand, the United States takes a very different approach in Rwanda (and 
elsewhere). While the UK primarily supports the GoR and little is known about what it does 
outside of the capital city, the United States is involved in multiple projects throughout the 
country (primarily through USAID). The United States is very active in the health sector, where 
it concentrates on HIV/AIDs treatment and prevention. During the FY2004-2008 the US gave 
$151 million to the health sector alone. Rwanda is also one of the threshold countries for the 
newly established United States Millennium Challenge Cooperation (MCC).70 In contrast to the 
UK, US government funds to Rwanda are exclusively project funds, and, as a representative of 
USAID put it, the US is not moving away from project funding unless Congress changes 
(Interview I-III, 10.23.09).71  
As figure 4.4 shows, US involvement in Rwanda spiked post-genocide, with ODA to 
Rwanda reaching $194 million in 1994 and then sharply declining to $10 million 1996. 
However, since the early 2000s, the amount of ODA provided to Rwanda by the US has steadily 
                                                
69 Source: DAD Rwanda, http://dad.synisys.com/dadrwanda/ (December 1, 2010). 
70 The new Millennium Challenge Cooperation targets countries that meet seventeen criteria. Countries fully 
meeting MCC requirements (“compact countries”) are eligible for large, five-year grants. Countries that come close 
to meeting the requirements (“threshold countries”) are eligible for smaller, three-year grants. Rwanda is a threshold 
country, meeting ten of the seventeen indicators. More information about the MCC’s selection criteria can be found 
at http://www.mcc.gov/mcc/selection/index.shtml.  
71 The US is currently “exploring” the possibility of sector budget support to agriculture (Interview II-VIII, 
06.09.10). 
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increased. In 2008, Rwanda received $114.81 million in ODA from the United States. There are 
a number of likely explanations for why ODA to Rwanda has increased rather rapidly, including: 
remorse about the genocide, the creation of AFRICOM (which is responsible for US military 
operations and relations in Africa), and the fact that Kagame is regarded highly by former US 
Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush (Totolo 2009; Kinzer 2008). However, it is 
important to keep in mind that, although Rwanda gets a lot of its aid from the United States, 
Rwanda is not a top recipient of US aid, nor is it a US priority country. 
Several other donors, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden, have also been 
active in Rwanda since the genocide. Belgian development aid has been in Rwanda since 1962, 
when Rwanda achieved independence from Belgium, and Rwanda is currently the number two 
recipient of Belgian foreign aid (OECD 2009a).72 Belgium is involved in many sectors; however, 
its largest contributions are to the health sector. In contrast to the US, it now gives budget 
support to the health sector (see chapter six, pg. 130), although it initially expressed reservations 
about providing budget support.73 
Since 1994, the Netherlands have been a top bilateral donor to Rwanda, focusing their 
work on two broad areas: (1) effective, efficient and increased access to and delivery of basic 
services, and (2) sustainable and equitable production, income and employment for the poor. The 
Netherlands also provides sector budget support (see chapter five).  
Lastly, Sweden’s development aid has historically come in the form of general budget 
support, and its development agency, SIDA, is very active in efforts to promote aid coordination 
and harmonization. Consequently, the GoR and other donors often see Sweden as an influential 
and important donor despite lower amounts of ODA. However, Stokholm suspended general 
                                                
72 Belgium aid is target to a much more limited set of country than the US or the UK.  
73 For an analysis of Belgian support to Rwanda see Hayman (2006, chap. 7). 
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budget support to Rwanda in 2008 after a UN report accused the country of supporting armed 
rebellion in neighboring DRC (Swedish Government Offices 2008).74  
Donor	  differences	  
Although several donors are active in Rwanda, how these donors pursue development 
varies. While the US in many ways continues business as usual, other donors (in particular, the 
UK, EC, and World Bank) have increasingly embraced new aid programs, such as budget 
support, that are thought to promote recipient-country ownership. The difference is stark when 
you look at the percentage of a country’s ODA that is recorded in the Rwandan national budget. 
Table	  4.7:	  Percent	  of	  ODA	  Recorded	  in	  the	  National	  Budget	  by	  Donor	  
Donor 2007  2008  2009/2010  
United Kingdom 96% 74% 94% 
European Commission  80% 69% 92% 
Netherlands 42% 79% 90% 
AfDB 86% 94% 88% 
World Bank 50% 73% 85% 
Germany 46% 77% 62% 
Canada  0% 33% 59% 
United Nations 20% 13% 44% 
Switzerland 0% 34% 39% 
Sweden 52% 54% 25% 
Japan 29% 43% 16% 
United States 0% 1% 0% 
Source:	  Donor	  Performance	  Assessment	  Framework,	  DPAF	  (GoR	  2010b)	  
 
While over 90% of ODA provided by the UK and the EC to Rwanda in FY2009/2010 was 
recorded in the nation budget, 0% of US aid was. The implications of these differences will 
become more apparent as I move through my case studies.  
                                                
74Sweden had previously suspended budget support in 2004. The Netherlands also suspended budget support after 
the 2008 UN report but has since reinstated sector budget support. 
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4.4.	   Concluding	  Remarks	  
In this chapter, I first outlined the contemporary history of development in Rwanda, 
discussing the role of donors and development schemes prior to, during, and after the genocide 
and civil war. This discussion contextualizes the forthcoming case studies (chapters five though 
seven). Rwanda’s history of violent conflict is all the more reason to be attentive to the political 
implications of development and foreign aid in the country.  
Second, I provided a summary of the current Rwandan political context. In particular, I 
focused on the existing domestic power dynamics. Despite the fact that ownership emphasizes 
recipient-country control, there has been little theory on how the domestic political climate 
influences recipient-country ownership. Whether or not domestic actors are tightly or loosely 
coordinated is likely to influence donors’ choices of who to work with, and, consequently, who 
gains influence under the ownership approach. If one or two domestic actors are dominant, it 
only makes sense that donors would work primarily with them.  
In Rwanda, authority primarily rests with the executive branch led by the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front. This is not to say that other domestic actors do not play a role, or that there are 
not attempts to challenge political authority in Rwanda. Diaspora groups outside Rwanda are 
actively organizing to challenge Kagame, and some have recently suggested that serious 
challenges to Kagame’s authority are emerging within the RPF itself (Sterns 2010). However, 
thus far, Kagame and his supporters have dominated the Rwandan political landscape, and 
contestation has largely been kept under wraps. As a result, there is little reason to believe that an 
ownership approach will increase the influence of citizens-at-large in Rwanda.  
Third, I described the major bilateral and multilateral donors currently providing 
development aid to Rwanda. While all donors claim poverty reduction as their main objective, 
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their development strategies are quite different and the salience of the ownership model varies 
across donors. If donors do not prioritize ownership, there is very little reason to expect a change 
in their practices as a result of the global emphasis on ownership.  
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Chapter	  5 	  Poverty	  Reduction	  Strategies	  and	  Budget	  Support	  	  
 
In this chapter, I analyze Rwanda’s experience with the poverty reduction strategy 
process and budget support. Poverty reduction strategies and budget support are the aid 
programs most commonly associated with ownership and the Paris Declaration (Armon 
2007; Hayman 2006; Koeberle, Stavreski, and Walliser 2006; Knoll 2008). Both are thought 
to encourage donors to use national systems and priorities and increase the recipient-
country’s influence over development policy. Historically, aid has been channeled into 
countries through donor-determined projects or through structural adjustment loans laced 
with conditionalities. Alternatively, budget support and poverty reduction strategies allow 
recipient governments to allocate aid towards self-determined priorities and then fund these 
projects using aid money deposited into the national treasury.  
Given the variables of interest outlined in chapter three, in this case study, I am 
looking for evidence that poverty reduction strategies and budget support have allowed the 
GoR to be more involved in decision-making and given them more influence over 
development policy. At the same time, I am looking for evidence that donors have decreased 
their role in policy decision-making, allowing the government to lead—even when it 
conflicts with their interests. Lastly, I am looking for evidence that citizens are playing a 
larger role in decision-making and have a greater say in development policy.  
I find that the GoR has become more involved in decision-making processes. 
However, this increased participation has not necessarily translated into increased influence. 
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I find little evidence that government policymaker’s preferences take precedence over 
donors’ preferences. Contrary to the predictions of the ownership approach laid out in 
chapters two and three, I find that donor participation in budget support and the poverty 
reduction strategy process may actually allow some donors to have more influence by 
integrating them into the day-to-day operations of the Rwandan government. Instead of 
giving up their influence, many donors have simply shifted their tactics, becoming more 
involved in the “policy dialogue” or with technical assistance. This change is more 
pronounced with those donors who have historically advocated for ownership and ownership 
approaches.  
Furthermore, I find no evidence supporting the prediction that poverty reduction 
strategies and budget support increase citizen influence. The domestic actor that has profited 
the most from the poverty reduction strategy process and budget support is the Ministry of 
Finance (in combination with the president’s office). Citizens remain relatively removed 
from decision-making processes, as do local governments and line ministries.  
This chapter is organized into four major sections. First, I provide an overview of the 
two aid programs, explaining how poverty reduction strategies and budget support are 
thought to increase ownership in recipient-countries. I also note recent critiques of budget 
support and the poverty reduction strategy program. My analysis builds on these critiques, 
investigating many of the issues touched on in this work by empirically examining one 
country’s experience with budget support and the poverty reduction strategy process. Second, 
I provide a descriptive overview of the aid programs’ history in Rwanda. I provide a 
summary of Rwanda’s two poverty reduction strategy papers, details on which donors 
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provide budget support and how much they provide, and explain how budget support is 
governed in Rwanda. 
I then move on to my analysis. In this section, I argue that, in Rwanda, the poverty 
reduction strategy program and budget support have resulted in three outcomes contrary to 
the predictions of the ownership model. One, although donors are now more likely to use 
national systems, there is little evidence that donors give preference to government priorities, 
if they are not in line with their own. Two, rather than decrease the role of donors in the 
policy process, participation in budget support likely increases a donor’s say over 
development policy. Three, the Rwandan poverty reduction strategy process and budget 
support have not made the policy process more inclusive or increased domestic 
accountability; instead, these aid programs have centralized domestic authority in the 
Ministry of Finance. I concluded by summarizing how my findings map on to the variables 
of interest identified in chapter three.  
5.1.	   Poverty	  Reduction	  Strategies	  and	  Budget	  Support	  Worldwide	  
Origins	  and	  prominence	  	  
The poverty reduction strategy program emerged in 1999 and budget support shortly 
thereafter. In the 1990s, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program was 
introduced by the Bretton Woods Institutions to provide debt relief to developing countries. 
During a meeting in Cologne, Germany in 1999, the leaders of the G-7 countries added to the 
HIPC requirements that participating countries lay out their own medium-term development 
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goals and strategies in a poverty reduction strategy paper or PRSP (IMF 2010).75 As early as 
2001, seventy low-income states had either a full or interim PRSP and many states are 
currently working on their second or third PRSP.76 Almost all bilateral and multilateral 
donors at least consult the recipient country’s PRSP when designing their country strategies. 
A country’s poverty reduction strategy is supposed to provide a road map for 
development in the recipient country and guide World Bank and IMF aid allocation in each 
recipient country. Instead of countries being told which reforms to make, countries are asked 
to outline their own plans for economic development, which is then funded by donors.  
Following the introduction of the poverty reduction strategy program, donors began 
issuing a new type of program aid (i.e., aid that is not tied to a particular project) linked to the 
country’s PRSP - budget support.77 At a basic level, budget support is a resource transfer 
directly into the budget or treasury of the receiving country. Budget support allows the 
recipient country to use its own allocation, procurement, and accounting structures. While 
sector budget support (SBS) is earmarked for a particular sector, such as education or health, 
general budget support (GBS) is completely un-earmarked (Beasley et al. 2005).  
The adjectives “new” or “partnership” are often added to the term “budget support” to 
distinguish it from alternative forms of program aid, such as structural adjustment loans, 
which were popular in the 1980s and early 1990s.78 “New” budget support places an 
emphasis on partnerships between donors and the recipient government, poverty reduction, 
                                                
75 Other criteria for participation include (1) be eligible to borrow from IDA, (2) face an unsustainable debt 
burden that cannot be addressed through traditional debt relief mechanisms, and 3) a track record of reform and 
sound policies through the IMF and World Bank (IMF 2010). The Joint Boards of the IMF and World Bank 
officially approved the PRSP program in December 1999 (Cheru 2006). 
76 New PRSPs are generally prepared every three to five years. For a full list of all countries with a PRSP or 
interim PRSP see http://go.worldbank.org/LYE7YNYBH0.  
77 Alternative types of program aid include balance of payment support and debt relief (Hammond 2006).  
78 For a discussion on whether or not budget support is really “new” see Knoll (2008). 
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and, most importantly, supports the national development strategy articulated in the country’s 
PRSP (Purcell, Dom, and Ahohamuteze 2006). 
As one interviewee put it, the push for budget support comes from “50 years of 
failure” (Interview I-XII, 11.04.09). Budget support is supposed to provide a more 
sustainable approach to development assistance. Stand-alone development projects can leave 
behind big, temporary structures that are no longer of any use (Interview I-XI, 11.04.09). 
Alternatively, budget support funds long-term initiatives and contributes to the growth of 
sound state structures by directly supporting the state and its initiatives.   
Over the past decade, leading bilateral and multilateral donors have increased the 
percentage of aid given as budget support. As budget support does not require individual 
project approval or additional donor staff, it offers an easy way for donors to increase aid 
quickly. In 2001, thirteen percent of lending from the World Bank came in the form of 
budget support (Barkan 2009). Budget support now accounts for approximately half of 
World Bank lending through IDA and half of the grants provided to Africa through the 
Poverty Reduction Support Credit mechanism. Additionally, roughly half of UK and EC aid 
is provided as budget support (Hayman 2011). The majority of budget support (60-70%) goes 
to Sub-Saharan Africa, where, on average, 30% of a country’s budget now comes from 
general budget support (Knoll 2008).  
Accurate data on budget support are difficult to come by.79 However, from 2003 to 
2008 the Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA) conducted a yearly survey of African 
                                                
79 Data on budget support should approve soon. The DAD Working Party on Statistics agreed on a new 
classification of aid modalities and instruments that will take effect in 2011 that includes GBS and SBS (OECD 
2005b).  
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countries engaged in general budget support.80 This dataset is not without its flaws: it is not 
comprehensive, commitment and disbursement rates are self-reported, and the number of 
countries in the survey fluctuates. However, it is the most extensive source of data on budget 
support currently available. Using data from the SPA budget support alignment surveys, 
figure 5.1 provides of snapshot of general budget support to Sub-Saharan Africa since 2003.  
Figure	  5.1:	  General	  Budget	  Support	  to	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  2003-­‐2008	  (in	  USD	  million)	  81	  
 
Source:	  Strategic	  Partnership	  for	  Africa	  Budget	  Support	  Alignment	  Survey82	  
 
Predictions	  of	  poverty	  reduction	  strategies	  and	  budget	  support	  
Poverty reduction strategies and budget support are thought to promote ownership for 
several reasons analogous to the predictions of the ownership approach outlined in chapter 
two. First, both PRSPs and budget support are supposed to increase the influence of 
recipient-country governments by encouraging the use of national systems and priorities. 
Historically, aid has been channeled into recipient countries via donor-determined projects or 
                                                
80 An overview of the survey is available at http://www.spasurvey.info.  
81 The decline in budget support from 2007 to 2008 is largely due to a decrease in the number of countries 
surveyed in 2008. If only countries w participated in the both 2007 and 2008 survey are included, the decrease 
is only 1.1% (Strategic Partnership with Africa 2009). 
82 Available at http://www.spasurvey.info/ 
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through grants that are conditional on the recipient making specified changes (i.e., structural 
adjustment loans). In both cases, recipient countries must act according to donor wishes if 
they want donor money.   
Alternatively, the poverty reduction strategy process and budget support are supposed 
to give more control over development policy to recipient-country governments. Instead of 
aid being channeled into countries through self-contained projects with donor-determined 
mandates, governments are supposedly able to allocate aid towards priorities that they 
determine in their PRSPs and then fund these priorities using money that is directly deposited 
into their treasury.  
Budget support is even argued to encourage donors to use national systems for non-
budget support aid. Donors have to trust the accounts into which they deposit aid. Therefore, 
donors often include capacity-building funds in budget support packages, and make budget 
support conditional on improvements in national systems, particularly public financial 
management (PFM) systems (Directorate General for Development 2006). Consequently, 
budget support is argued to create incentives for recipient countries to improve their national 
systems, and, if national systems improve, it is believed that donors will be more willing to 
use national systems for all types of aid.  
PSRPs and budget support are also supposed to decrease donor influence. In the past, 
donors used top-down conditionalities to force recipient states to make specific policy 
changes; or they provided aid in the form of stand-alone, donor-determined projects. This 
resulted in hierarchical (and often antagonistic) relationships between donors and recipient-
country governments. Together, poverty reduction strategies and budget support are 
supposed to decrease how much influence donors have over the policy process and let 
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recipient-countries lead (Amin 2006; Oxfam 2009; Mosley and Abrar 2006). According to 
Cheru, PSRPs “put country-led strategies for development at the heart of development 
assistance” and “democratize recipient-donor relationships, by replacing the politics of 
‘paternalism’ with the politics of ‘partnership’ and ‘mutual accountability’” (2006: 356-57). 
Similarly, Barkan argues that budget support:  
…requires no rigid conditionalities and is, in a fundamental sense, an 
expression of trust by members of the donor community in the anticipated 
performance of recipient governments and, by extension, their leaders. Budget 
support starts with the premise that the relationship between donor and 
recipient will be productive and harmonious and not adversarial (2009: 72). 
 
Lastly, some argue that poverty reduction strategies and budget support increase the 
influence of the recipient-country’s citizens by encouraging higher levels of domestic 
accountability or "...the ability of citizens to hold the state answerable for its actions, and 
ultimately to impose sanctions for poor performance" (Hudson and GOVNET Secretariat 
2009: 4). Although aid provided in the form of budget support still comes from donors, how 
it is spent is dictated by the poverty reduction strategy paper not development agencies. 
Consequently, governments (who draft the PSRP) are responsible for allocating aid, not 
donors. Furthermore, given that budgets are typically approved by the national parliament, in 
theory channeling money through the national budgets allows parliamentarians (who are 
elected by citizens) to influence how aid is allocated. If citizens do not approve of the way 
aid is being spent, they can express discontent through elections and civil society 
mechanisms. Under alternative forms of aid distribution, no such mechanisms exist because 
donors are not reliant on citizens to stay in power (Directorate General for Development 
2006).  
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Critiques	  of	  budget	  support	  and	  PRSPs	  
Early evaluations of both budget support and PRSPs often focused on implementation 
challenges, such as predictability (Celasun and Walliser 2006; Eifert and Gelb 2006) and 
fungibility (Koeberle and Stavreski 2006). However, there has recently been more focus on 
the “political dimensions” of each aid program (Hayman 2011). Much of this newer work 
suggests that there are several flaws with the aid programs, but has not yet provided a clear 
story on how budget support and the poverty reduction strategy program impact aid-
dependent states. Nor has it outlined the specific reasons why budget support has not resulted 
in the predicted outcomes.  
Regarding the impact of the aid programs on donor influence, there is some confusion 
in the literature (and sometimes within the same document). According to some, budget 
support and PSRPs have dramatically impacted donor-government relations—often not for 
the better (Craig and Porter 2003; Unwin 2004). However, others are quick to point out that 
conditionality remains part and parcel of international development, implying that little has 
changed (Hayman 2011).  
What this literature has in common is the claim that donors have not retreated in the 
way often assumed by proponents of the budget support. Missing is a broader understanding 
of when and how donor practices have or have not changed, and a precise understanding of 
the impact of such changes on the influence of government policymakers and citizens. 
Additionally, some studies suggest that donor-government relationships may have changed 
form (Gould 2005; Harrison 2001), but we have no direct evidence of this change, nor a clear 
understanding of how and why such a change occurs.  
Regarding the impact of the aid programs on citizen influence, previous analyses 
have found little evidence of increased accountability or better governance as a result of 
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either budget support or the poverty reduction strategy program. In Tanzania, Lawson and his 
colleagues find that intra-government incentives and democratic accountability failed to 
improve as expected (Lawson et al. 2006), and a five-country case study conducted by 
USAID found that general budget support did not always appear to strengthen democracy or 
public accountability (Beasley et al. 2005). In the most comprehensive evaluation of budget 
support to date, it was found that that general budget support may strengthen the central 
government, but it does not necessarily strengthen democracy or public accountability (IDD 
and Associates 2006, xi). 
What is again missing from this work is a clear picture of why budget support has 
apparently not prompted more citizen influence, or governance reform more broadly.83 The 
research outlined above suggests that citizen influence has not increased, but provides no 
explanation of why it has not. Nor does it explore how budget support and the poverty 
reduction strategy programs have impacted state-society relationships more broadly.  
Furthermore, the assumption that government ownership equals national ownership 
(see pg. 32) has gone largely unexplored in this literature. Hadziyiannakis and Mylonakis 
argue that an implicit, but fundamental, assumption in budget support operations is, 
“governments of recipient countries are genuine representatives of their peoples chosen 
through democratic processes” (2006, 5). How likely is this to reflect reality in many aid-
dependent countries? If governments are not actually representative of their peoples, and 
                                                
83 Hayman (2011) argues that budget support recipients have largely been dismissive of donor pressures to 
reform governance practices (including the withdrawal of budget support). Therefore, budget support has 
largely been ineffective as an instrument of democratic change. However, this focuses on donor influence and 
does not speak to the implicit assumption within predictions of budget support that citizens will be able 
influence the policy process more if government policymakers are more involved and have more influence.  
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budget support and the poverty reduction strategy process gives them more influence, then 
why would we expect greater citizen influence?   
5.2.	   The	  Poverty	  Reduction	  Strategy	  Process	  and	  Budget	  Support	  in	  
Rwanda	  
Rwanda jumped on the poverty reduction strategy bandwagon quite early, finalizing 
its first PRSP in June 2002.84 The first poverty reduction strategy was prepared by the 
National Poverty Reduction Programme (set up by the Ministry of Finance), and was based 
on an interim PRSP finalized in November 2000 and a Participatory Poverty Assessment 
(GoR 2002a). The latter included a national survey, pilot testing of a community action plan, 
and a policy relevance test. The first PRSP also built on Vision 2020, a document outlining 
Rwanda’s economic aspirations published by the Ministry of Finance in 2000.85  
The second poverty reduction strategy, the “Economic Development & Poverty 
Reduction Strategy 2008-2012” or the EDPRS, was finalized in 2007. The EDPRS focuses 
on three themes: Sustainable Growth for Jobs and Exports, Vision 2020 Umurenge, and 
governance.86 The EDPRS builds on the previous poverty reduction strategy but focuses 
more on implementation, which was seen as lacking in Rwanda’s first PRSP (GoR 2007e).  
                                                
84 The full document is available at http://www.imf.org/External/NP/prsp/2002/rwa/01/063102.pdf.  
85 Vision 2020 sets out to transition Rwanda into a middle-income country based on free market principals and 
private investments. Key targets include increasing the per capita income from 290 USD to 900 USD, halving 
the poverty rate from 64% to 30%, and raising life expectancy by six years to fifty-five. Central to Vision 2020 
is the move from subsistence agriculture to a knowledge-based society. Vision 2020 available at 
http://www.gesci.org/assets/files/Rwanda_Vision_2020.pdf.  
86 Sustainable Growth for Jobs and Exports is a public investment program whose goal is to reduce the 
operating costs of business, increase innovation, and widen and strengthen the financial sector. Vision 2020 
Umurenge is supposed to accelerating the poverty reduction rate by promoting the pro-poor elements of the 
national growth plan; the goal is to increase the productive capacity of the rural poor though a combination of 
public works, cooperatives, credit packages and direct support. The final flagship, governance, is supposed to 
anchor pro-poor growth by building on a reputation for low levels of corruption and its comparative regional 
advantage in soft infrastructure (GoR 2007b, i). 
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According to the GoR, it will cost 5,151 billion Rwandan Francs (approximately $8.7 
billion) over the FYs 2008-2012 to implement the EDPRS.87 This figure includes public 
recurrent expenditure, public capital expenditure, and private investment, with the public 
component making up two-thirds or 3,434 billion Rwandan Francs (approximately $5.8 
billion) (GoR 2007e). While all donors are, in theory, supposed to support the EDPRS and its 
priorities, budget support donors directly fund the EDPRS by funding GoR’s budget. As a 
representative of the European Commission told me, they try to support the EDPRS not 
“impose from above” (Interview I-XI, 11.04.09). 
Numbers	  and	  figures	  	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Figure 5.2 below provides an overview of general budget support to Rwanda from 
2003-2008, as reported in the SPA budget support alignment surveys.88 As the chart shows, 
since 2005, over $150 million per year has been distributed to Rwanda in the form of general 
budget support ($185.83 million in FY2007/08). Over the years, budget support appears have 
become more predictable, with almost 100% of committed funds being disbursed in 2008.  
	  
	  
                                                
87 US dollar amounts calculated on February 1, 2011 using the current exchange rate ($1 = 592 Rwandan 
Francs). 
88 The surveys stopped in 2008. 
  
97 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Figure	  5.2:	  General	  Budget	  Support	  to	  Rwanda,	  2003-­‐2008	  (in	  USD	  million)	  
 
Source:	  Strategic	  Partnership	  for	  Africa	  Budget	  Support	  Alignment	  Survey	  
 
General budget support further increased during FYs 2009/2010 and 2010/2011. The budget 
support packaged for 2010/2011 increased pledges by 21% to $335.4 million (Kagire 
2009).89 Figures for sector budget support to Rwanda are incomplete and not worth repeating 
here. However, the amount of sector budget support has quadrupled since 2007, and certain 
sectors, such as education, agriculture, and health, are more supported by budget support than 
others (GoR 2010d). 
Proportionally, Rwanda receives more budget support than any other country in the 
SPA Budget Support Alignment Survey (which surveys the countries receiving the highest 
amounts of budget support in Sub-Saharan Africa). As table 5.1 below indicates, the largest 
                                                
89 In 2009, Rwanda changed its budget cycle when it entered the East African Community.   
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recipient of general budget support in Sub-Saharan Africa is Tanzania. However, when the 
relative size of each country’s economy is taken into account, we see that general budget 
support actually constitutes a larger percentage of Rwanda’s GDP than it does in Tanzania or 
any other country in the survey.  
Table	  5.1:	  General	  Budget	  Support	  Disbursal	  Rates	  by	  County	  
 2004 Survey 2006 Survey  2008 Survey  
 GBS 
Disbursed 
(US$m) 
GBS as % 
of GDP 
GBS 
Disbursed 
(US$m) 
GBS as % 
of GDP 
GBS 
Disbursed 
(US$m) 
GBS as % 
of GDP 
Average 
GBS as % 
of GDP  
Benin  10.92 0.53% 72.06 1.61% 112.27 0.76% 1.06% 
Burkina Faso  131.55 2.65% 186.44 3.10% 236.31 3.50% 3.12% 
Ethiopia  193.48 2.41% 264.66 0.12%   2.06% 
Ghana  301.69 3.69% 331.54 3.44% 306.71 2.04% 3.24% 
Kenya    60.83 0.70%   0.35% 
Madagascar  103.72 1.73% 113.41 2.62%   2.25% 
Malawi  103.08 3.12% 120.82 4.14% 99.73 2.32% 3.08% 
Mali  255.98 4.34% 110.51 2.00% 108.65 1.44% 2.26% 
Mozambique  230.88 4.57% 317.33 4.88% 294.97 3.71% 4.84% 
Rwanda  86.17 2.37% 155.09 6.47% 186.1 5.55% 5.80% 
Sierra Leone  52.26 5.18% 64.08 6.97% 28.93 0.66% 4.93% 
Tanzania  580.38 3.47% 548.13 3.82% 653.4 3.76% 3.78% 
Uganda  404.07 4.93% 346.65 2.73%   3.75% 
Zambia    86.42 1.41% 194.13 1.58% 2.56% 
Source:	  Strategic	  Partnership	  for	  Africa	  Budget	  Support	  Alignment	  Surveys	  
 
Budget	  support	  donors	  
The GoR has a clear and stated preference for direct budget support. In 2010, the 
GoR declared that, “Rwanda's country systems are sufficiently solid and reliable for use by 
Development Partners funds.” Therefore, “Use of country systems and choice of modality in 
the Rwandan context is thus no longer principally dependent on technical improvements but 
rather is subject to political decisions and legal constraints by Development Partners" (GoR 
2010c, 2: emphasis in original). Despite the GoR’s decree, only a few donors provide 
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substantial amounts of budget support to Rwanda. During the FY 2010/11, the World Bank 
pledged $91 million, the EC $80.5 million, the UK $63.1 million, the AfDB $27.6 million, 
Germany $15.2 million, Netherlands $14.4 million, and Belgium $4.3 million (Kagire 2009). 
As these figures make clear, there are four major budget support donors in Rwanda: 
the United Kingdom (UK), the European Commission (EC), the World Bank, and the African 
Development Bank (AfDB). The UK was an early budget support donor due to a close 
relationship between a former UK Minister of International Development, Clare Short, and 
the Rwandan President Paul Kagame. When DFID began budget support in the early 2000s, 
there were no public financial management structures in Rwanda. Therefore, the UK was 
taking a huge leap of faith by providing budget support to the GoR (Interview I-XI, 
11.04.09).  
In the late 2000s, the World Bank and the EC emerged as Rwanda’s top budget 
support donors. Between 2008 and FY 2009/10 both the World Bank and the European 
Commission dramatically increased the percentage of their total aid package provided as 
budget support. While budget support constituted 23% of the EC’s total aid package in 2008, 
budget support was 70% in FY 2009/2010. Similarly, World Bank budget support grew from 
37% in 2008 to 83% in FY 2009/10 (GoR 2010d).  
Three bilaterals also provide smaller levels of budget support to Rwanda. Belgium 
and the Netherlands only provide sector budget support, and Germany just recently began 
budget support in Rwanda. The Dutch were supposed to begin general budget support in 
2008; the money was even ready to be transferred. However, they suspended general budget 
support to Rwanda due to Rwandan military activity in the Eastern Kivu region of the DRC 
and other governance concerns (Interview II-XII, 06.17.10). Stockholm also suspended 
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Swedish budget support in 2008 after a UN report accused the GoR of supporting armed 
rebellion in the DRC (Swedish Government Offices 2008).90  
Both the United States and Canada are exploring the idea of providing sector budget 
support to agriculture to Rwanda (Interview I-XXI, 11.16.09; Interview II-VIII, 06.09.10). 
According to a USAID official, they want to provide budget support and think it would be 
good to do so. Therefore, they have told the government that they will explore whether or not 
Rwanda meets the legal requirements (Interview II-VIII, 06.09.10).91 However, there is little 
indication on when budget support could begin, even if it is deemed legally permissible.  
The	  Budget	  Support	  Harmonisation	  Group	  	  
Budget support in Rwanda is currently overseen by the Budget Support 
Harmonisation Group (BSHG); a working group of the Development Partners Coordination 
Group (see chapter six, pg. 121). Members of the Development Partners Coordination Group 
(which is open to all donors) that provide more than $10 million each year in budget support 
are eligible for membership in the BSHG. The exception to this rule is the IMF, which is 
considered a full member because of its role and mandate regarding macro-economic policy 
issues. Additionally, those giving less can participate in the group as an observer (BSHG 
2008).92 For example, the US was recently invited to sit in on BSHG meetings because of its 
interest in providing sector budget support to agriculture (Interview II-VIII, 06.09.10).93 
                                                
90 One interviewee (a representative of a budget support donor) argued that the global trend toward 
collaboration and partnerships is being complicated by “knee-jerk reactions,” such as withdrawing budget 
support (Interview I-XI, 11.04.09).  
91 However, they would have to provide more than $10m in budget support to have voting power on the BSHG.  
92 The United Nations Resident Coordinator also has observer status. Additionally, those considering budget 
support are often invited to observe. 
93 However, they would have to provide more than $10m in budget support to have voting power on the BSHG.  
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According to its terms of reference, the BSHG is a forum, not a technical working 
group. Its objective is “to create a common understanding of achievements by and 
performance changes for all budget support partners; to provide a forum for open discussion 
and to reduce the transactions cost of budget support” (BSHG 2006b, 1). The BSHG is 
chaired by the Secretary General and Secretary to the Treasury of the Ministry of Finance, 
and donors alternate co-chairing the group every six months.  
Signatories of the BSHG’s memorandum of understanding, commit to “enhancing 
national ownership and domestic accountability,” giving the GoR leadership in this process 
and committing to strengthening the GoR’s capacity to exercise leadership (BSHG 2008, 4). 
Additionally, signatories “agree to ensure that assistance is channeled in a manner that 
responds to the priorities articulated in national places, and making maximum use of 
government systems…” (BSHG 2008, 4). However, the memorandum of understanding very 
explicitly states that it does not supersede bilateral negotiations or treaties.   
Twice a year, the BSHG conducts a review of budget support. These reviews are 
multi-day events and assess Rwanda’s overall progress, as well as its progress in the 
economic, social and governance clusters. The November review is an assessment, while the 
review that takes place in April is forward looking (Interview II-V, 06.05.10).  
During these reviews, the GoR reports to donors using the established Common 
Performance Assessment Framework (CPAF). The CPAF is a set of fifty indicators based on 
Rwanda’s second poverty reduction strategy paper, the EDPRS. These fifty indicators were 
agreed on by donors and the GoR and are supposed to be used by donors as triggers to 
disburse budget support. For example, the UK distributes budget support in both fixed and 
variable payments or “tranches.” The CPAF triggers disbursement of the variable tranche 
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(Interview II-X, 06.10.10).94 The idea is that the donor can choose from a set of triggers that 
the government is aware of and has consented to. The CPAF process has struggled with 
capacity challenges and it is time consuming. However, overall, my interviewees were 
generally positive about the framework and the review process.95 
Recently, a parallel assessment mechanism was established for donors, the Donor 
Performance Assessment Framework (DPAF). The DPAF assesses donors on thirty-two 
indicators.96 However, unlike the CPAF, the DPAF is not tied to aid disbursement. The idea 
for the DPAF came from Mozambique, while the CPAF was a government initiative 
(Interview II-I, 06.01.10).   
5.3.	  	   Findings	  
Poverty reduction strategies and budget support are hypothesized to allow recipient 
countries to be able to exercise more control over the way aid is allocated by getting rid of 
top-down conditionalities and stand-alone projects. At a simplistic level, they accomplish this 
goal. Poverty reduction strategies are “owned” by the national government, and once budget 
support has been transferred to the GoR, it is technically at the discretion of the government.  
However, my review of the poverty reduction strategy process and budget support in 
Rwanda highlights three findings that directly challenge the predictions of the ownership 
model outlined in chapters two and three. First, I find that donors are now more likely to use 
                                                
94 If all CPAF triggers were low, it would say something about the GoR’s commitment and also affect the fixed 
trench (Interview II-X, 06.10.10). 
95 For example, one interviewee told me that the reviews can be a big burden and come with their own 
transaction costs. However, he seem to see value in the CPAF overall. He noted that, although the report quality 
is low, this is recognized and is being worked on (Interview II-XII, 06.18.10). Another interviewee told me that 
when budget support started it was very disorganized. However, it is much better now, as things are more 
structured and the ministries are better prepared (Interview II-XX, 06.29.10). 
96 Twenty-six of these indicators apply to all donors. The remaining eight only apply to budget support donors. 
Baseline data for the DPAF was collected in 2007 and reviews took place in 2008 and 2009/10.  
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national systems; however, there is little reason to believe that they give preference to 
government priorities if they are not in line with their own. Second, I find that, rather than 
decreasing the role of donors in the policy process, participation in budget support increases 
a donor’s say over development policy. Third, I find that the Rwandan poverty reduction 
strategy process and budget support have not made the policy process more inclusive or 
increased domestic accountability, but have instead centralized domestic authority in the 
Ministry of Finance. 
Use	  of	  national	  systems	  and	  priorities	  	  
Table 5.2 uses data from the aforementioned donor performance assessment 
framework (DPAF) to compare how often non-budget support donors and budget support 
donors use national systems. The table shows that both groups have increasingly used 
national systems since 2007 (the first year of the DPAF). However, budget support donors 
use national systems much more often and both groups still use Parallel Implementation 
Units (PIUs) quite often.97 There is no guarantee increases in the use of national systems are 
due to budget support or the poverty reduction strategy; however, the figures do suggest that 
recent efforts to increase the use of national systems through aid programs like budget 
support have led to increases in the use of national systems.   
Table	  5.2:	  Donor	  Performance	  Assessment	  Results	  
  
% of ODA disbursed: 
Non- Budget Support 
Donors* 
Budget Support Donors** 
  2007 2008 2009/10 2007 2008 2009/10 
B1 in the context of a 
Programme-Based 
Approach 10.2% 7.4% 19.7% 43.4% 40.8% 78.0% 
                                                
97 The OECD defines PIUs as “dedicated management units designed to support the implementation and 
administration of projects or programmes” (OECD 2011).   
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B2 using GoR budget 
execution procedures 8.2% 0.6% 10.0% 49.9% 49.3% 61.7% 
B3 using GoR auditing 
procedures 10.8% 4.6% 36.7% 52.8% 42.4% 62.9% 
B4 using GoR financial 
reporting systems 10.8% 3.4% 39.9% 54.8% 49.1% 71.3% 
B5 using GoR 
procurements systems 14.8% 15.2% 50.0% 57.6% 52.0% 80.9% 
B6 Number of parallel 
PIUs 19 14 9 22 4 22 
B7 % of TC provided 
through coordinated 
programmes 59.4% 85% 72.6% 62.6% 68.3% 83.3% 
Compiled	  from	  2009/2010	  DPAF	  (GoR	  2010b)	  
*the	  number	  of	  budget	  support	  donors	  was	  eight	  in	  2007	  and	  2008	  and	  seven	  in	  2009/10	  
**the	  number	  of	  non-­‐budget	  support	  donors	  was	  five	  in	  2007	  and	  2008	  and	  seven	  in	  2009/10	  
 
Does the increased use of national systems mean national priorities are more reflected 
in national policy? Not necessarily. By most accounts, budget support in Rwanda is well 
aligned with the EDPRS. However, given that the EDPRS is a requirement of donors under 
the HIPC program and was produced in heavy collaboration with donors, there is clear 
reason to contest the EDPRS’s billing as a “homegrown” document representing national 
priorities.  
As noted, the poverty reduction strategy program came out of the HIPC program, 
which provides substantial debt relief to participating countries. To qualify for HIPC, the 
boards of both the World Bank and the IMF must endorse a country’s poverty reduction 
strategy. Under the HIPC program, Rwanda received over $1,226.6 million in debt relief 
from the AfDB, World Bank, and IMF (AfDB 2005). Therefore, producing a poverty 
reduction strategy that will be approved by the IMF and World Bank boards is clearly 
  
105 
advantageous to the GoR. Additionally, a country’s progress on its PRSP is reviewed each 
year by the staff of the IMF and World Bank.98 
Furthermore, there are clear guidelines for how PRSPs should be drafted,99 and 
donors are often heavily involved in the drafting process. This was certainly true with the 
EDPRS.100 At a high-level meeting between donors and the GoR in 2007, the Secretary 
General of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning noted “that the EDPRS was 
developed through an extensive 18-month consultation, led at a high-level by GoR and 
involving all major stakeholders in 19 sector working groups and cross-cutting issue groups” 
(GoR 2007d, 8). During my interviews, both GoR and donor representatives further clarified 
that, although Rwanda’s PRSP was “government-driven,” it was produced by all 
stakeholders (Interview II-I, 06.01.10). In other words, donors were actively involved in its 
creation. One donor representative went as far as to say it was “signed off” by donors 
(Interview II-X, 06.10.10).  
The drafting of the EDPRS was officially overseen by the EDPRS National Policy 
Steering Group, a body composed of GoR ministers (and chaired by the minister of finance). 
However, the Technical Steering Group – which was composed of GoR representatives and 
donor representatives from the World Bank, UNDP, EC, and DFID – actually monitored and 
                                                
98 Each year a progress report is produced, and the IMF and World Bank assess these progress reports in a 
“Joint Staff Advisory Note.” Guidelines for preparing these notes can be found at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/PDFs/jsan_apr_guidelines.pdf.  
99 For example, the “PRSP Sourcebook” guides countries in developing and strengthening their poverty 
reduction strategies. The sourcebook is available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPRS/0,,contentMDK:2017574
2~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:384201,00.html.  
100 Hayman noted similar dynamics in the drafting of the first PRSP. She suggests that it was DFID that really 
pushed for the PRSP process to begin with, as they needed for budget support, and that the PRSP was not 
accepted by all parts of the government (Hayman 2006, 168). Additional, she notes that, although the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Credit programme, the World Bank’s mechanism for funding the PRSP, should have been 
drawn from PRSP sector strategies, the World Bank was largely responsible for preparing the strategies (due to 
low capacity and a desire to put Rwanda’s PRSC programme before the board in June 2004 (Hayman 2006, 71). 
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oversaw the consultation process and drafting (GoR 2006a, 5).101 Additionally, donors were 
active in the eleven sector working groups that designed the actual EDPRS policies and 
interventions. 
Furthermore, international consultants heavily supported the drafting of the EDPRS. 
Two international consultants supported the Ministry of Finance with drafting for 
approximately two years, and an international consultant supported each sector (Informal 
Conversations: Kigali, 06.15.10; GoR 2006b). The use of international consultants is largely 
justified by low ministry capacity. Additionally, consultants often lend a degree of credibility 
to the process. International consultants are not supposed to represent donors; however, their 
paycheck and future jobs are dependent on donors. Their active participation in the drafting 
of the EDPRS indicates that international ideas and notions about how best to foster 
economic development often heavily guide national priorities. 
The active and influential role of donors in the EDPRS process does not mean that the 
document does not reflect national priorities (at least to some degree). However, it does 
suggest that national priorities cannot be assumed to have taken precedence during its 
drafting. During my interviews with donor and government officials, I did not come across 
any examples of government preferences taking precedence over donor preferences. Instead, 
what was conveyed to me was a spirit of collaboration between donors and the GoR. As 
Hayman writes: 
In Rwanda, the policy process consequently involves the government putting 
forward its agenda, which already reflects what donors want to see to a great 
extent, and then a process of negotiation ensues with donors requesting 
particular amendments to satisfy their needs (2009, 594).  
 
                                                
101 Civil society and the private sector also had very minimal representation.  
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As long as donors and the GoR are in agreement about what their national development 
policy should be, their poverty reduction strategies are likely reflective of national priorities. 
However, if GoR priorities deviate from donor priorities, there is little indication that they 
will take precedence over donor priorities.  
Increased	  influence	  of	  budget	  support	  donors	  
Furthermore, my interviews and observations in Rwanda suggest that, rather than 
decrease the role of donors in the policy process, participation in budget support actually 
increases a donor’s involvement in development policy. As one interviewee explained to me, 
budget support donors can monitor and evaluate more. They are involved with the budget. 
They know more what is going on and can better understand the context and people 
(Interview II-XV, 06.23.10). 
A review of the meeting minutes of the BHSG reveals that donors who participate in 
this group are very active in technical aspects of the GoR’s operations. For example, when 
the budget was presented to the BSHG during its June 2006 meeting, donors made comments 
about how to best “mop up excess liquidity,” the need to have a clear picture of revenue 
collection potential, and concerns about food distribution as a means to address a food 
shortage (BSHG 2006a). When the education sector budget was presented at the January 
2007 meeting, donors raised concerns about how performance contracts for teachers were 
being used (BSHG 2007), and, at the fall 2009 Joint Budget Support Review, I observed that 
donors were part and parcel of the policy process, asking very specific and technical 
questions about the GoR’s operations and activities. Each of these presentations occurred 
before the budget was presented to parliament for comment or review.  
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During my interviews, donors and GoR officials appeared to be well aware that 
budget support donors possessed heightened access. One highly ranked GoR official argued 
that with project funding everything is defined. However, he suggested that when a donor 
participates in budget support they are able to ask the “big questions,” such as what is the 
impact of all of your poverty programs? (Interview I-XX, 11.13.09). A representative of 
DFID argued that the US is often left out, as they are so tied to contracts and therefore have 
less impact, particularly on the policy dialogue (Interview I-XII, 11.04.09).  
A representative of UNDP told me that it is true that budget support donors have 
privileged access to information (Interview II-XX, 06.29.10). Additionally, a senior GoR 
official in the Ministry of Finance told me directly that budget support donors get more 
information than other donors, can make sure that their resources are being used well, and 
can “influence policy.” Because budget support donors come to the (CPAF) reviews, they 
know what is happening in all sectors, instead of just the few sectors where they have 
projects (Interview II-V, 06.05.10).102 A DFID representative put it more directly, telling me 
“we do what we want” (Interview II-X, 06.10.10; my emphasis). 
I also observed that non-budget support donors are well aware of the privileged 
position budget support donors are given. A representative of the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) lamented at their inability to give budget support (Interview II-
XVII, 06.24.10).103 A sector budget support donor noted inequalities between donors, telling 
me that, even though they give sector budget support, the government likes to make them 
                                                
102 He went on to tell me that development partners are a check for the government and help them strengthen 
their systems. 
103 One way that Japan has gotten around their inability to provide budget support is the Counterpart Fund. This 
aid project distributed fuel to the GoR. The GoR in turn was able to sell the fuel and use the revenue to fund the 
government (Interview II-XVIII, 06.24.10).  
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feel like they are not a part of things because they do not provide general budget support. 
The same donor representative went on to tell me that there is a big different between how 
donors and recipient-countries perceive the Paris Agenda. Recipient-countries thought it 
would garner them more control. However, when you are a budget support donor there is a 
need to discuss everything. You get access to everything (Interview II-XII, 06.18.10). 
While donors have largely moved away from hard conditionalities, my case study of 
budget support and the poverty reduction strategy process in Rwanda suggests that donor 
influence has not decreased. Instead, donors have merely shifted how they exert influence. 
Instead of making heavy demands upfront, donors have further integrated themselves into 
decision-making processes and become active participants in what is often called the “policy 
dialogue.” Consequently, donors exert influence in subtler but equally (if not more) powerful 
ways by becoming part and parcel of state decision-making structures.104 This is much easier 
to do if you are a general budget support donor, because you are given privileged access to 
information and are invited to give your input on state practices.  
Increased	  authority	  of	  MINECOFIN	  
Lastly, I find that the Rwandan poverty reduction strategy process and budget support 
have not made the policy process more inclusive, nor increased domestic accountability, but 
have instead centralized authority in the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance 
manages both budget support and the EDPRS. As budget support has grown more and more 
prevalent, the Ministry of Finance has grown more and more powerful. This has come at a 
cost to other actors.  
                                                
104 As one interviewee put it, everything is in the dialogue (Interview II-XII, 06.18.10). 
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Recently, civil society has been invited to participate in various high-level meetings 
between the government and donors (see chapter five for more details). Additionally, a more 
user-friendly budget was recently created, and the Ministry of Finance did present the last 
budget to civil society (Interview I-XVI, 11.10.09; Interview II-XXII, 07.02.10). However, 
your average Rwandan citizen continues to have very little control over development policy 
or budgetary processes. 
Key reports, such as the CPAF, are only presented to donors, not to the parliament 
(Interview II-XII, 06.18.10). Therefore, parliamentarians do not have the opportunity to 
comment on indicators used for the CPAF or its findings. On the 2010 Open Budget Index, 
Rwanda received a score of 11 out of 100. This score indicates that the GoR “provides the 
public with scant information on the central government’s budget and financial activities 
assessed by the Survey,” making  “it virtually impossible for citizens to hold the government 
accountable for its management of the public’s money” (Open Budget Partnership 2010, 1).  
Budget support, in particular, excludes civil society. Civil society does not have 
representation in the BSHG, and when funds are channeled through budget support instead of 
through projects, their role as an implementer is cut off. The executive director of the 
Rwandan Civil Society Platform worries about this, telling me that the government’s push for 
budget support leaves civil society vulnerable (Interview II-III, 06.03.10). A 2006 report on 
budget support in Rwanda found that budget support has resulted in “government 
empowerment,” particularly of the Ministry of Finance, but had done little to foster domestic 
accountability. The report notes that “the feedback process is not very inclusive,” with line 
ministers and other domestic stakeholders not being fully engaged (IDD and Associates 
2006, 89). 
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The reasons for a lack of citizen engagement are not entirely clear. A representative 
of the European Commission told me that most local NGOs are not interested in monitoring. 
The EC tried to get local NGOs to monitor the EDPRS but could not get any to agree to such 
oversight. While my interviewee was not sure if NGOs are fearful or just not interested in 
monitoring (or both), she noted that what is clear is that the government is very strong and 
civil society is very weak (Interview I-XVIII, 01.13.09).  
In contexts such as Rwanda, where the state is strong and civil society weak, there 
appears to be little reason to predict that aid programs that further centralize authority will 
translate into increased citizen influence. The hypothesis that budget support increases 
domestic accountability requires a pre-existing open political landscape, where civil society 
and parliament already play an active role in keeping the central government in check. When 
this does not already exist, as in Rwanda, there is little reason to believe that the poverty 
reduction strategy process or budget support will do anything to make the policy process 
more inclusive or to close the broken feedback loop in foreign assistance.  
5.4.	   Summary	  of	  Findings	  	  	  
In this chapter, I examined two related aid programs introduced in Rwanda in the 
early 2000s. Collectively, budget support and poverty reduction strategies are theorized to 
promote higher-levels of recipient-country ownership. However, in this chapter I have argued 
the following: (1) Although donors are now more likely to use national systems, there is little 
reason to believe that donors give preference to government priorities, if they are not in line 
with their own; (2) Rather than decrease the role of donors in the policy process, participation 
in budget support likely increases a donor’s involvement in decision-making processes 
regarding development policy; and (3) The poverty reduction strategy program and budget 
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support have not made the policy process more inclusive or increased domestic 
accountability in Rwanda. Instead, they centralize domestic authority in the ministry of 
finance. Table 5.3 below outlines how these three findings map on to the variables of interest 
in this study.  
Table	  5.3:	  Summary	  of	  Findings	  	  
 Government 
Policymakers  
Donors Citizens 
Changes in influence 
over development 
policy: 
 
The Ministry of 
Finance has gained 
more influence but is 
still constrained by 
donor preferences.  
Donors remain very 
influential and active in 
development policy  
Citizen influence over 
development policy 
decisions remains low.   
 
Regarding government policymakers, I find that the influence of government 
policymakers has increased. However, influence has been limited to the Ministry of Finance 
(in close collaboration with the president’s office). Alternative domestic actors, such as 
parliament, line ministers, and civil society have not seen their influence increase. As a 
result, citizen influence over development policy remains very low. Additionally, there is 
little evidence that, if the government preferences conflict strongly with donor preferences, 
government preferences will take precedence. Regarding economic issues, donors and the 
government appear to act in relative congruence.  
Furthermore, greater influence by the Ministry of Finance has not translated into less 
influence by donors. Donors active in budget support and the poverty reduction strategy 
process, such as the EC, the UK, and the World Bank, have not become shrinking violets. 
Instead, they have merely changed how they exert influence, engaging more heavily with the 
“policy dialogue” and in technical matters. This type of influence is perhaps less outwardly 
antagonistic, but it does not decrease donor influence over development policy. In fact, it 
likely makes it greater. By actively participating in budget support and the poverty reduction 
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strategy process, certain donors have only become further integrated into domestic decision 
making structures. Far from eliminating the government’s dependence on donors, links 
between the GoR and budget support donors have become stronger.  
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Chapter	  6 	  The	  Aid	  Coordination,	  Harmonization,	  &	  Alignment	  Framework	  	  
 
In this chapter, I turn my attention to Rwanda’s aid coordination, harmonization, and 
alignment (ACHA) framework.105 The wide-reaching ACHA framework is an attempt by the 
GoR and its donors to localize the Paris Declaration in Rwanda. The objective is to enable 
more country ownership through increased coordination, harmonization, and alignment. 
According to an overview of the ACHA framework: 
Aid effectiveness is at the center of today’s development discourse. Over one 
hundred donors and developing countries, including Rwanda, signed the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. In doing so, they agreed to measure their 
success at making aid more efficient with a set of indicators and targets. 
Donors and recipient countries now have a practical blueprint to advance 
development, enhance aid effectiveness, and monitor progress. Inherent to the 
Paris Declaration is the principal of country ownership. The Government of 
Rwanda and its Development Partners are devoted to implementing global 
commitments through their ACHA framework and within Rwanda’s national 
policies and strategies (GoR n.d.: emphasis in original). 
 
Ownership is at the core of the Paris Declaration’s agenda for improved aid effectiveness. 
However, additional elements – such as coordination, alignment, and harmonization – 
provide the foundation for ownership (see figure 2.2, pg. 25). If donors do not harmonize and 
align their activities with national systems and priorities, it is difficult for a recipient-country 
                                                
105 At one time, ACHA was the name of standing working group in Rwanda. In this chapter, I use the name to 
represent all actions taken by donors and the GoR to manage aid in accordance with the Paris Declaration not 
the defunct working group.  
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to take charge of its own development policy. Similarly, if donors remain fragmented, 
advancing a singular agenda led by the recipient-country is difficult. Therefore, since the 
early 2000s, the GoR and its donors have been developing a series of forums and policy 
procedures to realize the three principals of coordination, harmonization, and alignment in 
Rwanda (see table 6.1). In the following case study, I examine the various components of the 
ACHA framework, looking for evidence of increased ownership.  
Table	  6.1:	  Definition	  of	  Terms	  
Term Definition 
Coordination “sharing information, lowering transaction costs, and 
avoiding duplication efforts” 
Harmonization “streamlining and simplification of development partner’s 
procedures and practices” 
Alignment “the assurance that assistance is given in accordance with 
the GoR’s priorities and adopted to the Rwandan context” 
Source:	  Secretary	  General	  of	  MINECOFIN,	  Gatete	  Claver	  (GoR	  2004,	  25)	  
 
To do so, I first look for evidence that the ACHA framework has increased 
coordination, harmonization, and alignment in Rwanda. For example, I look for evidence that 
donors are sharing more information with each other and working together to implement aid 
projects. I also look for evidence that donors are sharing information with the GoR and 
working towards goals and within parameters set by the government. I do find some evidence 
to suggest that coordination, harmonization, and alignment have increased in Rwanda. 
However, there is great variation between donors. Additionally, bilateral agreements still take 
precedence, and partnerships primarily occur when it is advantageous for donors.   
I then look for evidence that the ACHA framework has resulted in increased 
government influence, increased citizen influence, and decreased donor influence. Just as 
with budget support and the poverty reduction strategy process, I find that, although 
government influence has increased as a result of the ACHA framework, this influence has 
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been limited to the Ministry of Finance and has not spread to other domestic actors. 
Additionally, donors have not receded into the background, but have maintained a great deal 
of influence over aid policy in Rwanda.    
The chapter is organized into five major sections. I first provide a summary of 
Rwanda’s aid architecture and aid policy. Second, I discuss the multiple high-level forums 
and meetings that take place between donors and the GoR each year. Third, I outline the 
complicated system of sector and working groups in Rwanda. In this section, I discuss the 
health sector and the new Division of Labour, which limits donors to participation in three 
sectors. Fourth, I briefly summarize the new Joint Action Forums, which attempt to formalize 
relations between donors and the government at the local level.  
In the final section, I pull together each of the pieces of the ACHA framework 
analyzed by listing the commonalities found across all, noting three core findings: (1) 
Despite a number of initiatives to limit their influence, donors remained active and influential 
in decision-making process about aid policy in Rwanda; (2) Donors’ commitment to the idea 
of ownership varies; and, (3) Domestically, the Ministry of Finance dominates the ACHA 
framework. I conclude by summarizing how my findings from this case study map on to the 
variables of interest in this study.  
6.1.	  	   Rwanda’s	  Aid	  Architecture	  and	  Aid	  Policy	  
The emphasis on aid coordination, harmonization, and alignment really began to take 
off in Rwanda between 2002 and 2004 (Hayman 2009a). Since then, a complicated aid 
system has emerged (see figure 6.1). Some components of the system, such as the Budget 
Support Harmonization Group (BSHG), were previously discussed, as they relate directly to 
budget support. 
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Figure	  6.1:	  Rwanda's	  Aid	  Architecture*	  
Adopted	  &	  Updated	  from	  Hayman	  (2006,	  66)	  
*As	  of	  fall	  2010	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Rwanda’s aid architecture is composed of forums and working groups that operate at 
three different levels. At the diplomatic level, very senior donor and government 
representatives come together in a formal annual meeting. Attendees include the Rwandan 
president, ambassadors, and senior donor representatives (who often fly in from donor 
headquarters for the occasion). Formal diplomatic visits between heads of state would also 
fall under this category. At the operational/management level, mid-level donor and 
government representatives meet frequently throughout the year to iron out the contours of 
the aid relationship in a less formal setting. Lastly, the nuts and bolts are typically decided at 
the technical level, where country-level, donor staff meet with government representatives on 
specific topics, such as health policy or budget support.  
In 2006, the GoR approved an Aid Policy, which is arguably an "adoption of Paris 
principals, tailored to meet Rwanda's needs” (Rwangombwa 2006, slide 6).106 The Aid Policy 
lays out twelve objectives related to the management of aid: operational development 
strategies, reliable country systems, alignment of aid flows on national strategies, 
strengthening of local capacities by coordinated support, use of country systems, avoiding 
parallel implementation units (PIUs), aid is more predictable, aid is untied, use of common 
arrangements, joint missions and analysis, results-oriented frameworks, and mutual 
accountability (GoR 2006c). According to a representative of a major international NGO, the 
Aid Policy was a political statement by the GoR, and the chapters flow directly from Paris. It 
is not a joint assistance strategy (i.e., jointly approved by both the GoR and donors) but a 
government policy (Interview II-XX, 06.29.10). 
                                                
106 In this chapter, I distinguish aid policy in general from the official Aid Policy by capitalizing the latter.  
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The Aid Policy makes clear that the GoR prefers un-earmarked budget support and 
articulates the GoR’s intention to decline any offer of assistance that does not meet its 
standards.107 It outlines the conditions under which the GoR will accept loans and technical 
assistance, and notes their concern with vertical funds (or funds delivered in structures 
parallel to the government). In addition, the Aid Policy expresses the need for more 
information about NGOs’ activities as a requirement for better aid management (GoR 
2006c).  
At first glance, the Aid Policy seems to be the epitome of national ownership. 
However, a deeper investigation complicates the story. First, similar to Rwanda’s second 
poverty reduction strategy (the EDPRS), it was produced with substantial input from donors. 
A handout provided in a workshop on the development of an Aid Policy clarifies:  
…there will be a number of elements in the policy that have direct bearing on 
the work of the development partners and therefore the process of elaborating 
the strategy must be a consultative one. It is important that the policy is both 
effective and workable and both development partners and Government 
agencies should buy into the finding (GoR 2005a). 
 
Prior to the drafting of the Aid Policy, donors were invited to give feedback on several 
documents, including a Baseline Survey on Donor Alignment and Harmonization in Rwanda 
and an Aid Policy Consultation Policy. There was also an extensive dialogue, including a 
four-day Aid Policy workshop (GoR 2006a). Donors themselves acknowledged their role in 
the process in November 2006, when they signed a Statement of Intent regarding both the 
Paris Declaration and the new Aid Policy. In this statement, donors recognized “…the 
transparent and participatory approach that was adopted in the elaboration of the Policy, 
                                                
107 After un-earmarked budget support, the GoR favors sector budget support then stand-alone projects on 
budget and on plan (GoR 2006c). 
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allowing Development Partners to provide their views and feedback on the provisions of the 
document” (“Joint Donors’ Statement” 2006).  
While donors were involved in the process, there was limited input from domestic 
actors outside the executive branch. Although local government officials were included in 
Aid Policy discussions, meetings primarily sought to “sensitize” them (a popular word in 
Kigali) to the document, not get their feedback and opinions (GoR 2007e; Highton 2009). 
During a workshop for local officials, a senior Ministry of Finance official noted, 
“Implementing the Aid Policy at the district level means building the capacity of local 
government officials to work with donors to align their activities to national priorities and, 
where possible, to harmonize their support and reduce transaction costs” (GoR 2007c, 1). 
That is, the goal of implementing the Aid Policy at the district level is to align local 
governments with priorities already decided on by the national government and donors.  
The process by which the Aid Policy was approved is also telling. Instead of being 
approved by the citizen-elected parliament, the Aid Policy (just like the Common 
Performance Assessment Framework) was approved by the Cabinet, which is appointed by 
the President. The decision to seek approval in this way was made by the Ministry of 
Finance, which then reportedly dismissed criticisms about the approval process (Interview II-
XX, 06.29.10).108  
Moreover, the Aid Policy gives the Ministry of Finance full authority over 
development assistance (GoR 2007a). Rather than donors negotiating aid packages with the 
relevant line ministries (e.g., the ministries of education or health), the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, or local governments, all aid negotiation is now supposed to go through the Ministry 
                                                
108 MINECOFIN did reportedly face criticism for this decision. Their response to this criticism was the 
consultation process could not go one forever (Interview II-XX, 06.29.10).  
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of Finance. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs still technically manages diplomatic 
relations, the Ministry of Finance is now in the lead (Interview II-XXI, 07.02.10).109   
Technically, a high-level group of government officials oversees the Aid Policy (e.g., 
implementation and policy outcomes). However, according to a representative of the 
Ministry of Finance, this group does not meet very often. Instead, implementation falls to the 
members of the External Finance Unit in the Ministry of Finance. This unit is currently 
finalizing an Aid Policy implementation plan (Interview II-I, 06.01.10). 
6.2.	  	   High-­‐Level	  Forums	  
Development	  Partners	  Coordination	  Group	  and	  Development	  Partners	  Meetings	  &	  Retreats	  
The highest-level coordination meeting in Rwanda is the Development Partners 
Meeting or DPM (see figure 6.1). Annual DPMs grew out of UN Round Table meetings that 
took place in Europe immediately following the genocide. The first meeting on Rwandan soil 
took place in 2000 (Hayman 2006). The annual meeting brings together senior GoR officials 
(including the president) and high-level diplomats from donor countries.110 The DPM is a 
diplomatic meeting, and the GoR uses it to drum up additional aid. Each year, the GoR picks 
a theme they would like to emphasize, and makes several presentations highlighting its socio-
economic accomplishments. Each development partner is also permitted to make a statement.  
At the organizational and management level, there is the Development Partners 
Coordination Group (DPCG) and the Development Partnership Retreat (DPR). The DPCG is 
an aid coordination forum composed of high-level GoR representatives (i.e. line ministers, 
                                                
109 GoR representatives did express concern about giving MINECOFIN so much authority at consultative 
meetings prior to the drafting of the aid policy (GoR 2005c). 
110 Even donors that do not have a ground presence in Rwanda but contribute aid via multilateral institutions 
sometimes attend DPM meetings.  
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Secretaries General, and directors of planning), ambassadors, heads of development 
corporations, and senior technical staff. The DPCG is a forum for political dialogue. It is not 
a technical working group, but a coordination forum for feelings and opinions (Interview II-
XXI, 07.02.10). 
The DPCG was set up immediately after the 2002 DPM and held its first meeting on 
November 18, 2002 (Hayman 2006). All donors with permanent representation in Rwanda 
can participate in the DPCG, but China and Korea choose not to attend meetings (Interview 
II-I, 06.01.10). The DPCG is co-chaired by the current Permanent Secretary and Secretary to 
the Treasury to the Ministry of Finance and the current UN Resident Coordinator. Presently, 
the DPCG meets quarterly. 
In 2005, members of the DPCG began gathering in a retreat format. In contrast to the 
DPM, the now annual Development Partners Retreat (DPR) brings together country-level 
staff in a more intimate setting outside the capital city (typically on Lake Kivu in the 
northeast part on the country). In contrast to the 400+ persons who typically attend the 
Development Partners Meetings, approximately 100 GoR representatives and in-country 
donor staff attend the retreats. There is more space for discussions about particular policy 
issues and most discussions about aid coordination occur during the retreats.  
Sessions at both the DPMs and DPRs are chaired by the relevant GoR line minister 
and co-chaired by a donor working heavily in the area or sector being discussed. Most 
sessions begin with a presentation by the GoR, followed by a response by a pre-selected 
development partner, and then the floor is opened up for questions. Not surprisingly, the GoR 
attempts to manage these discussions as much as possible, attempting to present the GoR in 
the best possible light.  
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Frequency	  of	  meetings	  and	  challenges	  to	  coordination	  
The frequency of DPCG meetings is highly variable. At one time, the DPCG met 
monthly. However, meeting frequency decreased to every other month in 2006 because of a 
request from the government (GoR 2006b), and then gradually decreased to quarterly over 
the following years. Now, even quarterly meetings do not always take place.111 When asked 
why the DPCG meets less frequently than it once did, one GoR representative told me that 
there is simply less to discuss (Interview II-I, 06.01.10). This is likely a variable, as meetings 
recently increased after the GoR introduced a new initiative called the Division of Labour. 
However, there is also some indication that the DPCG’s activities have decreased as budget 
support donors have increased their meetings and activities.  
In a conversation about the role of the DPCG, a DFID staff member questioned how 
useful the DPCG is given that the Budget Support Harmonization Group (BSHG) now has 
nine members (Interview II-X, 06.10.10). Not surprisingly, in my interviews, non-budget 
support donors were much more inclined to see a clearer role for the DPCG, and 
representatives of the UN (the UN co-chairs the DPCG) were particularly enthusiastic about 
the importance of the body. 
Concerns have also been raised about the current role of the DPM, which just recently 
became biennial. During the 2008 retreat, a working group discussed the role of both the 
DPM and DPCG, and concluded, “they should not simply be a forum for information 
sharing. Instead, one should have real policy dialogue. Furthermore, participants stated that 
they would like to be better prepared for the DPM” (DPCG 2008, 12).  
                                                
111 In 2010, the DPCG met three times. 
  
124 
The latter concern is one raised by donors in multiple contexts, as the GoR often 
moves very quickly on reforms and required documentation is often distributed at the last 
minute. According to donors, this gives them very little time to prepare for major policy 
discussions.112 As a representative of an international NGO noted, it is sometimes hard to 
decipher the motive for the GoR’s quick pace.  
In particular, my interviewee questioned whether or not the last minute distribution of 
important documents is because of poor planning or a political tactic of the government 
(Interview II-XXII, 07.02.10). In either case, the last minute nature of many policy actions 
has visibly impeded coordination between donors and the GoR in several circumstances. As 
another interviewee put it, the government works quickly and sometimes people get lost in 
the process (Interview II-IV, 06.05.10). 
Additionally, it is important to clarify that neither the DPCG nor the DPMs/DPRs 
replace bilateral agreements or talks between donors and the GoR, rather they add to them. 
For example, even through they are in charge of the DPCG, the UN’s bilateral relationship 
with the GoR has not changed (Interview II-XX, 06.29.10). Country strategies are still agreed 
on bilaterally with the GoR (the process for approval varies based on the donor), and donors 
still hold annual bilateral forums and discussions. Under the auspices of the European Union, 
many European donors have decreased (but certainly not eliminated) bilateral activities. 
However, this has more to do with European integration than the ACHA framework. 
                                                
112 This concern was particularly evident at the 2005 DPM where both the EU and the US raised the issue in 
their donor statements (GoR 2005b, 65 & 70). 
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Participation	  of	  civil	  society	  
Even more apparent is the limited role that civil society has played in the DPCG, 
DPM, and DPR. High-level forums, both at the technical and organizational and management 
levels, are dominated by the national government and donor representatives. Civil society, 
NGOs (even large international NGOs), and local government have historically been 
excluded. As a representative of Norwegian People’s Aid told me, the DPCG is for donors 
who fund the government, i.e. provide aid directly to the government through budget support 
or stand-alone projects. She went on to say that “development partners” are really the large 
bilateral and multilateral donors that fund the government, not smaller NGOs like 
themselves. As an international NGO, they lack the status, representation, and access that 
major bilateral and multilateral donors have (Interview II-XIX, 06.29.10).  
As was noted in chapter three, the GoR has often expressed skepticism about civil 
society. This skepticism continued throughout the 2000s. In June 2004, a report by a 
parliamentary commission on genocidal ideology recommended the dissolution of several 
international and local NGOs that “preached genocidal ideology and ethnic hatred.” 
According to Burnet, this list included the “only local human rights organization willing to 
criticize the government publicly and document human rights abuses committed by 
government authorities” (2007, 4). Most of these organizations shut down between July 2004 
and January 2005, and the organizations that remain are careful about criticizing the 
government, the RPF, the president, or their policies.  
In 2008, civil society was invited to participate in the DPM for the first time 
(Interview II-XXII, 07.02.10). Prior to the meeting, civil society came together to formulate a 
common statement that was read at the meeting. In this document, they called on the GoR 
and donors to: 
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…recognize civil society as an independent development actor in its own 
right. Enhanced recognition of civil society and supporting CSOs to fulfill 
their roles in the development process will be instrumental in developing and 
further strengthening genuine partnership and good society-state relations 
(Rwanda Civil Society Platform 2008b, 2). 
 
In the lead up to the common statement, it was concluded in a workshop attended by over 
160 members of civil society, that civil society as a whole faces many challenges in Rwanda. 
These challenges include, “government perception of the Civil Society as a weak entity and 
hence not considering it to be an important partner…” and “the fact that Civil Society 
activities are to some extent donor driven, which hinders the independence and the 
sustainability of actions…" (Rwanda Civil Society Platform 2008a, 1). 
The activities that occurred around the 2008 DPM were a high point for civil society, 
and the statement clearly articulates that some members of civil society would like the GoR 
and donors to take them more seriously. However, since 2008, little has fundamentally 
changed. While “civil society” now often attends high-level meetings, they lack a vote and 
participation is still constrained.113 
Civil society is represented at most donor-government meetings by the executive 
director of the Rwandan Civil Society Platform, a group formed in 2004 for the purpose of 
dealing with the government (Gready 2011).114 The Civil Society Platform represents 
umbrella groups, not individual NGOs. In total, fifteen umbrella groups are now members of 
the platform. These umbrella groups represent approximately 703 NGOs (Interview II-III, 
                                                
113 At the 2010 DPM civil society once again called on the GoR “to put in place an enabling environment for 
meaningful engagement and for the voice of its citizens to be heard” (Rwanda Civil Society Platform and 
Network of International NGOs 2010, 2) 
114 International NGOs and the private sector also elect a representative to attend the DPCG meetings and other 
forums. The formation of the civil society platform began in 2004 but was not officially launched until 2006 
and not fully operational until 2007 (Interview II-III, 06.03.10). 
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06.03.10).115 Under this arrangement, one person must speak for hundreds of organizations, 
many of which are not even members of the platform and therefore lack a vote in 
representation.  
Additionally, at the same time that civil society is being invited to sit at some tables, 
government control of their activities is increasing. All NGOs (local and international) are 
required to register all activities with a series of GoR institutions, ranging from the Ministry 
of Local Government, to the utugari or cell where they are working (Interview II-VI, 
06.08.10; Interview II-XIV, 06.22.10).116 The Law on Non-Profit Associations, enacted in 
2001, gives the government the power to control projects, budgets, and the hiring of 
personnel. Additionally, it requires all organizations to obtain a renewable certificate of 
registration from the Ministry of Local Governance. Numerous organizations have reportedly 
encountered difficulties registering or renewing their registration.  
During a meeting of the platform I observed, a government spokesperson reiterated 
these registration requirements to participants. He paid lip service to civil society 
independence, but then reiterated (in both English and Kinyarwanda) that there are guidelines 
and rules governing civil society organizations. He warned that some civil society 
organizations have been irresponsible and not followed these requirements, calling on all, “so 
that a few organizations don’t punish your overall image.”  
One interviewee noted that what the government really wants to do is sensitize (again, 
this is a word I heard often in Rwanda) civil society to their agenda or mission; what they 
want is a single voice (Interview II-IV, 06.05.10). Channeling NGO activity through the 
                                                
115 The platform has four main objectives: (1) forum for coordination; (2) information exchange; (3) represent 
others; (4) lobby and advocacy (Interview II-III, 06.03.10). 
116 The exact process for registering is rather oblique.  
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platform, which one donor suggested is (at the very least) pro-government, is certainly one 
way to do this. Another interviewee told me that much of government work is about 
sensitization and conformity in government; the idea of uniformity is untouchable. (Interview 
I-VII, 10.30.09). Yet another interviewee, noted that civil society is often about two things: 
keeping government accountable and keeping themselves accountable. The first is very hard 
to do in Rwanda, but the government is very interested in the latter (Interview II-XXII, 
07.02.10).  
In order for NGOs to be heard, another interviewee told me, it is necessary for them 
to partner with one another. They are, therefore, learning to speak with one voice (Interview 
I-XVI, 11.10.09). This approach is likely to be the best way of gaining access to the high-
level forums and meetings currently controlled and dominated by the GoR and its 
“development partners.” However, such a role is far from the commonly held idea of civil 
society as a group of diverse agitators, challenging the status quo from a variety of different 
perspectives.  
 Additionally, centralizing authority and voice makes it easier for the government to 
infiltrate civil society. According to Gready, umbrella structures and the platforms “are 
widely perceived to have been co-opted by the current government. Hierarchical in 
organizational culture, many are led by people that act as mouthpiece of the government” 
(2011, 90). Government is so pervasive within civil society that NGOs are jokingly said to 
stand for the “Next Governmental Official” (Interview I-XVI, 11.10.09). 
6.3.	   Clusters	  and	  Sector	  Working	  Groups	  
Underneath the Development Partners Coordination Group umbrella, there is a 
complicated set of clusters, sector working groups, and sector wide approaches (SWAPs). 
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These meeting groups have undergone several reforms over the years, and it is almost 
impossible to get a clear picture of their current state. They are always changing, and 
coordination structures are sector-specific. However, much of the nitty-gritty of policy work 
occurs in the sectors, making them an important part of Rwanda’s coordination structure. 
Sector activities in Rwanda are organized into three clusters: economic, governance, 
and social (Interview II-V, 06.05.10). Within the clusters are sector working groups, where 
the majority of the work is done.117 The names and labels of the sector working groups have 
undergone many changes over the years, but, according to the latest chart of donor activities 
by sector, there are currently fifteen active sectors. Depending on whom you ask, these 
sectors are supposed to be aligned with either the budget or Rwanda’s Economic and Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (both of which are also supposed to be aligned with one another) 
(Interview II-II, 06.01.10; Interview II-V, 06.05.10). Each sector is chaired by a line minster 
and co-chaired by a lead development partner, and sectors rotate reporting to the DPCG 
during its quarterly meetings. 
Each of the sector working groups is organized differently, with some being well-
coordinated and others more loosely organized. Additionally, some meet more frequently 
than others.118 In an annual ODA report, the GoR notes that the justice, decentralisation, and 
agriculture sectors are particularly harmonized (GoR 2010d). Additionally, the education 
sector is often heralded as a model of coordination. There is an education partnership 
agreement, and, as early as 2003, the sector had joint reviews and a sector strategy plan 
                                                
117 Sectors use to be called clusters. Therefore, the terminology often gets very muddled. 
118 For example, the governance sector meets about once a quarter (Interview I-VI, 10.30.09). 
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(Hayman 2006).119 Additionally, the education sector was the first to implement a Sector 
Wide Approach or SWAP. From the government’s perspective, each sector should have a 
SWAP, as SWAPs are thought to align the sectors, organize priorities, and pool funds and 
objectives (Interview II-I, 06.01.10). 
Spotlight	  on	  the	  health	  sector	  
The health sector has the largest number of active donors, and receives the most ODA 
of any of the sectors.120 The US provides the most money to health (largely because of 
PEPFAR or the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief). However, Belgium has 
taken on the role of as lead donor because of its lengthy involvement in the sector and an aid 
portfolio that includes sector budget support to health.  
Belgium, as lead donor, holds the Secretariat seat and is responsible for the sector’s 
agenda. To distribute this burden amongst donors, they introduced a health “Development 
Partners Group” in November 2008. The group meets every two months and has a rotating 
chair. During these meetings, donors set the agenda for the next sector meeting (Interview II-
XIII, 06.18.10). Both the chair (GoR) and the co-chair (donor) must sign the sector working 
group reports; therefore, they must agree on the contexts (Interview II-V, 06.05.10).121  
Coordinating donors in the health sector has not always been easy. The sector is 
composed of a plethora of working and technical groups, which function at varying levels of 
efficiency. There are currently six working groups, which then sprout out into around thirty-
                                                
119 The justice; health and population; and transport and ICT sectors also have Joint Sector Reviews (GoR 
2010d). 
120 The health sector is technically called the Health Coordination Group, because they were originally a cluster 
and already had a terms of reference when sector system was implemented in 2004 
121 My interviewee also noted that having donors sign sector working group documents makes them ‘get their 
hands dirty.’ His comment suggests an interesting point. Getting donor consent may be important to prevent 
donors from resending on promises when it is convenient for them.  
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four sub-groups. In addition, there is a new technical working group comprised of those 
donors that provide budget support (DFID, Belgium, and Germany), and the Swiss, who have 
a program for capacity building.122 In response to questions about the benefits and challenges 
of so many forums, the health sector Chair told me that, although coordination is good, there 
is the question of over-coordination (Interview II-XIII, 06.18.10).  
Furthermore, it has not always been easy to get donors to align their priorities. More 
than one donor mentioned to me that the US emphasis on HIV/AIDs due to the PEPFAR 
program was not aligned with Rwandan needs (Interview II-X, 06.10.10; Interview II-XIII, 
06.18.10).123 Additionally, in the health sector, the US has unilaterally drafted reports for the 
GoR without the knowledge of other donors, leading some to question how deep their 
commitment to the Paris Principals really goes (Interview II-XIII, 06.18.10). 
The experience of the health sector with coordination, suggests that donor 
coordination, harmonization, and alignment faces many challenges in Rwanda. Additionally, 
it suggests that donors remain part and parcel of decision-making structures regarding aid 
policy in Rwanda. Although the GoR technically chairs the sector working group, it is donors 
that hold the Secretariat and set the agenda for the meetings.  
Division	  of	  Labour	  
At the 2010 Development Partners Retreat, the GoR introduced a new plan to 
restructure donor sector involvement, entitled the Division of Labour (DoL). The new 
Division of Labour limits donor involvement to three sectors. The GoR argues that, “Un-
equal distribution of donor support not only distorts equitable development of sectors, but it 
                                                
122 Invitations to participate were also recently sent to the US and the UN.  
123 The prevalence of HIV/AIDs is much lower in Rwanda than many other African nations. UNICEF (2010) 
estimated that the adult HIV prevalence rate (aged 15–49) was 2.9% in 2009 (UNICEF 2010).  
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undermines national leadership of the development agenda” (GoR 2010a, 4). Therefore, in 
early 2010, the GoR proposed the Division of Labour in order to limit donor involvement to 
three sectors. During the following spring and summer, donors engaged in bilateral 
discussions (often involving their headquarters), and proposed a Division of Labour that was 
more reflective of donor preferences during a July 2010 meeting of the DPCG (see Table 6.2 
below). 
Table	  6.2:	  Donor	  Involvement	  by	  Sector	  under	  Division	  of	  Labour	  
 
 
 
 
 
Ed
uc
ati
on
 
He
alt
h &
 P
op
ula
tio
n 
So
cia
l P
ro
tec
tio
n 
Em
plo
ym
en
t &
 C
ap
ac
ity
-B
uil
din
g 
Yo
ut
h, 
Sp
or
ts,
 &
 C
ult
ur
e 
Tr
an
sp
or
tat
ion
 &
 IC
T 
 
En
er
gy
 
W
ate
r&
 Sa
nit
ati
on
 
Ag
ric
ult
ur
e 
Fo
re
str
y L
an
d &
 E
nv
iro
nm
en
t  
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g, 
Se
rv
ice
s &
 In
du
str
y  
De
ce
nt
ra
liz
ati
on
 / C
DF
 
Ju
sti
ce
 R
ec
on
cil
iat
ion
, L
aw
 &
 O
rd
er
 
Belgium S ●     ●  ●    ● 
Canada S+   ●     ●     
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Japan ●     S S ● ●     
Netherlands S+      ●     ● ● 
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DFID ● S ●      ●     
US  ●  ●     ●     
AfDB S+     ● ● ●      
EC   S+   ●   ●    ● 
WB  S+ S   ● ●  ●     
S= Silent Partnership / S+ = Silent Partnership + Sector Budget Support 
  
133 
Adapted	  from	  “Donor	  Division	  of	  Labour	  in	  Rwanda”	  (GoR	  2010a)	  
 
The proposal caused quite an uproar upon its initial presentation at the January 2011 
Development Partners Retreat. One interviewee told me it was “almost a fight,” with donors 
calling line ministers and telling them they would not be able to support them (Interview II-
V, 06.05.10). The plan was still a dominant topic of discussion when I was in Kigali the 
following summer (2011). Donors conveyed a range of opinions about the DoL to me, and, 
given that most were currently engaged in diplomatic discussions with the GoR, it was hard 
to get a clear answer from many. In general, most conveyed a basic belief that the idea was a 
good one, but pointed to hurdles and challenges for the plan. 
For some donors, limiting engagement to three sectors is not a particularly big deal—
or at least that is what I was told. Some donors are only active in one or two sectors to begin 
with and others are already working to focus their engagement on a few priority sectors to 
maximize their return. For example, a representative at USAID told me that eighty to ninety 
percent of US aid for 2010 is already in three sectors: health, agriculture, and economic 
growth (Interview II-VIII, 06.09.10). Similarly, a World Bank representative told me that 
they are lucky. They had previously developed a country assistance strategy with the 
government, during which they were encouraged to concentrate in certain areas. These are 
the sectors that they were given (Interview II-IX, 06.10.10). 
However, concerns arise for donors that are currently active across multiple sectors. 
A particularly challenging case is the United Nations. The organization is technically one 
organization under the One UN program but has various agencies all with different foci and 
agendas.124 Additionally, there are potential conflicts with the various agencies’ mandate 
                                                
124 The UN was broken down in to its various agencies in the final DoL.  
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from the UN General Assembly. For example, UNDP cannot just get rid of their focus on 
governance (Interview II-XX, 06.29.10). 
A concern raised by many is that forcing donors to focus on three sectors will cause a 
net decrease in ODA to Rwanda (Interview II-X, 06.10.10). The government response to this 
concern is that donors should increasingly use silent partnerships, and sector and general 
budget support. This would minimize donor involvement while maintaining (or increasing) 
aid levels. How realistic this is varies by donor. For example, as was pointed out in chapter 
five, the US is not likely to engage in general budget support in Rwanda in the near future.  
At first glance, Division of Labour proposal appears to decrease donor influence. 
However, as one interviewee put it, “the devil is in the details” (Interview II-XIII, 06.18.10). 
There are a host of exceptions and ways of interpreting the policy that will likely allow 
donors to continue business (at least somewhat) as usual. While many donors appeared to get 
rather exercised when the proposal was first presented, most have now engaged in intense 
bilateral negotiations that have resolved many of their concerns.  
For example, USAID reached an agreement with MINECOFIN through meetings 
with the head of the Africa division of USAID in Washington, DC (Interview II-VIII, 
06.09.10), and the World Bank will continue to be involved in other sectors on the “soft 
side,” i.e. through technical assistance and analytic work (Interview II-IX, 06.10.10). As one 
donor representative put it, you are not supposed to have projects in other sectors, but 
questions of expertise and technical input are “fuzzier.” 
For donors engaged in general budget support, the problem appears to be even less of 
an issue. Providing general budget support appears to grant donors the license to participate 
in any sectors they desire. Given that they fund the state itself – not specific sectors or 
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programs – they must monitor their entire aid portfolio and, therefore, are theoretically able 
to attend all sector meetings (Interview II-X, 06.10.10).   
The domestic actor that appears to benefit the most from the Division of Labour is, 
once again, the Ministry of Finance. Not only is the Ministry of Finance exempt from the 
Division of Labor (i.e. any number of donors can fund it), but the plan is a not so subtle 
attempt to encourage donors to use funding mechanisms (like budget support) that are 
entirely controlled by the Ministry of Finance (Interview II-X, 06.10.10; Interview II-XVII, 
06.24.10). When the proposal was first introduced, both civil society and line ministries 
raised concerns, fearing a drop in revenue and influence under the Division of Labour 
(Interview II-V, 06.05.10).  
6.4.	   Joint	  Action	  Forums	  
The last component of the ACHA framework that deserves attention is the new joint 
action forums. Within the past few years, a joint action forum (JAF) has been established in 
each of Rwanda’s thirty districts. These forums are intended to serve as the main 
coordinating mechanism for the district level, and are supposed to improve service delivery 
and economic development at the local level (SNV 2009). Similar to the Development 
Partners Coordination Group, but at the local level, the joint action forums are supposed to 
bring together donors, civil society, the private sector, and government. One interviewee 
described the JAF a way for the government to evaluate them, but also a way for them to 
evaluate the government. His colleague added that it is also a way to harmonize, as NGOs 
share their current activities to avoid duplication (Interview II-XIV, 06.22.10).  
In my interviews, I found that most bilateral and multilateral donors were vaguely 
aware of the existence of the JAFs but rarely participated in them; one person put it this way, 
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“who goes to districts” (Informal Conversations: Kigali, 06.15.10). International NGOs were 
more likely to have experience with the forums, given that they work at the district level 
much more.  
Joint Action Forums are relatively new, and I was told that some districts work better 
than others. According to one of my interviewees, one challenge is that local authorities often 
think of the JAF as a space for fundraising and reporting, not for coordination (Interview II-
XXII, 07.02.10). To improve their functioning, the Director of National Planning at the 
Ministry of Finance wants to put a person in each district that would serve as the focal point 
for Rwanda’s EDPRS. This individual would also know the Aid Policy and have a direct link 
with the Ministry of Finance (Interview II-V, 06.05.10).  
This plan is unsettling, given concerns raised by my interviewees that the forums do 
not actually provide an open space for discussion and dialogue. One interviewee noted that 
that not everyone is happy with the Joint Action Forums, because priorities are predefined for 
them (Interview II.IV, 06.05.10). Another noted that she doesn’t think NGOs really have 
much of a say in forum proceedings; instead, the body is another way to report to 
government on activities and budgets (Informal Conversation: Kigali, 06.24.10). A report 
from the Netherlands Development Organization (SNV) on the Joint Action Forums echoes 
many of these concerns, noting that there is limited participation by civil society and the 
private sector (SNV 2009). If a national point person was put in each district, centralization 
would only likely increase. 
Rwanda’s experience with the JAF further highlights challenges facing the ACHA 
framework, such as capacity. Additionally, it suggests that coordination mechanisms are 
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sometimes used as a tool to bring domestic actors into the fold. While this may increase their 
participation, it does not increase their influence.   
6.5.	  	   Summary	  of	  Findings	  	  
In this chapter, I analyzed Rwanda’s aid coordination, harmonization, and alignment 
(ACHA) framework, individually summarizing the major components of the ACHA 
framework, such as Rwanda’s Aid Policy and the Development Partner’s Meetings and 
Retreats. Each of the policies and forums discussed has a number of interesting points in its 
own right, and, collectively, they suggest a number of important points pertinent to the 
research questions of this dissertation. 
First, despite a number of initiatives to limit their influence, donors remain active and 
influential in Rwanda’s aid policy decision-making process. Donors, particularly those that 
are more vocal in their support of ownership, often take different approaches to exerting this 
influence, avoiding formal conditionalities for a language of partnership. However, there is 
little evidence to suggest that they do so at a cost to their interests or influence. 
The ACHA framework has created a complex set of bodies and institutions to 
coordinate, harmonize, and align donor and GoR practices. The GoR officially “chairs” these 
bodies and institutions. However, donors “co-chair” them, often acting behind the scenes in 
powerful ways (such as setting the agenda for the meetings). Additionally, these meeting 
groups and forums are in addition to, not in place of, bilateral meetings and diplomatic visits. 
At the end of the day, bilateral negotiations still supersede all commitments made in 
coordination forums. As one interviewee told me, it is not difficult to figure out which 
commitments are more important—those that are made via the Common Performance 
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Assessment Framework, or those made through bilateral talks at the Kivu retreat (Interview 
II-XII, 06.18.10). The latter takes precedent.  
Second, donors’ level of commitment to the idea of ownership varies. Some donors 
actively support the ACHA framework (e.g., the UK and the UN), whereas others are more 
passive participants (e.g., the US), and still others do not participate at all (e.g., China and 
Korea). As one interviewee told me, the Paris Declaration is supposed to get all donors, not 
just those that provide budget support. However, some do a better than others (Interview II-
XII, 06.18.10). My interviewees were particularly critical of the US on this point. For 
example, a senior Ministry of Finance official told me that the US is probably one of his 
biggest donor problems. (Interview II-V, 06.05.10), while a senior DFID official noted that 
the ten commandments of Paris are lessons the Americans haven’t learned yet (Interview I-
XII, 11.04.09).  
Third, just as with budget support, the Ministry of Finance dominates the ACHA 
framework, resulting in the further marginalization of other domestic actors. Civil society has 
become more visible recently, but there is reason to believe that their inclusion is mainly for 
“sensitization” purposes and to pacify critics. Overwhelmingly, the reforms implemented 
under the ACHA framework centralize authority in the executive branch and, in particular, 
with the Ministry of Finance. The ACHA framework not only side-steps civil society, 
parliament, and local government, but also limits the influence of other line ministers at the 
national level. In all of my questions about donor coordination and government-donor 
relationships in Rwanda, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was never mentioned. As one 
interviewee put it, in Rwanda, the Minister of Finance is the donor coordinator (Interview I-
II, 10.19.09).  
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Table 6.3 outlines how the findings from my case study of the ACHA framework 
map on to the key variables of interest in this study.  
Table	  6.3:	  Summary	  of	  Findings	  
 Government 
Policymakers  
Donors Citizens 
Changes in 
influence over aid 
policy: 
 
The Ministry of Finance 
has gained more 
influence but is still 
constrained by donor 
preferences.  
Donors remain very 
influential and active in 
development policy  
Citizen influence over aid 
policy decisions remains 
low.   
 
These findings are identical to those in the case study of budget support presented in the 
previous chapter. The ACHA framework does appear to have altered the institutional 
relationship between the GoR and its donors, but not in the ways predicted by proponents of 
ownership. While the GoR has increasingly participated more in decision-making on aid 
policy, donors remain influential and citizen participation has been marginal. 
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Chapter	  7 	  The	  Rwandan	  Joint	  Governance	  Assessment	  
 
JGA helps all of us in the direction of the Paris Declaration. In the context of the 2005 Paris 
Declaration, there are injunctions to support partner country efforts to strengthen 
governance and to increase aid alignment with partner country priorities. It is our firm belief 
that the JGA will contribute to the implementation of this strategy by providing a basis for 
reviewing governance priorities and monitoring progress.  
 
-Anthony Kwaku Ohemeng-Boamah, UNDP Country Representative to Rwanda, 2009 
 
The Rwandan Joint Governance Assessment (JGA) is a “jointly owned” set of 
indicators that measure governance and progress in governance in Rwanda. The central 
objective of the JGA is to produce a single governance assessment that both donors and the 
GoR can use.125 The idea for the JGA came about in 2006, and the first report was approved 
in 2008. It is arguably the first of its kind globally (RGAC 2009; Williams et al. 2009).  
The JGA is different from the aid programs analyzed in the previous chapters in two 
important ways. First, it is (by design) “jointly owned.” That is, donors are supposed to be 
partners in decision-making processes. There is some tension between ownership approaches 
that seek government control, and those that seek partnership with donors (see chapter two, 
pg. 30). However, both attempt to decrease donor influence and increase the influence of 
recipient-country governments. The JGA does not attempt to remove donors from the policy 
decision-making processes, but it is intended to give the GoR more control and influence 
over how they are measured and assessed as a government.  
                                                
125 For a quick overview of the JGA and a discussion of the benefits and challenges of a joint assessment see 
Williams et al. (2009). 
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Second, the JGA deals with governance, which is a highly politically sensitive topic 
for the GoR.126 As was noted in chapter four, the Rwandan government has a reputation for 
dismissing critiques of the regime and marginalizing and displacing dissenters. Additionally, 
while the GoR and donors appear to be in congruence about economic policy, they have not 
always agreed about governance. While donors have sometimes expressed concerns about 
human rights, civil liberties, and freedom of expression, the GoR has continually asserted 
that they must maintain consensus to preserve peace and national security. This tension is 
referenced in the JGA document itself: 
On this basis, five broad challenges for governance in Rwanda are discussed 
below. These are necessarily selective….Everything cannot be achieved at 
once, and there are priorities and trade-offs to be made. For example, the goal 
of prioritising security and national reconciliation has implications for other 
aspects of governance, and is reflected in the current preference for 
consensual rather than adversarial politics, and strict laws prohibiting hate 
speech, incitement and sectarianism. How best to balance these priorities and 
manage trade-offs in the short to medium term will be a key ongoing issue. 
(JGA Report 2008, 15).  
 
Tensions about governance make the JGA a particularly interesting ownership aid program, 
because it means that donor and GoR preferences are often likely to conflict. However, 
tensions also presented challenges during data collection. Interviewees were likely to be less 
forthcoming and documentation was likely to be less readily available and/or more 
sensitized. 
If the predictions of the ownership model are correct, the JGA should allow the GoR 
to have more influence over decision-making on governance policy. Given that the JGA is 
jointly owned, we should expect donors to remain a part of the policy process; however, they 
                                                
126 One of my interviewees began his comments on the JGA by saying, ‘this is all a bit sensitive’ (Interview I-
XIV, 11.06.09). 
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should not dominate it. Therefore, we should see evidence that the GoR is setting the 
governance agenda with guidance and input from donors.  
We should also see evidence that citizens have more influence over governance 
policy. Evidence of this might include a more active and involved civil society, more 
competitive elections, and greater domestic accountability. Not only are such predictions in 
line with the ownership approach to international development, but they correspond to the 
principals of good governance outlined in the JGA itself, including accountability, 
responsiveness, fairness, inclusiveness, and legitimacy (JGA Report 2008, 7).127  
My analysis of the JGA suggests that the government has been able to use the JGA as 
a tool to increase its leverage over governance policy in Rwanda, and that donors, generally 
speaking, have allowed the GoR to lead governance debates. However, this is likely at least 
partly due to donor uncertainties about the stability of the Rwandan political climate. As one 
of my interviewees put it, the genocide makes it less easy to challenge the government, 
because no one knows the limit128 (Interview I-XVIII, 01.13.09). Additionally, the JGA has 
not translated into more citizen influence. If anything, the JGA has allowed the GoR to 
control the governance debate, limiting challengers and silencing critics.   
The chapter is organized into three major sections. In the first section, I summarize 
the JGA process thus far. In this section, I outline the global context out of which the JGA 
emerged, and the motivating factors behind it. I then outline the drafting process for the first 
report, which was approved in 2008, and discuss the difficulties that have plagued the 
process since the first report was published.  
                                                
127 The JGA also lists state capacity as a pillar of good governance. 
128 Here my interviewee is likely referring to uncertainty over what practices and policies have the potential to 
incite violence in Rwanda.  
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In the second section, I present three findings that are directly related to the research 
questions of this dissertation. First, civil society, parliament, and local government have not 
been active throughout the JGA process, and their recent involvement has been somewhat 
superficial. Second, the body that oversees the JGA, the Rwandan Government Advisory 
Council, is anything but independent from the national government. Third, the JGA and its 
related survey have been used to dismiss unfavorable reviews of government practices. In the 
final section, I map my findings from this case study onto my variables of interest.  
7.1.	   Summary	  of	  the	  JGA	  Process	  	  	  	  
Governance	  assessments	  and	  the	  Paris	  Declaration	  	  
Since the mid-1990s, governance has been increasingly linked to poverty reduction 
and human development goals. Consequently, a number of governance assessments have 
emerged to track progress and backsliding on governance in developing countries. According 
to a recent survey by the OECD, governance assessments largely serve the needs and 
concerns of individual donor agencies. Therefore, they are not well linked with governance 
processes and concerns in recipient-countries and are often at odds with the 2005 Paris 
Declaration (OECD 2008). 
In an attempt to be more in line with the Paris Agenda, research on governance 
assessments has increasingly emphasized peer and country-led assessments and highlighted 
the importance of national institutions and local expertise. Examples of peer assessments 
include the African Peer Review Mechanism (which Rwanda participated in), the peer 
reviews overseen by the OECD, and the peer reviews needed to accede to the European 
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Union. The only widespread example of a country-led assessment is International IDEA’s 
State of Democracy assessment methodology.129 
County-led and peer assessments are increasing popular, because they are thought to 
foster a domestic dialogue on governance; something donor assessments typically are not 
thought to be able to do (OECD 2009b). Instead of relying on “naming and shaming,” 
domestic and peer-based assessments are believed to stimulate good governance from the 
bottom-up by fostering a national discourse and debate on the topic. A recent document from 
the UNDP claims: 
…the value of a country-led governance assessment is that it serves as a critical 
accountability and transparency mechanism for governance performance. 
Democratic governance is more likely to be sustained if targets for attainment 
and expectations of how governments should perform are formulated by those 
who live within the political system. When local actors participate in the 
assessment process, it stimulates their demand for governance information and 
a demand for greater accountability from government (UNDP 2009). 
 
That is, instead of just evaluating governance based on externally derived indicators, 
assessments that are locally owned are supposed to promote a vibrant national dialogue on 
governance. This dialogue is then thought to prompt more sustainable and meaningful 
changes in governance practices by engaging citizens in debates on the policies and practices 
that govern their lives.  
It is within this global context that the idea for the Rwandan Joint Governance 
Assessment emerged. The JGA assesses governance in three areas: ruling justly, government 
effectiveness, and investment climate,130 and is monitored by both donors and the GoR. The 
                                                
129 An overview of the methodology is available at http://www.idea.int/sod/. 
130 Items included under the “ruling justly” category include establishing and maintaining security, national 
reconciliation and transitional justice, rule of law, human rights and civil liberties, political rights, and voice and 
accountability. Items included under the government effectiveness category include public financial 
management, corruption, decentralization, public service delivery, and public service reform. Items included 
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process is co-chaired by the Minister for Local Governance and a lead donor,131 and overseen 
by a joint steering committee, which is made up of donors and GoR officials. A technical 
working group, led by a think-tank called the Rwandan Governance Advisory Council 
(RGAC), supports the steering committee.  
The JGA is the first of its kind globally and attempts to satisfy both the needs of 
donors to assess governance in the contexts in which they are working and the desire for 
more country ownership of governance assessment. Figure 7.1 is taken from a report by the 
consultants that drafted the first JGA report, and depicts the individual and shared the 
concerns of donors and recipient-countries. The reader will note that the Paris Principals is 
the first joint concern listed.  
  
                                                                                                                                                  
under the “investment climate” category include ease of doing business, corporate law and governance, private 
sector advocacy, and state-business relations (JGA Report 2008). 
131 The first report was co-chaired by Victoria Kwakwa, then World Bank Country Manager, and Protais 
Musoni, then Minister of Local Government (JGA Report 2008). 
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Figure	  7.1:	  Purposes	  and	  Users	  of	  Governance	  Assessments	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Source:	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  et	  al.	  (2009,	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Motivations	  
According to several sources, the original impetus for the JGA came from “the top,” 
President Paul Kagame (Musoni 2008, slide four; Interview II-XXIV, 07.13.10). During a 
press conference, President Kagame challenged those present to create a dialogue guided by 
facts, and challenged development partners to work with the government to develop 
governance indictors. Following the press conference, the Ministry of Local Government 
(MINALOC) drafted the terms of reference and the process got underway (Interview I-XVII, 
11.10.09).  
According to Professor Anastase Syhaka, who (in his capacity as Executive Secretary 
of the Rwandan Governance Advisory Council) oversees the JGA, the JGA came about 
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largely for two reasons. First, the JGA was justified on the grounds that it would result in a 
single assessment that both the GoR and donors can support (AfricaTimes 2009). The 
Rwandan Ministry of Local Government must respond to multiple requests and visits from 
the external evaluators, consuming a large amount of time in a ministry that is already low on 
capacity. On their side, donors often spend a great deal of time funding, responding to, and 
deciding what is accurate from a myriad of reports on Rwanda. By producing one report that 
all agree on, the transaction costs of both donors and the GoR are thought to decrease.  
Second, the JGA was justified on the grounds that it would result in an assessment 
that is locally produced and context sensitive (AfricaTimes 2009). While donors often 
highlight the coordination and alignment facilitated by the JGA, the GoR has increasingly 
emphasized the need for “local” reports, contrasting the JGA with “external” governance 
assessments, such as Freedom House and the Mo Ibrahim Index. The GoR critique is that 
external reports are often based on data collected from fly-in and fly-out missions and often 
do not reflect the realities on the ground.  
While the GoR is not the first to make this critique of governance indices, their 
response is also at least partially defensive posturing. Several of my interviewees noted a 
desire by the GoR to combat negative governance reports with a report of their own. They 
pointed out that the JGA followed critical reports by the World Bank and Transparency 
International (Interview I-XVII, 11.10.09; Interview I-XVIII, 11.13.09). On external reports, 
Rwanda fairs well on indicators measuring corruption and government effectiveness. 
However, the country often gets poor marks on measures of voice and accountability, 
political rights and civil liberties (see table 4.5, pg. 71).  
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An employee of the Ministry of Local Government who was actively involved with 
the JGA’s drafting told me that one of the big reasons for the JGA was controversy. While 
some reports were saying Rwanda is doing well and has a visionary government, others were 
saying that there was no civil society involvement, no freedom of media, etc. (Interview I-
XVII, 11.10.09).132 According to another interviewee, “business was getting complicated;” 
there were two versions of the same story (Interview I-XXII, 11.16.09). Another interviewee 
put it more directly, saying that the GoR was “pissed off” at external people coming in, 
spending little to no time in Rwanda, and making judgments (Interview I-XII, 11.4.09).  
The	  drafting	  process	  
After the initial idea for the JGA was conceived, the first report took time to realize. 
One interviewee blamed the delay on “inept UNDP procurement” but securing an agency to 
take on the report also proved to be difficult. Two other agencies were hired before a UK 
firm, the Policy Practice, finally began the project in late 2007 (Interview II-XXIV, 07.13.10; 
Interview I-XXII, 11.16.09).133 Policy Practice conducted approximately a month of intense 
fieldwork before producing a first draft of the report.  
The consultants originally felt very welcomed and were told nothing was off-limits. 
However, at approximately the third meeting of the JGA steering committee, things turned 
                                                
132 The same employee also told me that the JGA came about because they (the government) were able to 
engage development partners in dialogue. Conditions on both sides allowed this. You have a government that is 
committed to open dialogue and improvements and a global focus on ownership and partnership. There was 
finally an understanding that no matter what the assessments said, in the end ownership has to be with the 
government. Have to trust the process (Interview I-XVII, 11.10.09). Another interviewee told me the fact that 
the government is open to assessment is special. It’s rare in African countries to have that openness, especially 
in the highest office, and donors didn’t think they would be open to assessment (Interview I-XXII, 11.16.09).  
133 One reportedly dropped out because of personal reasons and another because of cold feet (Interview II-
XXIV, 07.13.10). 
  
149 
contentious. Controversy over the document was eventually so high that the GoR rejected the 
first draft (Interview I-XII, 11.04.09; Interview II-XXIV, 07.13.10).  
The most controversial issues in the first draft revolved around the introduction to the 
report, which was included to provide historical and contextual background. The consultants 
originally believed (naïvely) that their comments in this section were uncontroversial, and 
were caught off-guard when they turned out to be highly contentious to the GoR.134 
Particularly difficult passages included comments about human rights abuses by both sides 
during the civil war and genocide, commentary about Rwanda being a hierarchical society, 
and a discussion about the recent change in the official language from French to English. 
Furthermore, in an attempt to be independent and credible, the first draft referenced critics of 
the regime. Such citations led the GoR to proclaim charges of genocide denial (Interview II-
XXIV, 07.13.10).135 
According to one of the original consultants, a key challenge for the Policy Practice 
was confusion regarding its intended purpose. On one hand, it was suppose to be a joint 
assessment between donors and the GoR. On the other hand, it was supposed to be an 
international report. After the first draft was rejected, the Policy Practice realized that they 
could not maintain independence, and the firm decided they could not “put their names to it.” 
They therefore shifted their role to that of a “facilitator” (Interview II-XXIV, 07.13.10). As a 
result, Policy Project did not have as much of claim on the document as originally intended 
(Interview I-III, 10.23.09). 
                                                
134 History has often been a point of contention in Rwanda, so much so that history hasn’t been taught in schools 
since 1994. As Hayman notes, “The ‘history’ proposed by the GoR is one where pre-European arrival Rwanda 
was characterized by unity and general peace and that hatred and sectarianism were sown by the Europeans” 
(Hayman 2006, 143).  
135 This is a common tactic of the regime. 
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A second report was then drafted, this one largely dropping the entire historical 
section and the discussion of ethnicity (Interview I-XII, 11.4.09).136 As one of my 
interviewees put it, the GoR went through and slashed the document (Interview I-III, 
10.23.09). The second draft (which my interviewee called a “consensus document”) was 
much better received by the GoR and was finally approved in the fall of 2008. Table 7.1 
summarizes the JGA process from the drafting of the terms of reference to the first report’s 
approval.  
Table	  7.1:	  Timeline	  of	  Joint	  Governance	  Assessment	  Report	  
Year Month Activities 
2006 December Engaged development partners; approved the terms of reference; 
formed the steering and technical committees 
2007 January Established funding mechanisms and contract management; 
DFID and EU contributed funds while UNDP managed the 
contract 
 February/October A lengthy international bidding process to procure the assessing 
firm. Policy Practice, Ltd. Finally engaged. 
2008 January Inception report examined and approved by steering committee 
Workshops and interviews begin (January 30th) 
 April 
 
Draft presented to steering committee – found inaccurate 
 July Final report examined and adopted by the steering committee 
(July 28th) 
 September Final report is sent to cabinet for consideration (Sept. 6th) and 
endorsed (Sept. 12th) 
 November Approved by donors at 2008 Development Partners Meeting 
 December Formal launch  
 
In general, I found that my interviewees expressed satisfaction with the first JGA 
report, noting its imperfections but still suggesting it was a positive step forward. One donor 
representative was highly critical of the document, telling me it was a sensitized document 
and only reflected the government’s priorities (Interview I-XXI, 11.16.09). However, another 
                                                
136 As one of my interviewees put it, there will not be agreement on Rwandan history for at least another 50 
years (Interview I-XII, 11.4.09).  
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noted that it actually dealt with a number of controversial items and allowed them to have a 
lot of frank discussions (Interview I-XII, 11.4.09).   
Moving	  forward:	  The	  future	  of	  the	  JGA	  
The first JGA report established a set of indictors for an annual governance 
assessment. The idea was to produce a yearly report that would note progress and/or 
backsliding. However, there has been no follow-up report since the original was issued in 
2008,137 even though work has been ongoing. In late 2009 and early 2010, a countrywide 
survey was conducted to collect data, and, during the summer of 2010, a new team of 
consultants began drafting a new report. However, the second report has been delayed 
several more times and, as of the time of this writing, has yet to be released. 
There are multiple reasons for the continual delays (including procurement), but my 
interviewees most often noted coordination and capacity challenges. Many of the indicators 
did not have baseline data until late 2009 or early 2010. This means that progress or 
backsliding cannot be determined until another survey is conducted in 2011 (Interview II-IV, 
06.05.10). Furthermore, the number of indicators has fluctuated. At one time, there were 
more than 400 indicators, but that number has since decreased to a more manageable 45. 
One interviewee told me that JGA process is difficult because it is hard to get people 
together; they are still figuring out everybody’s role (Interview I-VI, 10.30.09). Another told 
me that the process takes up way too much time and is not efficient. He went on to note that 
there are lots of constraints because of government capacity (Interview I-XI, 11.04.09). 
According to another interviewee, the process is challenged by issues such as the size of the 
                                                
137 It has now been recognized that an annual report is not feasible (Interview I-XVIII, 11.13.09). One of my 
interviewees suggested that the report should be biennial, although even this appears to be difficult to 
accomplish (Interview I-XI, 11.04.09). 
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committee overseeing the JGA, the fact that the government is relatively new, and that there 
are not a lot of firms with expertise in this area (Interview I-XVIII, 11.13.09).  
7.2.	  	   Findings	  
The JGA is hypothesized to allow recipient countries to be able to exercise more 
control over governance policy by allowing the GoR to have a say over the indicators that are 
used to assess their governance practices. By its very existence, the JGA gives the GoR more 
of a say over governance assessment. However, donors are in no way obliged to use the JGA. 
While several of my interviewees expressed interest in replacing their own internal 
assessments with the JGA, none have done so (at least entirely). While the JGA allows the 
GoR more influence over how they are assessed in regards to governance, donors are not 
required to listen to these assessments.  
Furthermore, my analysis of the JGA suggests three findings pertinent to the research 
questions of this dissertation. First, civil society, parliament, and local governance have not 
been active throughout the JGA process, and their recent involvement has been largely 
superficial. Second, the body that oversees the JGA, the Rwandan Government Advisory 
Council, is anything but independent from the national government. Third, the JGA and its 
related survey have been used to dismiss unfavorable reviews of the government practices. 
The following section outlines each one of these findings.  
Involvement	  by	  civil	  society,	  parliament,	  and	  local	  government	  	  
Similar to the previous case studies, my JGA case study reveals little indication that 
domestic actors outside the central government play an influential role in the process. This is 
perhaps not surprising when one notes that, despite the fact that most Rwandans do not speak 
  
153 
English, the JGA was originally written in English (it has now be translated in to 
Kinyarwanda). This suggests that the document was originally targeted towards donors and a 
more global audience, not Rwandan citizens.   
The JGA was the subject of a short case study in a document prepared for a 
conference on “Governance Assessments, Domestic Accountability and Agency Reform” in 
Madrid, Spain in 2009. The case study, based on a mission to Rwanda by the Oslo 
Governance Centre found “Low awareness and lack of involvement among national 
stakeholders beyond the executive office and ministry of local governance” (Meyer, Foerde, 
and Molanaers 2009, 13: emphasis in original). According to a short report on the case study, 
the civil society platform spokesperson told members of the fact-finding mission to Rwanda 
that the JGA was not much use to civil society, and a member of parliament told them that 
the JGA was for the executive not parliament. Additionally, they report that the ombudsman 
told them that the JGA was primarily for donor relations. Given this evidence, the case study 
claims that the JGA is driven by the executive and MINALOC. They conclude, “[t]here is 
little to no ownership of the JGA among stakeholders that are charged with oversight of the 
government, including parliament and the committees on politics and good governance, civil 
society, the ombudsman, the judiciary or the auditor general” (Meyer, Foerde, and Molanaers 
2009, 15). 
My interviewees made similar points. For example, one interviewee told me that 
although parliament is monitored by the JGA, it is not represented in discussions on JGA 
proceedings (Interview II-XV, 06.23.10). Another told me that he hasn’t seen a link between 
the JGA and parliament; they maybe working on complementary things, but not because of 
the JGA. He went on to say that research shows that civil society is not even aware of the 
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indicators; therefore, they aren’t using them. They maybe are working on some of them 
indirectly, but if they don’t know the JGA indicators are there, they can’t be using them 
(Interview II-IV, 06.05.10). 
 Another interviewee told me that, if you really want the process to be “Rwandan,” 
you need civil society involvement. Therefore, civil society is a part of the steering 
committee. However, they are not involved in the day to day; it is “not their baby.” When 
civil society is involved, it is through a representative of the Rwandan Civil Society Platform 
(see pg. 125). The representative is only one person, and that person sits on the steering 
committee. However, the real work is done on the technical committee, where they have no 
input (Interview I-XVIII, 01.13.09). As a result, civil society input on the JGA has been 
marginal to say the least.  
Independence	  of	  the	  Rwandan	  Governance	  Advisory	  Council	  	  
The JGA technical committee is chaired by a newly minted think tank called the 
Rwandan Governance Advisory Council (RGAC). Although the council was originally 
created to oversee the JGA, they are increasingly expanding their activities. Their mission 
statement reflects this larger purpose:  
The mission of the RGAC…is to promote the principals of good governance 
and monitor the practices of good governance in public institutions and 
conduct research in civic, political and corporate domains, for achieving 
institutions accountability, sustainable development and prosperity (RGAC 
n.d.). 
 
Besides overseeing the JGA, the council also organizes policy debates and provides a link 
between national, regional, and international think tanks (Interview I-V, 10.29.09). In 2010, 
the council piloted a project called the “mobile school of governance,” which translated the 
JGA from English to Kinyarwanda and brought it in to local communities.  
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The council has grown exponentially over the past year, both in terms of personnel 
and mandate. When I first visited the council in October 2009, its small staff had only two 
researchers, three support staff, and the Executive Secretary. The staff barely filled the large 
space it had recently been allotted. When I returned only eight months later, the current staff 
of fifteen was overrunning the space. The council is supposed to become a board, similar to 
the Rwandan Development Board, in the near future. This change, which would take place 
based on an act of Parliament, would expand and change the council’s mandate, as well as 
bring additional institutions under it (Interview II-XV, 06.23.10). 
The RGAC behaves in ways that make it appear to be a non-political research 
organization. It is headed by a professor (and this is always noted) and staffed by individuals 
with master’s degrees in population studies and statistics. Just recently, the RGAC introduced 
a “peer-reviewed” journal,138 and, in August 2010, the council was asked to observe the 
presidential elections and carry out research on several aspects of the electoral process.  
However, despite appearances, the RGAC is actually a government body. Despite 
repeated promises to sever ties, the RGAC remains a subsidiary of the Ministry of Local 
Government (although it has moved from its original location inside the ministry). 
Given this, it is not surprising that the RGAC often advocates for current GoR activities. 
Many of RGAC’s publications look more like campaign advertisements than 
governance assessments. A recently created Facebook page for the council is dominated by 
links to positive press on the Rwandan government, particularly President Paul Kagame,139 
and the council’s reports on governance largely ignore critics of the regime.  
                                                
138 How the peer-review process works has not be specified by the RGAC.  
139 See http://www.facebook.com/pages/Rwanda-Governance-Advisory-Council-RGAC/152531114805656  
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The first article published in the aforementioned peer-reviewed journal summarizes 
the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators for Rwanda (see table 4.5, pg. 71). 
While the paper does not completely ignore negative findings, it emphasizes areas where the 
GoR is doing well and glosses over weaknesses (RGAC 2010b). The council’s report on the 
2010 presidential elections also focuses on positive findings, completely ignoring alleged 
transgressions (RGAC 2010a). A recent publication on corruption in Rwanda (entitled 
“Promoting Good Governance in Rwanda: An Out Standing Pace Towards a Corruption-Free 
Society”) reads like a flyer for President Paul Kagame. It begins with a quote by and a photo 
of Kagame and concludes as follows:  
…different indexes (WGI, CPI, EABI, RGAC’s data) converge on the 
conclusion: Rwanda is making an outstanding pace towards a corruption-
free society, a trend that is likely to be maintained. This situation results from 
several measures that have been put in place by the Government including 
institutional setup, mindset change and adequate enforcement of rules and 
regulations that aim at completely eradicating corruption. If the trend is 
maintained, can Rwanda aspire to become a corruption-free society before 
2020? At this pace, there is no doubt that Rwanda can catch up with Asian 
tigers in control of corruption before the end of H.E Paul Kagame’s term (2010-
2017), the champion of the campaign against corruption in Rwanda (RGAC 
2011b, 5: emphasis in original). 
 
This is not to say that members of the RGAC staff are ill intentioned or uncommitted to 
better governance. However, either because the political climate does not allow them to, or 
because they are ideologically committed to the current regime, more often than not the 
council clearly acts in ways that are intended to bolster the exact government they are 
supposed to objectively assess.   
Dismissal	  of	  External	  Indices	  	  	  
The tendency of the council to advocate for the status quo is especially apparent in 
the RGAC’s response to external governance indices. RGAC staff repeatedly communicated 
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to me that external indices don’t involve them in their research. According to one 
representative of the RGAC, Freedom House and Mo Ibrahim rely on old data instead of just 
talking to ministers (Interview I-XV, 11.06.09). Consequently, “real” information is missing 
and the indices cannot be seen as valid or taken as a realistic portrayal of what is actually 
occurring on the ground. At the 2010 DPM, Kagame concluded his opening address at 
follows: 
…because we want to promote a more reciprocal approach to good 
governance and development, our Government is constantly working with 
development partners to develop mechanisms that allow parties to conduct 
evidence-based assessments of our governance systems and practices. We 
welcome your support so the real story is not missed by some so-called 
experts and governance ratings (Kagame 2010, 4: my emphasis). 
 
The external index that has received the most attention (and criticism) is the Mo 
Ibrahim Index. The Mo Ibrahim Index is billed as an “African” index of governance, and this 
has given it prominence throughout the continent. In June 2010, the Rwandan Governance 
Advisory Council invited staff members from the Mo Ibrahim Foundation to Rwanda for 
“consultative meetings” prior to the release of its 2010 index.140  
In each of the nine indices issued by Mo Ibrahim, Rwanda’s aggregate rank has been 
somewhere in the middle of the pack (ranking anywhere from 29-32). In the most current 
index, issued on October 2010, Rwanda ranked 31 out of 53, receiving high marks for 
sustainable economic opportunity, but low marks for safety and rule of law (see table 7.2). 
	  
                                                
140 The signature component of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, which was established by the wealthy Sudanese 
businessman of the same name, is its governance index. Similar to other governance indexes, such as Freedom 
House or the World Bank Good Governance Indicators, the Mo Ibrahim Index assesses African countries on a 
variety of criteria pertaining to governance. However, in contrast to other indexes, the data is not collected by 
the Index itself but is collected from a variety of other indexes and independent sources. The scores for each 
indicator are then combined to produce scores in four broad categories (safety and rule of law, participation and 
human rights, sustainable economic opportunity, and human development) and an overall score. Lastly, from 
these scores, a ranking of African countries is compiled.  
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Table	  7.2:	  Rwanda’s	  Rankings	  in	  the	  2010	  Mo	  Ibrahim	  Index	  
Ranking	  out	  of	  fifty-­‐three	  countries	  
 
Overall 2010 
Ibrahim Index 
Safety and 
Rule of Law 
Participation 
and Human 
Rights 
Sustainable 
Economic 
Opportunity 
Human 
Development 
31 39 34 10 25 
Source:	  Mo	  Ibrahim	  Foundation	  
 
I had the opportunity to observe the meetings between the RGAC, other government 
officials, and Mo Ibrahim staff.141 On one hand, the government should be praised for 
engaging the foundation. According to a staff member of Mo Ibrahim, this was the first time 
the foundation had consulted with an African government about the index, and governance 
indices certainly have problems worth exploring in a policy dialogue. However, from my 
vantage point, the meeting quickly became more about critiquing and “othering” all external 
indices than engaging on the pluses and minuses of the Ibrahim Index.  
There were a total of four sessions during the policy dialogue, one for each of the four 
broad categories of the index. A representative of the Index first presented the results for 
2010.142 Then a representative of the Governance Advisory Council responded, and the floor 
was opened to questions. The presentations by the council staff critiqued the results of the 
Mo Ibrahim report based on the argument that “local” data, most of it from the JGA and its 
corresponding surveys, showed a different picture. As the report on the dialogue puts it,  
“…it was found that some data displayed in Mo Ibrahim report were in total contradiction 
not only with recorded and updated local data but also with the reality on the ground” 
(RGAC 2011a, 4).  
                                                
141 I attended a daylong workshop and evening reception. According the report on the meeting, a smaller 
meeting also took place to following day to draft final resolutions (RGAC 2011a).  
142 The foundation, quite strategically, asked African scholars who sit on their advisory council to present the 
findings.  
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The response by Mo Ibrahim to this critique was that their index needs to have cross-
national data in order to make comparisons, and the data must come from a reputable, 
international source to be credible. Therefore, if the council and the GoR see problems with 
data used for the index, they need to supply better data to the various sources used by Mo 
Ibrahim to calculate their score. This conversation resulted in a stalemate of sorts, with the 
two sides largely talking past one another.  
What was particularly fascinating about the conversation is how quickly the 
comments from RGAC staff and other GoR representatives in attendance, particularly the 
Ombudsman, turned into a blanket critique of all external indices. Additionally, things that 
are valid critiques of governance in Rwanda, such as media freedom, were completely 
dismissed as inaccurate, and concerns about reliability and international credibility were 
outwardly ignored. 
Even more telling is how the meeting was used when the 2010 Index was released in 
October 2010. Within three days, no less than three articles in the government-leaning New 
Times blasted the Mo Ibrahim Index and a nine-page official response were released. The 
New Times first reported that: 
According to government, there was no effort at all to use some of the latest 
data collected and certified by different government bodies responsible for 
research and data collection during this year’s ranking, hence the credibility of 
the findings of the index questioned (Kagire 2010a). 
 
In another New Times article, this time an opinion piece by a Senior Economic Advisor to the 
President, the claim of bad data is reframed, this time with slightly more specificity: 
Examination of research used to arrive at the above index, leads one to 
question the methodology and variables used by Mo Ibrahim Foundation to 
arrive at their inconclusive index of governance in Africa. African data 
sources used in social research such as this one, have been known to be 
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inaccurate, thus increasing the margin of error, that finally distorts results 
obtained from such research (Mamasseh 2010). 
 
In a third article, this time authored by Professor Syhaka, the claim is of bad data is driven 
home along with the “we told them so” argument: 
What is clear is that is that the index is not based on facts. Even on the last Mo 
Ibrahim report, the government reacted over data discrepancies. We showed 
them areas where there were data discrepancies, they promised to make sure 
to rely on more accurate data next time…If you analyze properly you see that 
whoever fills in this data has a plan to undermine or deliberately soil the 
image of the country (quoted in Kagire 2010b, my emphasis). 
 
Professor Syhaka’s statement also personalizes the index’s findings, arguing that the use of 
bad data is intentional and malicious. This follows a pattern identified by Reyntjens, who 
argues that, “Voices critical of the regime become victims of character assassination, 
intimidation or even physical threat” (2004, 202).143  
The attack continued at the November 2010 Development Partners Meeting, where 
James Musoni, the current Minister of Local Government, proclaimed that  “Some external 
people and NGOs use baseless frameworks and indexes and have been misrepresenting 
Rwanda’s governance status” (Musoni 2010, slide 8). Musoni went on to argue that the major 
external challenges to governance include:  
• Some groups/ “experts” consistently define Rwanda contrary to our nation 
building policy and process;  
• Mindset of “One size fits all” infringing on our freedom to define our political 
system (consensus vs. majoritarian);  
• Negative/ biased reports and indexes on Rwanda’s governance  
                                                
143 For example, the GoR condemned the International Crisis Group after they issued a report very critical of the 
democratization process in Rwanda. The GoR issued a statement, claiming that “For the last two years, 
International Crisis Group (ICG) has persistently waged a misinformation campaign designed to not only 
malign the Government of Rwanda, but also to undermine the efforts of the Rwandan people regarding national 
unity and reconciliation.” They go on to name particular ICG officials claiming that they “deliberately used the 
ICG to advance the destructive agenda of negative organizations, including known and recorded terrorist 
groups…” (GoR 2002b).  
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• Resistance to accept country’s socio-economic and political transformation 
(Musoni 2010, slide 21). 
 
Musoni contrasted these challenges to local challenges, such as poverty.  
Instead of fostering a debate about governance in Rwanda, it appears that the JGA is 
sometimes used to defend current practices and avoid addressing critiques. As one 
interviewee told me, the government often rejects criticism; they want to be seen as perfect. 
(Interview I-XI, 11.04.09). (He went on to speculate that they are trying to prevent 
opposition.) Instead of inviting debate and discourse on governance, the JGA appears to 
allow the GoR an opportunity to control the debate on governance.  
7.3.	   Concluding	  Remarks	  
Table 7.3 maps the findings of this case study on to the dependent variables of this 
dissertation. The findings are slightly different from the previous case studies, as donors 
appear more willing to let the GoR lead policy decision-making processes on governance 
than those on development and aid policy. This is not necessarily surprising, given some 
donors’ reluctance to get overly-involved with governance issues in recipient-countries, 
particular in contexts like Rwanda that have a history of conflict and violence. 
Table	  7.3:	  Summary	  of	  Findings	  
 Government 
Policymakers 
Donors Citizens 
Changes in influence 
over governance policy: 
The executive is largely 
unchallenged publically 
by donors regarding 
governance practices. 
Donors remain very 
moderately involved in 
governance policy 
Citizen influence over 
governance policy 
decisions remains low.   
 
This does not mean that donors are completely passive regarding governance. As was 
noted in chapter five, both the Swedes and the Dutch withdrew budget support due to 
concerns over Rwandan military activity in the DRC. However, donors often remain 
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relatively silent on governance issues in Rwanda, at least publicly. One interviewee told me, 
the government doesn’t respond well to criticism, but things will sometimes change if they 
are pointed out discreetly. She went on to note that donors have been remarkably silent on 
current events, referring to the tensions surrounding the 2010 presidential elections 
(Interview II-XXII, 07.02.10). 
Even more clearly, the JGA has further centralized debates on governance at the 
national level. Civil society, local governments, and even parliament are largely excluded 
from debates of consequence on governance in Rwanda. Political competition remains low, 
as do domestic accountability mechanisms. As a result, citizen influence over governance 
policy remains small. 
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Chapter	  8 	  Conclusion	  
  
The analyses presented in the previous chapters of this dissertation suggests that new 
aid programs designed to foster ownership in post-genocide and civil war Rwanda have not 
actually led to ownership, as idealized by the OECD and other bilateral and multilateral 
donors. Instead, aid programs, such as budget support or the Joint Governance Assessment, 
have resulted in what I call in this chapter “centralized collaboration.” By this, I mean a 
condition in which multilateral and bilateral donors work with a small group of domestic 
actors to design and implement socio-economic development schemes.  
In this concluding chapter, I first summarize the empirical analysis found in chapters 
four through seven of this dissertation. My case studies of ownership aid programs in 
Rwanda suggest that government policymakers actively seek to influence decision-making 
processes. However, the aid programs have not resulted in the outcomes predicted by 
proponents of the ownership approach in two key ways. 
 One, donors have not retreated, nor given control over development to recipient 
countries; rather they have sought alternative ways of influencing the policy process. Two, 
what we see emerging in Rwanda is not broad national ownership. Instead, donors work with 
an elite group of government policymakers. I call this type of aid relationship “centralized 
collaboration,” and contrast it to the old “donorship” relationship and the idealized 
“ownership” relationship outlined in chapter two of this dissertation.  
I then argue that evidence from my case studies suggests that the new relationship 
between donors and the GoR is largely the result of three things: donor preferences, the 
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amount of leverage the GoR is able to exert over donors, and existing state-society 
relationships. Given that there are several unique features of the Rwandan case, my findings 
regarding the impact of the ownership approach in Rwanda are unlikely to be directly 
generalizable to other cases; i.e., we will not necessarily find the exact same outcome in all 
aid-dependent states. However, I argue there are broad similarities between many aid-
dependent states and these three factors (donor preferences, leverage, and state-society 
relations) provide a framework for assessing and analyzing donor-government relationships 
and ownership aid programs in other aid-dependent states.  
I conclude by outlining four policy implications of my findings. One, the recent 
emphasis on ownership within international development is laced with faulty assumptions. 
Two, while donor-government relationships are susceptible to change, change is likely to 
occur around the periphery rather than at the core. Three, when considering the impact of 
ownership aid programs, it is important to consider the existing political context. Four, 
ownership aid programs do not solve the broken feedback loop in foreign assistance. Each of 
these policy implications are important for development practitioners to keep in mind.  
8.1.	   Centralized	  Collaboration	  	  	  
Collectively, my analysis of ownership aid programs in Rwanda suggests that such 
programs have altered the nature of government-donor relationships in Rwanda—but not in 
the ways predicted. Donor influence has not declined but has instead changed form. 
Additionally, citizen influence remains low. In the following section, I first summarize my 
empirical findings, tying together the three cases studies presented in the previous chapters. I 
then argue that what we see emerging in Rwanda is not ownership (nor donorship), but what 
I call “centralized collaboration.” 
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Summary	  of	  empirical	  findings	  	  
My case studies of ownership aid programs suggest that, in Rwanda, government 
policymakers actively seek to influence the decision-making process. Through initiatives 
such as the Aid Policy (pg. 116), the Division of Labour (pg. 131), and the Donor 
Performance Assessment Framework (pg. 100), the GoR has asserted itself into decision-
making processes that have historically been dominated by donors. 
My interviewees were often quick to point this out. For example, one interviewee 
noted that, in Rwanda, there is strong leadership, and they know how they want to guide you. 
She went on to say that the GoR is very confident and “tells us no sometimes” (Interview I-
VII, 10.30.09). As another interviewee suggested, this likely makes Rwanda interesting and 
different from than other places (Interview II-XXIII, 07.02.10). 
By presenting themselves in this manner, the GoR fulfills Whitfield and her 
colleagues’ ownership criteria of non-negotiability and confidence (Whitfield 2009). The 
drive and rhetoric of the GoR regarding ownership has caught the attention of Rwandan 
donors and has resulted in a language of partnerships and collaboration in Kigali. However, 
ownership aid programs have not resulted in the outcomes predicted by proponents of the 
ownership approach in two key ways.  
One, donors have not retreated in the way often assumed by proponents of ownership. 
Rather than granting control to government policymakers, evidence from my case studies 
suggests that, in Rwanda, donors have merely sought additional means of influencing the 
policy process. For example, they have increased technical assistance, stepped-up the policy 
dialogue, and developed joint initiatives with the GoR.  
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As outlined in chapter two, donors’ unwillingness to relinquish their influence is not 
surprising. Asking donors to give up their influence in aid-dependent states amounts to 
asking them to voluntarily give up control over vast sums of money that they are charged 
with using wisely for diplomatic, development, and/or commercial purposes. Not only is this 
unlikely, but it is not necessarily optimal from a development standpoint. It would, in 
essence, amount to granting complete control over vast amounts of money to states suffering 
from a variety of political and economic challenges. 
However, this finding does challenge a narrative that is increasingly emerging from 
Rwandan scholars, which depicts Rwanda as having “policy independence,” despite a great 
deal of aid dependence (Zorbas 2011). It is clear that the GoR often asserts itself and has 
attempted to gain more influence over policy decision-making in Rwanda. As Straus and 
Waldorf note, 
The RPF skillfully plays international donors: it exploits donor guilt over the 
genocide, invokes the Paris Principals on aid effectiveness, makes defiant 
assertions about Western neo-colonialism and Rwandan self-reliance, and 
adopts donor preferences and rhetoric on issues its considers peripheral and 
unthreatening (like gender mainstreaming) (2011, 15).  
 
However, this does not mean that donors have simply given up their influence, or that the 
GoR has “policy independence.”  
The GoR’s hard line on donor influence has likely been somewhat effective regarding 
donor involvement in governance, where donors are less likely to challenge the GoR for fear 
of the unknown and renewed violence. However, regarding economic issues, the GoR has not 
pushed donors aside. Instead, donors and the GoR often work in highly collaborative ways 
that appear to be mutually beneficial. Instead of donors retreating, many have merely 
changed their means of influence, working with the state instead of issuing commands from 
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above. In other words, the nature of donor-government relationships has changed in Rwanda; 
not because donors have given up their influence, but because they have changed their 
tactics. This allows the GoR to maintain a hard line on donor involvement, and donors to 
appear to be upholding the Paris Principals. Under this arrangement, donors get to maintain 
their influence, while the GoR retains billions of dollars in development aid. 
Second, what we see emerging in Rwanda is not broad national ownership. Instead, 
donors work with an elite group of government policymakers. As one interviewee told me, 
Rwanda relies on a small group of highly-skilled people (Interview I-VIII, 11.02.09). The 
case studies presented in the previous chapters suggest that ownership aid programs only 
exacerbate centralization in Rwanda. Poverty reduction strategies, budget support, and the 
ACHA framework strengthen the authority of the Ministry of Finance, and the JGA allows 
for the discourse on governance in Rwanda to be further regulated and controlled.  
It is unclear how much of this is intentional. As one interviewee pointed out, when 
donors need quick results (two to three years) they work with government (Interview I-
XVIII, 01.13.09). Capacity remains low in Rwanda and civil society has not strongly asserted 
itself. Therefore, when and if particular government agencies assert themselves, it seems 
reasonable for donors to latch on to these bodies. At the same time, it does seem likely that 
the current regime deliberately seeks out ways to perpetuate its authority in Rwanda.  
Regardless of intentions, it is clear that the average Rwandan’s influence on policy 
remains marginal. As one interviewee put it, ownership is serious here, but where is the 
strength in the system? It is all very top down. Rwandans are not really involved. There are 
key persons in the ministries that drive all the thinking. There is not enough involvement by 
others. It’s a very autocratic way of doing things (Interview II-XIII, 06.18.10). 
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Neither	  donorship	  nor	  ownership	  
Historically, donors have sought to influence development from the outside. Under 
the “donorship” approach, donors either used monetary incentives and top-down 
conditionalities to pressure recipient countries to make what they saw as needed reforms, or 
funded stand-alone, donor-determined aid projects. Both are now thought to lead to 
development strategies that are unsustainable and out of touch with the actual needs of aid 
beneficiaries.  
Alternatively, under the new ownership approach, control is thought to shift to 
recipient countries. Instead of donors calling the shots, recipient countries are supposed to 
dictate the terms of their own development through an inclusive process involving multiple 
domestic actors. This is supposed to close the broken feedback loop in foreign assistance, 
allowing aid beneficiaries to have a say over the development policies and practices that 
impact their daily lives. 
However, the situation in Rwanda looks like neither the old donorship approach, nor 
the new ownership approach. Instead, my case studies of ownership aid programs in Rwanda 
suggest that the new emphasis on ownership has resulted in an alternative aid relationship, 
which I call “centralized collaboration.” Under this type of aid relationship, policy decision-
making is a result of input from a select group of domestic actors in close collaboration with 
donors (see table 8.1). 
Table	  8.1:	  Alternative	  Aid	  Relationships	  
 Policy decision-making is a result of… 
Donorship: donor priorities and demands. 
Ownership: an inclusive process, involving multiple domestic actors. 
Centralized 
Collaboration: 
input from a select group of domestic actors in close 
collaboration with donors 
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Instead of pressuring from the outside, donors increasingly exert influence from the 
inside. Donors, particularly those who advocate for ownership approaches, increasingly 
appear to engage with the state. Instead of working against it, they work with it and through 
it. The result has been a relationship between donors and the GoR that is less hierarchical and 
outwardly antagonistic. However, Rwandan donors are certainly not subservient to the 
government. Instead of relinquishing authority, donors merely shift their role to one that that 
is less visible and more technical. This qualitative change was most apparent in those donors, 
like the United Kingdom, that emphasize ownership.  
At the same time, my case studies suggest that, rather than opening up the Rwandan 
political space, the new emphasis on ownership has further centralized authority into the 
hands of a select group of domestic actors. While the emphasis on ownership has not led 
donors to abandon their influence over the policy process completely, it has given the GoR 
an opening. Ownership aid programs have integrated top GoR officials into policy decision-
making processes, but this has not translated into broad domestic participation. Domestic 
groups, such as civil society groups, have recently been invited to sit at the table. However, 
my case studies suggest that their involvement is typically only symbolic or a way of 
“sensitizing” such actors to the agenda already decided on by the executive. 
8.2.	   Towards	  better	  theory	  and	  development	  policy	  
In the previous section, I argued that a type of new aid relationship, which I call 
centralized collaboration, has emerged in Rwanda. This aid relationship is qualitative 
different than “donorship,” but it is also different from the “ownership” idealized in 
international development circles. In this section, I address the broader question, why has this 
new relationship emerged? 
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The objective of this section is to clarify what the Rwandan case has to say about 
ownership and government-donor relationships more broadly and to address how transferable 
the findings of this dissertation are likely to be. Given that there are several unique features 
of the Rwandan case, we may not see the exact same type of aid relationship emerging in all 
aid-dependent states. However, my case studies are suggestive of a broader framework for 
understanding donor-government relationships and assessing how ownership aid programs 
play out in other aid-dependent countries. Additionally, they suggest several policy 
implications that are important for development practitioners to keep in mind.   
A	  framework	  for	  understanding	  donor-­‐government	  relationships	  
 Based on evidence from my case studies, in this dissertation I argue that what we see 
emerging in Rwanda is not “ownership” but “centralized collaboration.” By the latter, I mean 
a condition where policy decision-making is the result of input from a select group of 
domestic actors in close collaboration with donors. But, why did such a relationship emerge 
in Rwanda, and how likely is it to emerge elsewhere? 
 Throughout this dissertation, I note several factors and mechanisms that contributed 
to the emergence of this new type of aid relationship; some are unique to Rwanda, while 
others are found in aid-dependent countries around the world. However, broadly speaking, 
my case studies suggest that the new relationship between donors and the GoR is largely the 
result of three things: individual donor preferences, the amount of leverage the GoR is able 
to exert over donors, and existing state-society relationships. These three factors provide a 
framework for assessing and analyzing donor-government relationships and ownership aid 
programs in other aid-dependent countries.  
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First, my dissertation suggests that individual donor preferences shape donor-
government relationships. As we saw in the Rwandan case, different donors have different 
preferences. Some, such as the United Kingdom, prefer to work closely with the state and 
have ideologies that closely align with the promises of ownership. Others, such as the United 
States, have maintained a more traditional approach to development. While both rhetorically 
support “ownership,” the UK’s preference for working with the state has changed the 
relationship between the GoR and the UK, while the US’s relationship has remained 
relatively stagnate. As a result, while both clearly have an interest in influencing the policy 
process in Rwanda, the tactics of the UK have changed more than the tactics of the US.  
Donor preferences are likely to remain somewhat constant in all aid-dependent states, 
because they are a characteristic of the donor not a characteristic of the country where the 
donor is working. For example, the UK and the US tend to work in similar ways and 
implement similar aid programs in the countries were they operate. That being said, donor 
preferences may change in different contexts based on country-specific events or the agenda 
and legacy of a donor in the country. For example, if a donor has strategic or commercial 
interests in a recipient-county, they may be more inclined to ignore transgressions. 
Additionally, not all donors are active in all aid dependents states, particular since many 
donors are attempting to target and concentrate their aid. My research suggests that before 
one begins to analyze donor-government relationships or diagnose the likely outcomes of 
ownership aid programs, it is important for researchers and practitioners to identify and 
categorize donor preferences in the aid-dependent country being scrutinized.  
 Second, my dissertation suggests that how much leverage the recipient-country is able 
to exert over donors is an important factor in understanding donor-government relationships. 
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Unlike some aid-dependent states, the GoR has maintained a strong line on ownership, 
asserting itself not only rhetorically but also through the implementation of programs such as 
the Division of Labour and the Rwandan Aid Policy. A legacy of donor guilt from the 
genocide, as well as a strong record of economic performance has only bolstered the GoR 
claims for ownership. The GoR’s leverage is not absolute and is challenged by high-levels of 
aid dependence. Additionally, my case studies suggest that the GoR has more leverage in 
certain areas than others (e.g., governance). However, the leverage they do possess proved to 
be important factor in the relationships that emerged between the GoR and its donors.  
On this factor, there is likely a good deal of variation between aid-dependent states. 
Leverage may depend of contextual factors, such as the genocide. However, leverage is also 
likely to be related to who is in power in the recipient-country, and the government’s 
bargaining position relative to its donors. The latter likely depends not only on the country’s 
aggregate level of aid-dependence, but also on how dependent the country is on individual 
donors. For example, does the country receive the majority of its aid from one or two donors, 
or does aid come from multiple donors?  
Third, my dissertation suggests that existing state-society relations shape the impact 
of ownership programs. The aid programs analyzed in this dissertation were implemented in 
a tightly regulated and hierarchical political context that has a legacy of violent conflict 
between groups. Additionally, historically, civil society has not strongly asserted itself into 
political spaces. As a result, donors seeking domestic partnerships have largely allied with 
the government, cementing existing power dynamics rather than changing them.  
However, if the political space of the recipient-country is more open or if there are 
more domestic veto players, the impact of ownership aid programs will likely be different. In 
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contexts where power is decentralized or where civil society is vibrant, ownership aid 
programs may allow broader domestic participation and influence. That being said, it is not 
unusual for aid-dependent states to have autocratic tendencies; therefore, there maybe more 
cases that look like Rwanda in this regard than cases that do not.  
In all aid-dependent counties, the recipient-country government relies on donors to 
provide support for fundamental services and goods, without which the state would collapse. 
This is implied in the very definition of an aid-dependent country. At the same time, donor 
agencies rely on the existence of the aid-dependent state to stay in business. Additionally, 
their reputation as an organization and, in the case of bilateral donors, the country they 
represent relies on the success or failure of their programs (and the country as a whole). As a 
result, in all aid-dependent countries, donors and recipient-countries are tightly linked and 
such links are unlikely to be severed anytime soon. 
My research suggests that alternative donor-government relationships and differences 
between the outcomes of ownership aid programs are likely to come from variation in donor 
preferences, the amount of leverage of the recipient-country government has over donors, 
and existing state-society relations. When analyzing the likely impact of ownership aid 
programs and donor-government relationships in other country contexts, these are the factors 
that one should focus on.  
Policy	  implications	  
Given that my dissertation is concerned with a dominant policy practice within the 
international development community, it is also important to consider the policy implications 
of my findings. My findings are not definitive enough to suggest a wholesale rejection of any 
particular policy or practice. However, they do suggest a number of things that development 
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practitioners ought to keep in mind when designing and implementing ownership aid 
programs.  
First, my findings suggest that the recent emphasis on ownership within international 
development is laced with faulty assumptions. Each of the potentially problematic 
assumptions laid out in chapter two were validated by my analysis of ownership aid 
programs in Rwanda. This suggests that ownership, as it is currently discussed in the 
development literature, is relatively ill conceived. If donors choose to implement ownership 
aid programs, they need to be more upfront about the changes they wish to see and the 
potential limitations of the programs.  
Second, my findings suggest that, while donor-government relationships are 
susceptible to change, change is likely to occur around the periphery rather than at the core. 
Regardless of the aid program being implemented, donors retain interests and preferences in 
aid-dependent states. If a recipient country strongly asserts itself, they may succeed in 
changing the contours of their relationship with donors. However, donors will not simply 
retreat but will likely seek alternative means of influencing the policy process. These changes 
are meaningful, and should be accounted for by theory; however, they do not change the fact 
that donors remain part and parcel of decision-making structures in aid-dependent states.  
 Third, my findings suggest that, when considering the impact of ownership aid 
programs, it is important to consider the existing political context. Where authority lies is not 
likely to change drastically on account of the introduction of ownership aid programs. If 
anything, these programs might exacerbate an existing centralization of authority within the 
recipient-country, as we see happening in Rwanda. Therefore, it is important to first survey 
the existing political climate when considering the impact of ownership aid programs. 
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 Fourth, ownership aid programs do not solve the broken feedback loop problem in 
foreign assistance. Even when ownership aid programs do give more influence to domestic 
actors, they do not inherently foster a more inclusive feedback loop. In the best-case 
scenario, ownership aid programs may permit high-level government policymakers to give 
feedback. However, there is little evidence that ownership aid programs will allow citizens –
the supposed beneficiaries of development – to provide feedback on development programs 
and aid policy.   
8.3.	  	   Concluding	  Remarks	  
The new global emphasis on ownership is predicted to make the policy decision-
making processes in aid-dependent countries less donor-driven and more inclusive of a wide 
array of domestic actors. Doing so is predicted to make aid more effective by allowing 
beneficiaries more input over their own development. If aid is demand-driven, it ought to 
actually respond to the needs of the population better, increasing the rate of development in 
the world’s poorest countries.  
However, in my dissertation research, I find little evidence that ownership aid 
programs have resulted in the outcomes predicted by their proponents. While my findings are 
not necessarily directly transferable to other contexts, they do suggest several inherent 
limitations to new ownership aid programs and challenge the idea that the new emphasis on 
ownership, at least in its current incarnation, will actually improve aid effectiveness. Instead, 
my research in Rwanda suggests that, at times, “ownership” may actually exacerbate traits of 
foreign aid believed to hinder its effectiveness.  
The dissertation also raises several other interesting questions such as, why do 
ownership programs increase donor influence in some cases? What types of aid relationships 
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are most conducive to economic growth and development? Can donor-government 
relationships be altered to help with institutional challenges, such as commitment problems 
or broken feedback loops? Research in each of these areas would extend the findings of this 
dissertation in important and interesting ways.  
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  1:	  List	  of	  Interviews	  
 
Interview 
Number 
Date of 
Interview 
Ministry or Agency Represented  
 
Fall 2009 
  I-I 10.15.09 World Vision 
I-II  10.19.09  KfW - German Development Bank 
I-III 10.23.09 United States Agency for International Development  
I-IV 10.28.09  Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency  
I-V 10.29.09 Rwandan Governance Advisory Council  
I-VI 10.30.09 United Nations Developing Programme 
I-VII 10.30.09 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
I-VIII 11.02.09 Norwegian People’s Aid 
I-IX 11.03.09 Search for Common Ground 
I-X 11.03.09 Rwandan Governance Advisory Council 
I-XI 11.04.09 European Commission 
I-XII 11.04.09 Department for International Development, United Kingdom  
I-XIII 11.05.09 United Nations Developing Programme/Rwandan Parliament 
I-XIV 11.06.09 United Nations Developing Programme 
I-XV 11.06.09 Rwandan Governance Advisory Council 
I-XVI 11.10.09 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
I-XVII 11.10.09  Ministry of Local Government 
I-XVIII 11.13.09 European Commission 
I-XIX 11.13.09 United States Agency for International Development 
I-XX 11.13.09 African Development Bank 
I-XXI 11.16.09 Canadian International Development Agency  
I-XXII 11.16.09 World Bank 
I-XXIII 11.19.09  Ministry of Economic Planning and Finance 
   
  Summer 2010 
 II-I 06.01.10 Ministry of Economic Planning and Finance 
II-II 06.01.10 Aid Coordination Unit (United Nations/MINECOFIN) 
II-III 06.03.10  Civil Society Platform 
II-IV 06.05.10  L’institut de Recherche et de Dialogue pour la Paix 
II-V 06.05.10  Ministry of Economic Planning and Finance 
II-VI 06.08.10  Rwandan Governance Advisory Council 
II-VII 06.08.10 Rwandan Governance Advisory Council 
II-VIII 06.09.10 United States Agency for International Development 
II-IX 06.10.10 World Bank  
II-X 06.10.10 Department for International Development, United Kingdom 
II-XI 06.16.10 United Nations Developing Programme 
II-XII 06.18.10 Netherlands Embassy, Rwanda 
II-XIII 06.18.10 Belgian Embassy, Rwanda 
  
178 
II-XIV 06.22.10 Action Aid Rwanda 
II-XV 06.23.10 Independent Consultant 
II-XVI 06.23.10 KfW - German Development Bank  
II-XVII 06.24.10 Japan International Cooperation Agency 
II-XVIII 06.24.10 Japan International Cooperation Agency 
II-XIX 06.29.10 Norwegian People’s Aid 
II-XX 06.29.10 United Nations Development Programme 
II-XXI 07.02.10 Ministry of Economic Planning and Finance 
II-XXII 07.02.10 Trocaire/INGO Network 
II-XXIII 07.02.10 KfW - German Development Bank 
II-XXIV 07.13.10 Policy Practice 
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  2:	  Primary	  Documents	  
 
Most of the government documents listed below are available online at the Rwandan 
Development Partners Website (http://www.devpartners.gov.rw/). For documentation not 
available online, please contact the author (hjswedlu@maxwell.syr.edu).  
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  3:	  Aid	  Dependent	  States	  
Aid-­‐Dependent	  States	  
Average	  ODA	  as	  a	  %	  of	  GNI,	  2000-­‐2008	  
	   Moderately	  Aid-­‐Dependent	  States	  	  
Average	  ODA	  as	  a	  %	  of	  GNI	  
2000-­‐2008	  
Liberia 61.0  Cambodia 9.7 
Micronesia 42.8  Benin 9.3 
Timor-Leste 42.4  Comoros 8.8 
Burundi 38.0  Chad 8.8 
Marshall Islands 36.3  Senegal 8.5 
Afghanistan 34.8  Central African Republic 8.2 
Guinea-Bissau 34.6  Dominica 7.9 
Sierra Leone 32.5  Guinea 7.5 
Solomon Islands 30.0  Bolivia 7.3 
Eritrea 28.9  Congo, Rep. 7.0 
West Bank and Gaza 28.0  Serbia 6.8 
Mozambique 26.7  Cambodia 9.7 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 26.7  Benin 9.3 
Sao Tome and Principe 24.1  Comoros 8.8 
Palau 21.5  Chad 8.8 
Malawi 21.1  Senegal 8.5 
Rwanda 21.1  Central African Republic 8.2 
Nicaragua 17.8  Dominica 7.9 
Zambia 17.2  Guinea 7.5 
Mauritania 16.5  Bolivia 7.3 
Guyana 16.4  Congo, Rep. 7.0 
Cape Verde 15.4  Serbia 6.8 
The Gambia 14.7  Armenia 6.8 
Kiribati 14.6  Papua New Guinea 6.5 
Ethiopia 14.5  Bosnia and Herzegovina 6.4 
Niger 14.2  Honduras 6.3 
Uganda 14.1  Moldova 6.2 
Mali 13.9  Nepal 6.2 
Tanzania 13.8  Georgia 6.1 
Burkina Faso 13.5  Lesotho 5.8 
Vanuatu 13.4  Cameroon 5.7 
Madagascar 13.1  Jordan 5.5 
Lao PDR 12.7    
Mongolia 12.6    
Tonga 12.4    
Djibouti 11.6  Data	  compiled	  from	  World	  Bank	  
World	  Development	  Indicators.	  
Available	  at:	  	  
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
Bhutan 11.5  
Kyrgyz Republic 11.3  
Ghana 11.2  
Tajikistan 11.2  
Samoa 11.0  
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